

Vladimir Ivanov

The Philosophy of Survival



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ВОЙНА, МИР И ПРОГРЕСС ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСТВА

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CONTENTS

Introduction	5
PART ONE. WAR AND HISTORY	11
1. The Social Essence of War	11
2. War in the Nuclear Age	22
3. National Security and Military Doctrine	34
4. The Road to the New Thinking	47
PART TWO. SEARCH FOR A JUST PEACE	62
1. The Philosopher's View of Universal Peace	62
2. From the World Revolution to the Non-Aggression Pact	73
3. Break-up of the Old System	85
4. The Road to a Non-Violent World	95
PART THREE. SURVIVAL AND SOCIAL PROGRESS	107
1. Marxism and the New Political Thinking	107
2. The Optimism of History	117
3. The Philosophy of Trust	128
4. Development Through Disarmament	138
In Lieu of a Conclusion: The Outlook for Progress	151

INTRODUCTION

It was the 23rd of September 1987. A live Moscow-Washington television debate, with deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet and US Congressmen posing their questions, the situation growing tenser and more aggravating, both sides firing charges at each other, an American Senator asking Marshal Akhromeyev, then Soviet Chief of General Staff, if he thought a nuclear war was winnable.

The Marshal chuckled, and said:

"I've told the Senator in a private conversation we had, and can tell him again publicly: to my mind there will be neither winners nor losers in a nuclear war if, God forbid, it should ever break out."

A flutter of satisfaction on the Soviet side. No comments on the American side. The discussion continued...

The above is graphic evidence that the new political thinking is no longer wishful thinking. It is the guideline followed by Soviet political leaders and, indeed, Soviet military men in key positions. Though military men, by virtue of their calling, should, one would think, be dedicated to war preparations.

No winners in a nuclear war, said President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in their joint statement in Geneva, echoing yet another conclusion, arrived at after an arduous and dramatic period of history, namely, that in the nuclear age war cannot be a means of politics because its outbreak will mean the end of all politics. As Professor John Galbraith¹ once said, if such a war breaks out, it would be impossible to distinguish between the ashes of socialism and the ashes of capitalism.

Today, we agree with him completely.

Today, it is essential to prevent the destruction of civilization, and to secure the survival and prosperity of humankind.

Yet, by reason of ignorance or complacency or, for that matter, by dint of a refined cynicism, there are still people who dis-

agree with the new thinking. Not until it becomes part of the universal mentality, the basis of the world outlook of every member of the human race, will we be able to say it has triumphed over prejudice and the thought habits fashioned by thousands of years of war and strife.

The new thinking reflects a fresh vision of the problems and dangers facing civilization today. It is centered on overcoming the historical class-based or national or regional limitations of human knowledge. Humankind must at long last realize that it is a single whole, and renounce prejudices that were shaped by the longtime isolation and antagonism between various human communities.

The new thinking is not an aim in itself. It is a means of survival, the door to further progress. Theory, Marx wrote, becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses.² And we will do everything we can to make the new political thinking a force that will put an end to wars and violence. A non-violent world is a supremely human aim set themselves by Communists and their allies in the drive for peace and goodwill, survival, and further human progress.

Today, the human race is divided into countries and social systems with opposite interests. But the world it lives in is interdependent. No country and no system can prosper in isolation from the rest of humankind. There must be cooperation. Yet cooperation is impossible without confidence. Such is the fabric of what we might describe as the world process. Argue if you must, but never carry matters to the extreme of mutual suicide, for then no one will be left to decide who was right and who was wrong.

The thousands of years of fragmentation caused by the low level of production of necessities, have done people an ill service. They created a system of international relations based on inequality, injustice, egoism, and violence. For ages, the interests of separate communities dominated over universal human interests. Worse still, they contradicted them. General violence, a war of every man against every man, as Thomas Hobbes³ put it, is still conceived by much too many people as the only possible and eternal condition of the world.

The peril of nuclear war has, admittedly, made some people reflect on what such a condition may lead to nowadays. Weapons, of which there were many different types in history, are now able to terminate history. Something is very wrong. Emergency measures are called for to rectify the situation.

For the first time in history, the dream of an eternally non-violent world has turned into a concrete political objective, one that brooks no delay, for a second opportunity to attain it will hardly arise.

All too many people in West and East still think a nuclear-weapons-free and secure world is an unrealistic, utopian aim. A most convenient attitude this, for it permits sceptics to stay on the sidelines and watch others try to halt humanity's drift to the edge of the abyss. The funny thing is that if the sceptics turn out to have been right, they will never learn they were.

"Alas," Mikhail Gorbachev wrote, "many influential forces still cling to outdated notions of how to ensure national security. As a result, the world is in the absurd position of being insistently told that the road to the abyss is the best road."⁴

We can only hope the dynamic realities will help those influential forces to change their tack before it is too late.

Those who believe in the new thinking will continue to promote the understanding that civilization exists in new conditions. History has shown that aims which initially looked unrealistic were achieved by virtue of the dedication and perseverance of the minority.

The new political thinking is in essence universal. No single side can monopolize it. It is opposed to any and all class-based or national exclusiveness and one-sidedness. It would be wrong to think the aim has been achieved if the new thinking is adopted by one side only, while the other clings to the old outlook. The Soviets do not claim the truth is exclusively theirs. They hope the gravitation towards dialogue and cooperation is stronger than the trend towards hostility and isolation. In the long run, members of all political currents and ideologies must contribute to the new thinking.

For us, too, acceptance of the new thinking is no easy matter. We, too, must climb over stereotypes and prejudices that piled up over the hundred-odd years of the revolutionary movement. We, too, must renounce views that no longer conform with the conditions and aims of humanity's and not only socialism's survival.

I think it was not simple at all for Marshal Akhromeyev to say there can be neither winners nor losers in a nuclear war. To say so was to contradict past experience, to contradict the training and psychology of a military man. But there is no other way. And Communists, including army generals, practice the new thinking for all the world to see, calling on others to do the same.

The new thinking is inconceivable if there is no openness, glasnost, and democracy. This also applies to analysis of Soviet foreign policy which had, for a long time, been effectually closed to any critical examination. But no people, no political force on earth is unerring and immaculate. Nothing is easier than to hurl charges at the Americans. We must see if, perhaps, blame also devolves on the Soviet side.

Soviet scholars are doing so. Not to please Sovietologists abroad, but to draw conclusions for the future from the past, including negative, experience. So as not to repeat mistakes that were largely caused by the old political thinking which was inevitably restricted by class-based and national (even here-and-now) interests.

I hasten to make the following reservation, addressed to those who might think critical analysis of past mistakes is tantamount to renunciation of socialist positions. To my mind, it is wrong to think that the many mistakes made in the past were rooted in any socialist principles. They were much sooner the result of socialism's underdevelopment, the immaturity of the socialist mentality, and of subjective factors. Today, the Soviet public sees things in a different light. This is incontestable evidence of a certain maturity of socialism, of the public mentality, the human factor.

That Marxists today can on principle critically assess past mistakes shows that Marxist theory has made headway, that it has advanced to a deeper understanding of the laws that govern the evolution of society. An essential and natural process if Marxists want to keep abreast of the times.

Humanity has laboured long and hard, with often tragic repercussions, before it attained the new thinking. On both sides of the dividing line were people hamstrung by their class allegiance. This determined their actions and reactions. Nothing could be more senseless than to accuse them of anything today, from the height of the new thinking, and doubly so if we remember that our generation, too, is not the end of evolution and that our truths are not absolute either. History requires an objective study—without blank spots or forgotten personalities—showing the mistakes as well as the achievements. It must serve the present. Yet, since the most important thing today is to assure humanity's survival in face of the many global problems, the facts of history cited in this book are meant to show how complicated and long the road has been to the new political thinking or, to be precise, the road to survival.

A few words about my presentation. I am a professional philosopher, and whatever I might produce will reflect the virtues and vices of the philosophical method of research. A historian examining humanity's long and arduous labours to understand the new realities, would have devoted more attention to the objective course of events, including whimsical accidents, zigzags, and deviations. The philosopher looks at things a little differently. His interest lies mainly with the essence of things and processes. For him, the historical is a synonym of the logical at the level of the substance, when twists and turns of history are smoothed out and the level of abstraction conceals diverse accidents caused by the intertwining of causes, conditions, and human inter-subjectiveness.

The reader must not expect a detailed presentation of the facts of history that a professional historian might have given here. To my mind, a conceptual examination of the problem, a presentation of the logic that assimilated the new background to humanity's survival in the light of the new political thinking, the new philosophical paradigm, is essential as part of any historical study of the problems of war and peace.

The other specific feature of this book is that it is a history of ideas rather than of people. At the level of philosophical abstraction, ideas are often like living creatures that act by themselves. Such philosophizing, however, is liable to reduce itself to a mere game with notions and concepts that have nothing in common with the true content of human history. To avoid this, I have referred to objective data in various fields of knowledge, introducing correctives in the theoretical analysis of notions.

Any study of the complicated and contradictory set of problems covering diverse aspects of war, peace, progress, survival, and restructuring of international relations must, of necessity, presuppose a comprehensive study covering more than one field of knowledge.

The book contains extensive factual material about the probable consequences of nuclear war and the complicated advance towards an understanding of all the dangers facing humanity. That is why the third part of the book covers various aspects of the emerging new thinking – from its philosophical premises and foundations to its practical application to global problems, principles, and conclusions in the practice of international relations.

It stands to reason that not everything in my book is incontestable. But the truth that will help us to survive is born in debate.

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¹Moscow News, March 16, 1986.

²Karl Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law", in Marx, Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 182.

³See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil*, George Routledge & Sons, London, 1886, p. 64.

⁴*Pravda*, September 17, 1987.

PART ONE

WAR AND HISTORY

1. The Social Essence of War

For thousands of years, armed force was ever-present in people's life. Time and again, they stopped and cursed the dogs of war that carried off lives, wiped out tribes, peoples, towns and villages, off the face of the earth, and destroyed monuments of material and spiritual culture. Descriptions are extant of battles fought for diverse reasons. Wars were considered natural. They were admired and damned. But they recurred again and again, arousing holy terror.

"These were inspired of Mars, but the others by Minerva — and with them came Panic, Rout and Strife whose fury never tires, sister and friend of murderous Mars, who, from being at first but low in stature, grows up until she uprears her head to heaven, though her feet are still on earth. She it was that went about among them and flung down discord to the waxing of sorrow with even hand between them."

This by Homer in *The Iliad*, describing the war between the Achaeans and Trojans.¹ The passage evokes a dual feeling, something that is neither acceptance nor negation. For Homer, war was sacred in the most literate sense as a product of the gods. I doubt very much, however, that he would have considered the 20th-century wars a divine product. Wars have changed so much over the millennia there is no longer an aura of romance about them. They have acquired entirely different dimensions. They are mechanized in form and estranged from the separate warrior. They have become pure slaughter. The aesthetic dimension has vanished. The Trojan War may have appalled Homer, but he produced magnificent battle descriptions. Would a nuclear war arouse the same feelings in a Homer of our time? Hardly. If modern war, too, has an aesthetic side to it, it is the aesthetics of ugliness and repugnance. This reflects humanity's changed attitude to war. While the exploits of Achilles were described by the greatest writer of the times, Rambo's exploits are written up by a cynical hack driven by a lust for money and little else.

What has changed? Why this metamorphosis? And why have ever more people the world over ceased to think war is inevitable? Why do they fight against it? Yes, we are more civilized, more humane. True, not all of us, for the 20th century has witnessed abominations that eclipse those of the Middle Ages. Still, civilization and humaneness are making their way forward.

How we would have liked the progress of society to have been smoother, more straightforward, and unintermittent! Unfortunately, so far, this was an unrealistic dream. So far, all achievements of the intellect were used to humanity's detriment, for military purposes. The industrial revolution of the 18th-19th centuries ushered in the era of machine production, enabling humanity to produce far more consumer goods than it needed to sustain itself. But that revolution also saw the development of firearms, to say nothing of the discovery of atomic energy. The atom, by nature, proved ambivalent. At first it was used to kill and destroy. Today, too, there are those who want to use one more human achievement, the breakthrough into outer space, for military purposes. And it is hard to say what else will follow.

So far, we have not been able to reverse this race to destruction. Not because we did not want to, but because war has been a rational means of resolving various problems, and, however strange it may sound, was justified by the public.

Ever since *Homo sapiens* emerged from the animal world, force has always been present in society. It was impossible to conceive wild nature without force, though each other's destruction by living creatures evoked somewhat different feelings in humans than destruction of humans. In principle, I can well conceive a human society of a very high order in which the life of any living creature would be as sacred as that of a human. This principle was indeed proclaimed by the Buddhists and is cultivated over the ages in the consciousness of Indian society. Humanity as a whole, however, has not yet attained this high stage. The distinction between humans and animals, on the other hand, including the question of taking life, was felt by people from the very beginning. Some psychologists have even deduced the presence in humans of the dual we-they relationship from the primordial contraposition of already-humans to non-humans.

"Let us picture two primeval groups — clans or tribes," Soviet expert in psychology Boris Porshnev writes, for example. "If they never met each other, no individual in group A would feel he belonged to any other community... For a subjective 'we' to appear, the groups would have had to meet and separate from a 'they'.

In other words, if we look at the issue on a subjective, psychological plane, 'they' are still more primary than 'we'. The appearance in the individual's mind of a notion of 'they' should, indeed, be considered the prime act in social psychology."²

Porshnev cast about for the source of this contraposition. Here is what he arrived at: "If we go back still further to the most ancient times, we naturally wonder if this original psychological separation from some 'they' reflects the coexistence of humans and their biological predecessors, the Neanderthals? It must have been these latter whom humans felt to be incompatible and dangerous 'non-people' or 'semi-people'... In this hypothesis the initial human psychological relationship is not a self-appreciation of members of a primordial clan but the relationship in which they conceived themselves as humans rather than members of their community. It was only after the Neanderthals died out or were exterminated that the same psychological outlook spread to relations between groups, communities, or tribes, and then also to relations between other groups within the single biological species of humans."³

People's conception of themselves as a specific species among other living creatures was not simple at all. Those who belonged to another blood community were at first not even considered human. Later, slaves were denied identification as members of the human family. More recently, members of non-Aryan or, in general, non-white races were also considered non-people. It was easier to apply force to creatures who were said to be sub-human, for then no moral standard had to be applied to them. The enemy image lacking positive human qualities and abounding in negative features, typical of relations between present-day social systems, also has its origins in the "we" and "they" dualism.

Aside from the psychological dualism, increasing significance attached to the social division of people. It derived from contradictions in, above all, economic interests, and was no longer of the animal nature of the we-they dualism though, often enough, they intertwined. This intertwining identified force in general with war as a purely social phenomenon. A dangerous thing, because war was considered eternal and inescapable, and inspired a sense of futility and pessimism — something that cannot help to end wars.

In fact, violence in general and war as armed violence are different things. Primitive man had no special tools to destroy his like. Archaeological studies bear this out. There is good reason to believe that originally peaceful relations had been standard

between tribes. In that context, it would be more accurate to speak of clashes or quarrels rather than wars.

Armed violence came into the world at a certain stage of social production when labour implements made it possible to produce a surplus product. This was used to sustain members of the community performing specialized functions which appeared as a result of a division of labour and were initially related to the economic conditions of production. The most important of these functions was that of obtaining vital means from other communities and tribes by resort to force. Armed force in relation to "strangers" was at first invoked to obtain food and other consumer items from them but in due course members of the community themselves became a desired item.

The inception of slavery changed the nature of armed force. Clashes between communities, initially casual and accidental, developed into a purposeful hunt for captives, who were immediately turned into slaves. A special group of people adept at making war carried out this economic function. Thus, with the emergence of slave societies there also appeared *armies*. Since those days, war as a social phenomenon and the army as its instrument had been used to amass wealth and to capture territory. In the world of today, too, we should not, I feel, dissociate the violent side of war from its economic aims. Force, Engels once pointed out, is only the means, whereas the aim is economic advantage.⁴

The economic function of armed force gave rise to armies as a special institution, while the need to control social production gave rise to a special class of persons who arrogated *power*. As Lenin noted, the existence of this class was "the distinguishing feature" of the emergence of states.⁵

Politics as a specific sphere of social relations evolved together with the state. It is closely related to the economic interests of people and their communities, but is not to be reduced to these interests alone. Marxists have never been vulgar economists who reduce the richness of social relations to purely economic relations. This is borne out, among other things, by what Engels said about production and reproduction being determinative only in the *final analysis*. The economic situation is the basis, but the course of the historical struggle is also influenced, and in many cases determined in *form*, as Engels said, by "various elements of the superstructure — political forms of the class struggle and its results, such as constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and especially the reflections of all

these real struggles in the brains of the participants, political, legal, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas".⁶

War is no exception. Hence, it cannot be reduced to exclusively economic interests. Being a specific type of activity in the exercise of armed force, it has its own laws of development, which are studied by military science. One cannot deny, however, that war is always used in the interests of the ruling classes. For, as Lenin noted, "a fight without a political purpose is not a fight but merely a brawl."⁷

Since in a class society economic interests inevitably take a political form (doubly so in international relations), we are quite safe to say that war is the continuation of politics by armed force. This definition was first given by von Clausewitz, the German military theorist, and has been used extensively since in military and political literature.

The very definition of war has two sides, one restricting the other. Logical analysis of their correlation shows that war can contain different amounts of politics, depending on the extent to which it is aimed at securing economic interests and to which it is being used as a means of armed force. This measure may differ, since economic aims may be secured not only by resort to war but also by threats of war, evading direct military action. One of the first theorists of military affairs in history, the Chinese general Sun Tzu, in fact, said, to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.⁸ At present, the concept of war has, indeed, been enlarged to embrace such notions as cold war, undeclared war, psychological warfare, and other subversive actions, terrorist acts, and psychological blackmail by official bodies of hostile states while peaceful relations are formally sustained. Still, if we follow the concept entrenched in international law, a war begins when military action begins, even in the absence of a formal declaration of war. Thus, outbreak of military action is one of the limits of war. The other logical limit, in theory at least, is such a use of weapons where the political aims lose sense since the damage involved may be unacceptable.

Until the middle of the 20th century, the above was pure theory. Even the First and Second world wars, despite the enormous loss of life and property, secured the political interests of the victor-states. That is why, reflecting on the possible increasing losses, statesmen and generals tried to overlook the fact that war was gradually ceasing to be acceptable as a means of securing political aims.

Still, this thought gained currency among people who looked more profoundly and realistically at the tendencies prevailing in the world. Among them were the founders of Marxism.

Certainly, Marx, Engels, and Lenin belonged to their own time. Though war was no longer considered a natural state of affairs, it was still inevitable. The means of destruction had not yet attained a level that could destroy all civilization. The optimism ingrained in Marxism prompted the idea that no matter what destruction culture is subjected to, it cannot be deleted from the history book; it will be hard to regenerate but as Lenin said, "no destruction will ever mean the complete disappearance of that culture".⁹ This was consonant with the humanistic tradition of the industrial society, and was not at all surprising.

But Marxism is something far more complicated than its various well-meaning and inevitably slanted interpretations. The dialectical method of research frequently led to conclusions that at first glance contradicted the basic idea. A closer look shows, however, that in the changed setting it is these conclusions that confirm the universally human significance of Marxism's fundamental ideas. "Marx's creation," wrote Rosa Luxemburg, who was herself an outstanding Marxist theorist, "which is a scientific achievement constituting a gigantic whole, exceeds the immediate requirements of the workers' class struggle, though that was what it was created for. Marx's painstaking and consummate analysis of the capitalist economy and his historical method of research with its far-ranging sphere of application, have given us much more than required for the practical needs of the class struggle. And as our movement reaches ever more advanced stages, dishing up new practical issues, we dip again into Marx's bank of ideas."¹⁰

The question of war and peace is no exception. At the end of the 19th century, as Europe slowly drifted towards a world war, Frederick Engels, Marx's friend and collaborator, noted that the war must "either result in an immediate victory for socialism or shake up the old order of things from top to bottom, leaving behind so appalling a pile of rubble that the existence of the old capitalist society would become even more impossible than before."¹¹

As we know, Engels's prediction was right. The survivors of the horrors of the First World War, who had seen carnage and destruction on a heretofore unprecedented scale, tended to doubt the sense of ever again using such a brutal means of obtaining economic and political gains. Small wonder that its aftermaths triggered a massive pacifist movement all over Europe.

But that war had also given rise to other sentiment. A significant segment of Marxists, notably the Bolsheviks and their leader Lenin, issued a call to turn the war against those who had started it. The revolutions in Russia and Germany, and workers' actions in the other belligerent countries, showed that this idea was correct. In Russia, capitalism suffered total defeat and was succeeded by the world's first socialist state. It defended its right to exist in the flames of a devastating civil war. Thus war confirmed that it was political in nature, though doubts as to using it to achieve any rational aims were not dissipated.

Lenin, convinced as he was that war against the exploiters was justified, was far less single-minded on this score than many of his followers. After the October Revolution had taken place, as Krupskaya, his wife had recorded, he observed that modern technology had made war increasingly destructive, and that a time would come when war would be so utterly destructive as to become unthinkable.¹² This most important observation shows that Lenin was far ahead of his time and had contrived in an era of optimistic industrialism to notice certain tendencies that did not surface until several dozens of years later. By and large, however, the conditions for propagating non-violence had not yet ripened. As before, the world was brutal and the march of history had not yet ground up enough lives.

Since times immemorial, in a setting of scarcity, the human race secured its livelihood through the sacrifices of separate individuals who were its members. This was unavoidable in the first stage of humanity, and would be senseless to justify or condemn. Man's needs were meagre, but the ways and means of satisfying them were more meagre still.

Quite naturally, therefore, humanity broke up into two social groups, one of which shed blood and sweat to satisfy the needs of the other, less numerous, group. There was headway in culture and the arts. Knowledge was preserved and multiplied. The human race improved itself. The march of history, as Marx wrote, created a situation in which "the development of the capacities of the *human species*" was at first secured at the cost of human individuals and even classes.¹³

In due course, the amount of the surplus product increased. The vigorous struggle of the common people to better their condition caused a slight redistribution of the national product in their favour. But what Engels said a hundred years ago is still valid: "History is probably the most cruel of *all goddesses*, dragging its triumphant chariot over mountains of corpses not only at

times of war but also at times of 'peaceful' economic development."¹⁴

In the circumstances, Marxists who were striving to change the world in the interests of a specific social class, the proletariat, were compelled to act in accordance with the prevailing rules. Socialism was built and defended not by ideal people but by people bred and raised under the old system of social relations with all its good and bad points.

The pervasive war of every man against every man was contrary to the ideals of the new society. But the deposed ruling classes did not give in, and compelled the oppressed to act against their oppressors by the same means and with the same weapons. This was a fact of life that determined the world situation for many years to come. Forced to function in an enemy encirclement, the socialist state created its own army. It defended socialism and its gains in mortal combat with Hitler's most frankly brutal regime of recent centuries.

Hostility to socialism did not end after the Second World War. Both social systems were gripped by hatred and fear of each other, bred by the long negative experience of history. Another war seemed inevitable. It was essential to be constantly prepared. In the mid-fifties, it is true, the Soviet Government declared it did not believe a direct and open clash of the two systems was inevitable. But the struggle continued unabated. Especially for influence on the periphery of the capitalist world.

It was natural, therefore, that military theorists, statesmen and scholars focussed upon political goals, paid no attention to the change in the means of warfare and continued to regard them as means to secure political priorities. The fact that the new means of warfare were making war unthinkable was denied in practice and theory.

Yet war has two sides to it, which restrict each other not only in a logical analysis but also in practice. To see the effect of politics on the means of warfare and to forget the effect of the latter on politics, is the extreme of folly. I am safe in saying, however, that Marxists are aware of the mutual influence of society and politics, on the one hand, and the means of warfare, on the other. Like society, wars differ in form and change in step with the productive forces. "Nothing," Engels wrote, "is more dependent on economic prerequisites than precisely the army and navy. Armament, composition, organization, tactics and strategy depend above all on the stage reached at the time in production and on communications."¹⁵

Far-reaching change in the productive forces triggers a revolution in military affairs. The country that masters the results of technological progress first, gains a military edge. We know how easily the Spanish vanquished the Red Indians of South America, crushing the powerful empires of the Incas and Mayas because they had come on horseback, the energy of their mounts exceeding the physical capacity and speed of humans several times over. Spanish firearms and the absence of wheels on the Incan and Mayan side had also helped tilt the balance despite the relative smallness of the Spanish force. Its technical novelties made up for the immense numerical advantage of the defenders.

The appearance of new types of weapons had a staggering effect on society, too. In most general terms the evolution of arms saw man's destructive powers transcend his corporeal organization. For ages, means of destruction like means of production were commensurate with the physical capacity of the individual. Inevitably, this held down the destructive powers, though ancient history offers cases where entire civilizations perished in the flames of wars waged by as yet imperfect means of destruction.

Originally, the means of warfare were diverse modifications of knives, swords, daggers, and spears. Invention of the bow and arrow was a revolution. It extended the soldier's striking distance. All nations have legends and tales extolling the warcraft of soldiers armed with boomerangs, bows and arrows, swords or rapiers. This reverent attitude derived from the millennia that such weapons were in use, requiring physical strength and individual skill.

Not until gunpowder was invented in the 13th century did a technological revolution occur in the conduct of war. Human energy was replaced by the energy of chemical reactions. The appearance of firearms, a legitimate result of the growth of the productive forces of society, cardinally changed the image of civilization. "The introduction of firearms," Engels wrote, "had a revolutionizing effect not only on the conduct of war itself, but also on the political relationships of domination and subjection. The procurement of powder and firearms required industry and money, and both of these were in the hands of the burghers of the towns. From the outset, therefore, firearms were weapons of the towns and of the rising town-supported monarchy against the feudal nobility. The stone walls of the noblemen's castles, hitherto unapproachable, fell before the cannon of the burghers, and the bullets of the burghers' arquebuses pierced the armour of the knights."¹⁶

Relieving human energy of the limitations of the human's corporeal nature, the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries also removed the limitations on the destructive powers man had come to control. The development of rifles in the 19th century, and of automatic weapons, tanks, aircraft, and submarines in the 20th — put man and humanity in terrible jeopardy in face of the increasing power of arms. The very nature of war changed, as did the attitude to war of the mass of the people.

Seen previously as a natural and unavoidable part of life, war grew into an extraordinary event that violated the natural course of things. The increasing destructive power of arms made it more difficult each time for society to restore the prewar structure of the economy. Wars became ever more expensive, ruinous, and wasteful.

Until the end of the 19th century, war-makers relied on preliminarily stockpiled armaments, technical means, and other material things as the sole possible source of meeting the needs of the armed struggle. Then the First World War exposed this approach as incompetent: stockpiled supplies were no longer enough. Belligerent economies had to be converted to wartime production, a task that no country was heretofore able to accomplish during the course of the war.

In the Second World War needs were met by current, i.e. wartime, production. As much as 90 per cent of the supplies and means of warfare were thus provided for. After the war, wartime facilities remained a permanent element of the economy, sidetracking requisite resources from the civilian industries and undermining welfare. All this could not but disaffect the people, though the edge of the dissatisfaction was taken off by militarist propaganda. True, ever more people wondered if a future war would be rational. Those who were in favour of war were still sure they could gain more than they lost in the event of victory. For them, therefore, war still had a rationale.

Along with material losses, the buildup of arms and materiel caused ever greater casualties. And each successive war saw them rise. In the 17th century, for example, war-inflicted loss of life added up to 3.3 million, in the 18th century to 5.4 million, in the 19th century and until the outbreak of the First World War to 5.7 million, and to more than 9 million in just the four years of the First World War. The Second World War was the most destructive of all, with the loss of life exceeding 50 million (some estimate 55 million). Total property losses and war expenditures were 1,213 times greater than the

combined average annual income of all countries in the first fifty years of the 20th century.¹⁷

For all this, the striving for victory and the belief that war was a continuation of politics by armed force, remained part of all the national political programmes and military doctrines. This was due to the fact, among other things, that the evolution of the means of destruction and annihilation was confined to the military sphere, which has its own laws that tend to neutralize the increasing destructive powers of the new types of weapons. One such law is that of the sword and shield. Marshal Ogarkov of the Soviet Union described it thus: "Past wars have shown that new means of attack lead inevitably to the development of appropriate means of defence and, in the long run, to new ways of conducting battles, operations, and war as a whole. The rapid development of tanks, aircraft, and submarines, for example, witnessed the no less rapid development of anti-tank, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine weapons, whereupon means of defence were devised against these latter, resulting in new forms and methods of warfare."¹⁸

Acting on the law of the sword and shield, generals and statesmen sought to resolve the problems that piled up with the growing striking power of enemy arms by purely military means, that is, by creating a shield for any newly-appearing weapon. There was the assurance that every weapon had a counter-weapon. As a result, the arms race became a general sociological law.

The striving to settle all problems within the military framework and by military means survived when atomic and then thermonuclear arms were devised. Though it was becoming increasingly clear that many of the laws governing technical military activity, including the law of the sword and shield, were no longer valid. The power of nuclear arms was so immense there could be no defence against it. Besides, the development of means of defence was becoming ever more expensive, while that of means of attack was costing less and less. It took a few dozen years, however, for this fact to sink in. Meanwhile, the old thinking clashed with the new both in the East and the West. Not until the mid-eighties did the Soviet and US leaders, albeit in different measure, come to see that in the nuclear age war had ceased to be the continuation of politics by other means. Mikhail Gorbachev reaffirmed this publicly on September 29, 1987. "The nuclear peril has become real," he said. "War must be ruled out as a means of settling political issues. The Clausewitz formula that war is a continuation of politics by other means is no longer valid."¹⁹

It is up to historians to investigate if this simple conclusion could have been drawn earlier. We, for our part, will look into what happened when nuclear arms appeared on the world scene, and why formulas and laws that operated for millennia had lost validity in the nuclear age.

2. War in the Nuclear Age

"Just at that instant, there rose as if from the bowels of the earth a light not of this world, the light of many suns in one. It was a sunrise such as the world had never seen, a great green supersun climbing in a fraction of a second to a height of more than eight thousand feet, rising ever higher until it touched the clouds, lighting up earth and sky all around with a dazzling luminosity.

"Up it went, a great ball of fire about a mile in diameter, changing colours as it kept shooting upwards, from deep purple to orange, expanding, growing bigger, rising as it expanded, an elemental force freed from its bonds after being chained for billions of years...

"A huge cloud rose from the ground and followed the trail of the great sun. At first it was a giant column, which soon took the shape of a supramundane mushroom. Up it went, higher and higher, quivering convulsively, a giant mountain born in a few seconds instead of millions of years...

"All through the very short but long-seeming time interval not a sound heard... The new-born mountain in the distance, a giant among the pygmies of the Sierra Oscura range, stood leaning at an angle against the clouds, like a vibrant volcano spouting fire."²⁰

The above passage is by William Laurence, the only journalist, an American, who had access to the secrets of the Manhattan Project and who witnessed the first atomic explosion in history on July 16, 1945, at Alamogordo. That explosion ushered in the nuclear age, used by President Harry Truman at the Big Three summit negotiations in Potsdam in a bid to cow USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Stalin.

We know this from the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov and those of Truman's daughter. We also know that Stalin did not react to the US President's information, giving rise to speculation that the Soviet leader had simply failed to understand what he was told.

This episode is graphic evidence of the attitude of the leaders of those days to that fundamentally new type of weapon, which,

in due course, had a revolutionizing effect on the system of international relations.

From the day it appeared, the atomic weapon was used for political means. There was no difference between it and other types of weapon in that respect, though its qualitative difference in destructive power and effect on life was understood immediately even by President Truman, who was far removed from science and technology. George Bogdan Kistiakowsky, one of the men involved in the Manhattan Project, observed right after the Alamogordo test that on Doomsday, during the last millisecond of the Earth's existence, the last human being would see what he and the other observers had just seen.²¹

Those who helped in developing the atomic bomb, the greatest physicists of those days, such as Robert Oppenheimer, Albert Einstein, and Niels Bohr, knew perfectly well what they had created. Why, then, did not their knowledge spread to the rest of humankind? Why was it that even forty years later, not all people, and not even all experts, realized that the existence of nuclear weapons repealed practically all the heretofore valid rational laws of war?

To answer this question we must turn to the objective properties of nuclear arms, the most important of which were not discovered until just a few years ago.

The Alamogordo explosion amounted to something like 20 kilotons. Although no conventional explosive could compare with atomic energy, the extent of the destruction caused by the bomb dropped on Hiroshima (while the bomb dropped on Nagasaki was weaker—about 12 kilotons) was commensurate with previous experience in the Second World War. There was the prototype (though it had naturally required enormous amounts of explosives) of the Allied bombings of German and Japanese towns. The United States alone used up 7.7 million tons of trinitrotoluene or its equivalent in the Second World War. The destruction caused by the blanket bombing of Tokyo was several times greater than the destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. During the bombing of Hamburg on July 27-28, 1943, the fireball rose to an altitude of ten kilometers. Dresden, bombed in mid-February, 1945, burned for seven days and eight nights.²² To be sure, the fact that a single bomb ten times more powerful than all the air bombs dropped in two days on Hamburg, could destroy a city with a population of 300,000 elicited admiration among military men. The difference between the old and new type of weapon was

then felt only in a quantitative context. But this in itself augured ill for the future of civilization.

Radiation turned out to be the second destructive effect of atomic and nuclear arms. Though for a long time its danger escaped the notice even of experts. And doubly so of the public at large. For, in fact, the very existence and effects of radiation were being hushed up and minimized.

For many years, a veil of secrecy had isolated the Japanese *hibakushas* (people who suffered in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings) from the outside world. Only 33 years later was the medical research into the effects of the first use of atomic weapons made public. All those years, US army physicians examined sufferers, but the results were kept from the public. As of March 1977, the Japanese government had registered 366,523 people as victims of the atomic bombings — 179,637 of them from Hiroshima, 109,936 from Nagasaki, and 76,950 from other Japanese prefectures. That was the appalling effect of just two atomic bombs of some 34 kilotons. It is inordinately lucky for humankind that no other atomic or nuclear device has been used for military purposes since.

The effects of radiation had been underestimated for years both in the United States and the Soviet Union. Suffice it to say that atomic weapons were detonated in military exercises in both countries. In 1983, the public learned that the US Government had sent soldiers to the epicenter of atomic test blasts to see what doses of radiation they would withstand. It is estimated that between 250,000 and 500,000 US servicemen had taken part in atomic tests in Nevada and the Pacific Ocean between 1945 and 1962. How many of them died as a result is not known. Nor can anybody say how many more will perish.

In the Soviet Union, the first big army exercises involving a real atomic bomb detonation took place in September 1954.²³ Today, in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster, this seems horrendous. But history cannot be rewritten. Soviet atomic scientists, too, had ignored the effects of radiation, risking their lives and health to secure the earliest possible breakthrough. One of those involved in the test of a thermonuclear device, V. Yemelyanov, recalls that researchers frequently entered the epicenter of a nuclear explosion, staying for as long as seven or eight minutes.²⁴ This is probably why, among other things, none of those involved in atomic development, including I. Kurchatov, B. Vannikov, A. Zavenyagin, and V. Malyshev, had lived more than fifteen years after the project was launched.²⁵

Prolonged study of the radiation disease, an accumulation of experimental and statistical data, yielded a true picture of the effects of radiation on human beings. But the results were kept secret, well out of the reach of the general public. Instead, optimistic evaluations were published, working for political ends.

But some surfacing facts acted like a cold shower on world opinion. One of the most shocking was the *Fukuryu Maru* (Lucky Dragon) tragedy. The Japanese fishing vessel had happened to be within 160 kilometers of Bikini during a hydrogen bomb test there on March 1, 1954. One member of the crew died instantly, twenty-two others died some time later from the effects of radioactive fallout. The tragedy aroused the whole world. People learned of the awesome effects of atomic and nuclear arms. What frightened them was that radiation from a 15-megaton explosion was felt hundreds of kilometers away. It was clear that nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and under water were a grave threat to all humanity.

Radiation was hereafter considered the most dangerous of the effects of nuclear arms. Radiation provoked the greatest fears. It attracted prime attention. But at the end of the 1950s, research into the aftermaths of nuclear explosions showed they had a destructive effect on the biosphere. There had been practically no radioactive strontium (strontium 90) on the earth's surface prior to the nuclear explosion. After nuclear testing, this long-lived and exceedingly dangerous radioactive product was spotted everywhere, even the Antarctic. Yet strontium 90 could cause cancer or leukemia. And cesium 137, carbon 14, and other radioactive isotopes that also result from nuclear explosions, were no less dangerous.²⁶ Scientists warned the human race would not survive more than 2,000 or 3,000 nuclear weapon tests. Data obtained in the early eighties bore this out. Considering that the nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere and under water from 1945 to 1963 (when the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was signed) totalled 510 megatons,²⁷ it should be patently clear that the testing was halted just in time.

In 1958, the Soviet Union set a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, later joined by the United States and Great Britain. Then the US President announced that the United States would resume testing, and the Soviet Union followed suit. Everything began all over again.

Still, the halting of nuclear tests for some time showed that the governments of the nuclear powers were aware of the

radioactive contamination of the Earth, and also of the fact that agreement could in principle be reached. The signing of the nuclear test ban of August 5, 1963, was the first step in holding down the dangerous effects of atomic and nuclear weapons. But it also had a certain negative effect, breeding some complacency about the possible aftermaths of a nuclear war. The public at large underestimated the dangers created by the presence of nuclear arms. The practical problems of disarmament dropped out of public view, while endless negotiating took place in the seclusion of governmental offices, mostly without result.

Army staffs worked on plans of limiting damage in the event nuclear weapons should be used. The main accent was on enhancing the accuracy and reducing the power of warheads. Development of 100-megaton warheads was renounced, for the use of just one such bomb was sure to do irreparable damage to the biosphere.

The decisive factor for experts was that the radioactive contamination of the biosphere by nuclear tests dropped to a minimum rapidly after the testing in the atmosphere and under water was halted. Suffice it to say that already by 1970, that is seven years after the test blasts were stopped, the content of strontium 90, for example, was just 5 per cent of the total dropout from the tests of only 1963.²⁸ The amazing adaptability of the biosphere created the illusion that it was quite possible not only to survive a nuclear conflict but also to secure progress.

The epidemic of fear caused by the nuclear threat at the end of the 1950s and in the early sixties, gave way in the latter half of the sixties to attempts at creating new types of nuclear weapons capable of evading the restrictions imposed by the characteristics of 50- and 100-megaton warheads.

Meanwhile, statesmen and scientists on both sides looked into possible ways of using nuclear arms and sought to determine acceptable and unacceptable losses on either side if they should ever be resorted to. Here are a few official evaluations that reached the general public.

Take the results of research in the early 1960s in the United States: in the event of a 24-hour nuclear war losses there were estimated to amount to 50 million to 75 million people.²⁹

US journalist Robert Scheer shows in his 1982 book, *With Enough Shovels*, that this estimate prevailed up to and including the early 1980s. An abridged version of the book was also published in the Soviet Union. Here, Scheer cites his conversations with leading statesmen and generals, including the President and Vice-

President. Asked if it was desirable to have arms superiority of twenty per cent, considering that both sides had enough hardware to destroy each other several times over, George Bush, then still Vice-President, bristled and replied, "Yes, if you believe there is no such thing as a winner in a nuclear exchange, that argument makes little sense. I don't believe that."

Scheer then asked, "How do you win in a nuclear exchange?"

Bush replied, "You have a survivability of command and control, survivability of industrial potential, protection of a percentage of your citizens, and you have a capability that inflicts more damage on the opposition than it can inflict upon you."

Did he mean five per cent would survive or, perhaps, two per cent, Scheer asked.

"More than that, if everybody fired everything," Bush replied, "you'd have more than that survive."³⁰

The above passage, and other US survivability estimates, show that American statesmen had underestimated the nuclear menace, at least until the early 1980s. It was this that led them to consider use of nuclear arms time and again, including at least four times against the Soviet Union.

There had also been diverse views in Soviet upper echelons. The first time earlier notions of nuclear arms were revised was in 1954, that is, after the tests of the Soviet and American thermonuclear devices. Shortly before that, on December 8, 1953, in a message to the UN General Assembly, President Eisenhower had said for the first time that the outcome of a nuclear war between the "two atomic colossi" would be the "probability of civilization destroyed".³¹ The Soviet press responded to this admission with expressions of approval. In fact, campaigning for election, USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Georgi Malenkov declared on March 12, 1954, that the Soviet Government was opposed to the ongoing cold war because it was preparing the ground "for a new worldwide slaughter that would, given the latest means of warfare, signify the destruction of world civilization".³²

Unfortunately, this realistic estimate was promptly overturned. In January 1954, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles referred to "massive retaliation", envisaging not only a retaliatory nuclear strike but also first use of nuclear arms by the United States if it felt its security was endangered.

The Soviet Government responded with a new formula of its own. Shortly after Malenkov's speech, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov issued a government note to Western governments saying "use of atomic and hydrogen weapons would cause in-

calculable suffering, it would lead to the mass annihilation of civilian populations and destruction of most centers of modern industry, culture and science, including the oldest centers of civilization, such as the major capitals of various countries."³³

On April 26, 1954, this formula was repeated by the head of the Soviet Government at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Soviet Union, as we see, had renounced the estimate that nuclear war would destroy world civilization.

At the same time, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CPSU Central committee, made a still more one-sided statement, saying, "If the imperialists try to start a new war, it will inevitably lead to the collapse of the entire capitalist system".³⁴

These utterances were not fortuitous. They stood for the Soviet leaders' conviction that losses in a nuclear war could be kept down. Khrushchev said as much in a speech at the USSR Supreme Soviet on January 14, 1960. It contained an exposition of the latest Soviet military doctrine. "Certainly," Khrushchev said, "all countries would suffer in some way if another world war were to break out. We, too, would suffer greatly, and would have large casualties, but we would survive for our territory is enormous and our population is less concentrated in large industrial centers than in many other countries. The West would suffer incomparably worse."³⁵

The Berlin and Caribbean crises, in 1961 and 1962 respectively, had almost precipitated disaster. This had a sobering effect on the thinking both of President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.

Speaking at the 6th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany in January 1963, Khrushchev said some 700 million to 800 million people would perish in a first strike. All the major cities of the two leading nuclear powers, the USA and the USSR, and those of France, Britain, Germany, Italy, China, Japan, and many other countries, would be wiped off the face of the earth. He said the aftermaths would drag out over many generations, causing disease, death, and deformation of the human race. "The Marxists-Leninists," he said, "cannot think of building a communist civilization upon the ruins of the world centers of culture, on a devastated earth contaminated by thermonuclear dropout." And he added: "For many nations, the question of socialism would no longer exist, because they would have been physically eliminated from the face of the Earth."³⁶

Similar conclusions were drawn by US President John Kennedy. In a public statement on June 10, 1963, he declared: "Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain

large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all of the Allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by the wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn."³⁷

But, as I have said before, these estimates did not abolish the idea nursed by military men and some statesmen on both sides that the damage could be kept down, and that a nuclear war was winnable. Take the following passage by Yevgeny Rybkin, a leading Soviet military theorist, published in 1968:

"Destruction of conditions for the existence of all humanity is just one abstract variant of the development and outcome of a nuclear war. Apart from this, there exists, or is being developed, a possibility for securing victory, though at a very high price."³⁸

Even in the early 1980s, when researchers had already grasped many of the disasters that could ensue in a nuclear conflict, the Soviet press published the following estimate: loss of life in a nuclear strike would amount to 200 million, with another 60 million wounded.³⁹

These figures were unrealistic. Worse, they were meant to convince people that one could survive and, indeed, win a nuclear war. This complicated the search for approaches to disarmament. Both sides clung to the old approaches and the old positions.

Naturally, all this influenced the mass consciousness in West and East. The utterances of Ronald Reagan, George Bush, and the American generals only added fuel to the fire of the New American Patriotism, a specific and grim reality of America in the early 80s, the Rambo mania, and clinical xenophobia.

On the other hand, the rightward swing and toughness of the US Administration redoubled Soviet suspiciousness. Statements forgotten since the time of detente, reappeared in the Soviet press. The following passage by a Soviet writer published in the country's central literary newspaper may be held up as an example. "Nuclear warheads will not kill communism," he wrote. "Even if only one hundred people survive, they will come to communism as the most just and lofty way of life."⁴⁰

Luckily, those were the last few public specimens of the old-time ideologized thinking divorced from the realities of the interdependent world. The nuclear winter concept buried outdated views once and for all.

The year 1983 made history. It clarified the true dangers to humankind created by the dozens of years of nuclear stockpiling. Deep-going study of the probable consequences of a large-scale nuclear conflict by divergent methods in the USA and the USSR put an end to all illusions. True, Western literature cast doubt on the results of research in the question of a nuclear winter. It said that Soviet scientists had no results of their own and took the cue from estimates of US experts. New calculations were cited to prove that the result of a nuclear exchange would not be a "winter" but a "fall" (autumn. — *Tr.*), meaning the consequences would be less appalling and less final than had been earlier claimed.

It seems to me, however, that in a matter such as the salvation of civilization, it is better to make assurance doubly sure. All the more so, because even played-down characteristics of the outcome of a nuclear war, even a "limited" one, bring us to the unambiguous conclusion that it is not winnable. As General Secretary Gorbachev said, "If, however, someone ventures to deliver a nuclear first strike, he will doom himself to a painful death — and this not even from the retaliatory strike but from the consequences of the detonation of his own warheads. This is not propaganda, not political improvisation, and not intimidation; it is a reality which it is simply irresponsible to deny and criminal to overlook."⁴¹

For a long time, radiation, and notably radioactive contamination, was considered the main debilitating factor of nuclear arms. But by the beginning of the eighties, another factor, secondary at first glance, came to the forefront: the smoke of burning cities.

This was not an entirely new thing. British and American airmen had, indeed, created firestorms over cities in Germany and Japan during the Second World War. In one of his wartime letters to Stalin, Winston Churchill wrote: "This we know for certain, eighty per cent of the houses in Hamburg are down... And even greater destruction will be laid upon Berlin."⁴² Firestorms that rose many thousands of feet above a city, precipitated an oily black smoke consisting of particles that screened off the sun. This caused a drop in temperature and darkness. A similar effect was created by the atomic explosion over Hiroshima. Survivors spoke of the horrifying darkness and coolness immediately after the blast. Steam condensed and fell upon the earth in the form of soot-black rain.⁴³

For a long time, however, the effects of dust and soot on the atmosphere were not properly studied. Not until the seventies

did researchers have enough facts to draw conclusions. They looked at the forest fires in Siberia in 1915, Alberta, Canada, in 1950, and the European part of the Soviet Union in 1972. During the last-named the smokescreen was continental in size—a gigantic blotch of smoke some 200-400 kilometers wide stretching nearly 6,000 kilometers from the central part of the country's European territory to Lake Balkhash. The quantity of smoke, as estimated from Soviet and US satellites, was in excess of one million tons, and the altitude it reached was about five kilometers. After that firestorm, the transparency of the air was below normal for several months.⁴⁴

What also interested researchers were the powerful volcanic eruptions. The year following the eruption of the Tambora in Indonesia in 1815 was known as the year without a summer in North America and Western Europe. In the summer of 1816, New England registered snowfall, and morning frost in July and August. There was a crop failure that year, food shortages, and evidence of pandemic cholera. The Krakatoa eruption in August 1883, and that of Saint Helens in May 1980, with the resulting cloud over US territory, lowered the temperature day and night by 8°C.⁴⁵

In 1971, the interplanetary Mariner-9 vehicle in orbit round Mars began transmitting photographs: Mars was completely covered with dust as a result of a gigantic dust storm. Scholars found that the dust in the upper layers of the atmosphere consumed the sunlight with a resultant rise in temperature while the surface of the planet lost warmth.⁴⁶

Here is one more fact bearing out the catastrophic consequences of smoke and dust in the atmosphere caused by one or several giant asteroids which dropped upon the Earth sixty-five million years ago. "Though there was hundreds of times more dust in the atmosphere then than there would be after a possible nuclear conflict," write Soviet researchers G. Golitsyn and A. Ginsburg, "no reduction of sunlight by tens of thousands of times is necessary, as in the case of the falling asteroids, for the temperature on the surface of the Earth to drop abruptly. A reduction to just a quarter would cause the temperature to drop considerably."⁴⁷

Phenomena related to a drop in temperature as a result of the diffusion or absorption of the sun's rays by particles of dust and soot preoccupied Paul Crutzen, a West German scholar, who set forth his studies of the consequences of a nuclear conflict in 1982 together with J.W. Birks in the journal *Ambio*.⁴⁸ What they wrote created interest in many other countries, and generated

intensive research in the Soviet Union and the United States into the question of a "nuclear night" and "nuclear winter" as being predictable effects of a nuclear conflict.

By 1983 models were produced which showed graphically that humankind would not survive a nuclear war. The strike wave, destruction, radiation, and the blinding light caused by a blast, would be followed by an abrupt drop in temperature owing to the soot and smoke from burning forests and cities reaching the stratosphere. Research into this was carried out by the National Center for Atmospheric Research (USA) and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under professors Carl Sagan and Paul Ehrlich.

The same research, but by different methods, was carried out in the Soviet Union at the Academic Computation Center and the Institute of Atmospheric Physics, both of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The results of the American and Soviet research were essentially the same.

"Whilst some ten or fifteen years ago it could be said that a nuclear war would take a toll of hundreds of millions of human lives and cause unprecedented destruction of property," said Yevgeny Velikhov, Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, "current perceptions of the global ecological catastrophe that would occur as a consequence of a nuclear war indicate that it would cause the collapse of human civilization. The continued existence of humankind and even of the very life on Earth, is at stake.

"This conclusion was first formulated by scientists active in different fields and of different countries early in 1983, and reasserted publicly and in no uncertain terms at an international conference, *The World After Nuclear War*, in Washington on October 31-November 1, 1983."⁴⁹

Further Soviet studies showed that nuclear winter was only one of the consequences of the wholesale combustion of organic matter. There could also be a complete racemization, that is, a conversion of optically active substances into optically inactive, and the disappearance of pure substances that comprise the chemical basis of life on Earth. Explaining the results of his research, Vitaly Goldansky, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, stressed that apart from self-reproduction, the bio-organic world had one other amazing property that was lacking in non-living nature: chiral purity or an exclusively "left" content of amino acids in proteins and an exclusively "right" content of sugars in nucleic acids.

"If left to themselves," Goldansky said, "chirally pure compounds will sooner or later turn into a mixture with an equal quantity of right and left isomers. Chemists call such mixtures racemose. Non-living nature has a tendency towards racemization, a mirror symmetry, an equality of left and right. Chiral purity, on the other hand, is a necessary condition for the inception and maintenance of life: self-duplication of the molecules of life can be conceived and maintained exclusively in a chirally pure medium."⁵⁰

It is quite likely that as a result of nuclear war and the combustion of a mass of organic matter, of the destruction of humankind and all the flora and fauna, the natural environment would suffer complete racemization. This means that the biosphere would disappear completely. The substance out of which life is shaped would disappear. And even if chirally pure substances should one day reappear, humankind would hardly be a winner.

A serious view of all this was taken by the leadership of the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries. Knowledge of the actual peril prompted the Soviet and American leaders to sign a Joint Statement in Geneva in 1985, saying that, being conscious of the special responsibility of the USSR and the USA in the matter of safeguarding peace, they have declared that nuclear war must never be started, and there cannot be a winner in that war.⁵¹ Graphic evidence of the new political thinking, this offers fresh opportunities for restructuring the system of international relations on the principles of confidence and security in the name of the survival of human civilization.

But perestroika here is hindered by ideological, psychological, military, and political stereotypes and prejudices that accumulated over the preceding decades. The Soviet Union is prepared to go its half of the way, and to get rid of them. This effort has already begun. "The problem of the new mentality has preoccupied our society and the Soviet leadership for some time," Mikhail Gorbachev said to the participants in the international Moscow forum For a Nuclear-Free World, For the Survival of Humanity. "We have given it a lot of thought. We have criticized ourselves and others. We have asked ourselves difficult, mind-boggling questions before we came to see the realities as they really are. And we arrived at the conviction that in today's complicated and contradictory world which has come to a crossroads, there must be new approaches and methods of solving international problems. We arrived at conclusions that compel us to revise some of the things that were priorly considered axiomatic."⁵²

But unlike the Soviet Government, others in the world refused to abandon old axioms. These axioms affect the thinking of generals and politicians, giving rise to new versions of the old political and military doctrines.

3. National Security and Military Doctrine

In January 1980, the House Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, discussed Soviet strategic forces: how much the Soviets could be trusted at negotiations in the light of CIA data, and the intentions of the Soviet leadership. Shortly before, the Senate had declined to ratify SALT-2. Intimations of a new international deterioration had appeared on the detente horizon, and the congressmen were looking into the future of disarmament.

Two leading experts on Soviet affairs, Richard Pipes and Raymond Garthoff, delivered reports. Pipes said: "One can now speak openly of something that could not have been spoken of three years ago; namely, that the CIA has had in its hands for some time long runs of a Soviet theoretical journal called *Voyennaya Mysl* or Military Thought, a journal intended for high officers, in which military men speak to other military men."⁵³

Though, Pipes continued, the journal did not have a very tight classification, it was relatively free of the cruder kind of propaganda that you find in open Soviet sources.

What Pipes said was true: certain reservations which, with some wishful thinking, could be interpreted as leaving open the option of a nuclear first strike, did crop up in *Voyennaya Mysl*, though, to be sure, it was quite unnecessary to resort to the services of the Central Intelligence Agency to read that journal.

But even the most secret Soviet publications never published anything about a possible Soviet initiative of starting a war between the superpowers. True, Pipes said so himself. "Even in *Military Thought*," he said, "which is a classified organ, the Soviet Union never initiates war."⁵⁴

It is another matter that Soviet military men, like their American counterparts, must for professional reasons deal with the possible consequences of a conflict erupting between the nuclear powers, and plan military operations within the framework defined by official military doctrine. And to avoid incorrect interpretations of each other's utterances, it would evidently be a good idea to update the doctrine so that military men would not

have to discuss at a professional level the question of annihilating their adversary.

Let's admit that military doctrine was until recently one of the most conservative elements of the Soviet foreign-policy concept. That was what allowed the opposition to use utterances of Soviet military experts and mount propaganda campaigns furthering the idea of a Soviet "military threat". One such campaign was mounted in the latter half of the 1970s, at the very height of detente. Americans were told that the Soviet Union had not spoken the truth about its intentions, and that the truth could be found in expert articles in secret Soviet journals.

It is a fact that until quite recently, the articles of Soviet military experts did contain ideas that could well be used in propaganda campaigns. Gradually, with the realities of the present-day world sinking in, those ideas were squashed. I have intimated this before. But we must remember that this resulted from an acute clash of opinions between the "tough" and "mild" lines in foreign policy. When Mikhail Gorbachev said old axioms should be revised, he meant specific things, including those related to the military doctrine which Soviet Armed Forces had adhered to over nearly thirty years.

History should not be rewritten to suit anyone's tastes. There should be no blank spots in history, concealing inconvenient facts and personalities. The main thing is, however, that the Soviet Union was the first to overcome dangerous misconceptions and to arrive at the new political thinking in its official policy. Its counterparts in the world arena have not yet attained that dimension.

On May 29, 1987, at a sitting of the Political Consultative Committee in Berlin, the Warsaw Treaty countries adopted a new military doctrine. It may be described as an instrument for the prevention of war. For the first time in history, it has put down the principle of "sensible sufficiency", entrenching the defensive nature of the Warsaw Treaty's armed forces. Another new feature was its call on the NATO countries to hold consultations with the object of comparing the military doctrines of the two alliances, ending mutual suspicion and distrust, and obtaining a better idea of each other's intentions.

To visualize the distance between the old and new political thinking, let us take the true history of the evolution of the Soviet and American military doctrines, and see how intricate and contradictory it has been.

Soviet military doctrine was first formulated in the early 1920s, soon after the Civil War ended in Russia. A bitter debate ensued between some Bolshevik military experts and Leon Trotsky, then Chairman of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council. Trotsky insisted that offensive wars should be part of Soviet military doctrine. This followed from his concept of "permanent revolution". Mikhail Frunze, noted for his victories over the whiteguard armies of Kolchak and Wrangel, opposed Trotsky on this issue. "From the angle of the first point," Frunze said, referring to Trotsky's thesis, "I believe it is a most harmful, stupid and childish idea for us to speak today of offensive wars. If we trumpet about it in the papers, at public meetings and the like, this will be silly and harmful for our cause, and no Marxist should agree to it."⁵⁵

Frunze's approach was backed by the Bolshevik leadership. On January 19, 1925, speaking at a Central Committee Plenum, which relieved Trotsky of the duties of Chairman of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council, Stalin stressed that "as before, our banner is one of *peace*. But if war breaks out, we will not be given the chance to sit it out — we will have to act, but let's be the last to act. We will act in order to put the decisive weight on the scales, a *weight* that would tilt them."⁵⁶ Since then there has been no mention in Soviet military doctrine of "offensive wars" to be started by the Soviet Union.

The first Soviet military doctrine stood the test of time. It went back to when the Soviet Union was in a hostile encirclement, and therefore envisaged an inevitable world war in which the USSR would face capitalist states seeking to wipe out the socialist system. Hence, the war would be decisive, of manoeuvre rather than positional, the Red Army adhering to an offensive strategy. The ground forces were considered decisive, bearing the main responsibility for defeating and destroying the potential aggressor.

The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 against Nazi Germany was a crucial examination for the Soviet military doctrine. Although gross mistakes had been made, notably about the importance of the opening stage of a war and the defensive operations, the final victory proved that the provisions of the doctrine were viable.

That is why some Soviet leaders stuck to the old doctrine for some time after the war ended. As before, the central idea was that another world war was inevitable. Referring to the anti-war movement, Stalin used to say that since imperialism survived

despite the successful peace movements, the inevitability of war survived as well.⁵⁷

To be sure, this provision was in keeping with the situation that had shaped right after the Second World War. With a monopoly on atomic arms, the Truman Administration espoused the concept of containment, conceived on two planes as containment of socialism by means of conventional arms and politico-military measures, and containment by means of nuclear weapons conceived as deterrence. A cable by George Kennan, US Ambassador in Moscow, backed by National Security Council Directives 20/1 and 20/4, said pressure, including military action and the country's occupation, should be put on the Soviet Union to change its system. Containment was conceived as part of the preparations for a nuclear war against the Soviet Union. Before 1948, the Pentagon had something like ten plans, with the first twenty targets for an atomic attack having been listed back in 1945.⁵⁸ There was a succession of plans, codenamed Totality, Charioteer, Cogwheel, Gunpowder, Halfmoon, Fleetwood-Doublestar, and so on. Anthony C. Brown, a US researcher, let the public know about them. "The joint chiefs," he said among other things, "would have thought there was reason and excuse for preventive war in 1948-1949."⁵⁹ The thing that made the US Government hesitate was its fear that despite the carnage and havoc of an atomic strike, the Soviet Union would succeed in blotting out the US bridgeheads along its western frontiers.⁶⁰

In the circumstances, the Soviet Government had no choice but to step up its development of an atom bomb of its own. What difficulties this entailed is well illustrated by the following episode. It was 1947—the country lay in ruins. USSR Health Minister E.I. Smirnov toured the war-ravaged areas. He was appalled. In Makeyevka the hospital served food to its patients in tin cans instead of plates. He asked the Government for more money, but received much less than what he had asked for. Council of Ministers Chairman Stalin observed dryly that Smirnov was in a position to know of the drive for atomic weapons and should be aware what the money was being spent on.⁶¹

The atomic weapon was finally developed. No longer was it a monopoly of the United States.

A little confused by this news, the US leaders amended their military strategy. They produced Dropshot, a plan for protracted and total war preparations (which was later declassified—probably by mistake). Dropshot's main thrust was that the US should gain a 10:1 nuclear arms superiority and use it to de-

feat the USSR and its allies in a nuclear war. The aggressive essence of Dropshot was reflected in the tentative date set for starting a nuclear war: January 1, 1957, with the reservation, it is true, that the start depended on whether the situation made war possible and necessary. Nothing was said of the intentions of the Soviet leadership.

The first American national nuclear age doctrine was highlighted by outspoken aims and designs. Although it was called doctrine of containment, its aims as defined in NSC memorandum 68, drawn up under Paul Nitze's guidance, showed that what containment really meant was "a policy of calculated and gradual coercion".⁶² Those who still portray containment as a means of defence against what they call communist expansion, would do well to remember this. Military superiority, aggression, surprise attack, and victory in a nuclear war — those were the distinctive features of US military strategy. To a large extent, they are still typical of Pentagon's present-day plans.

The Korean war of 1950-1953, in which the United States lost 54,246 dead and 103,284 wounded, with material losses to the US economy totalling 164 billion dollars,⁶³ was a typical piece of deterrence strategy. It had a sobering effect on the American leadership, and prompted it to look for new approaches.

There are those who say United States intentions are not aggressive for if they had been, it would have started a war when it still had a monopoly on atomic arms. But Anthony C. Brown, who referred to secret American military reports, set us right on this score. The outlook for Trojan, which envisaged nuclear war in 1950 and was drawn up by a group under Lt.-Gen. John Edwin Hull, was anything but satisfactory: the United States, which counted on delivering a devastating atomic strike by bombers from airfields near the Soviet border, would not be able to prevent Soviet tanks from occupying Europe and the Middle East. The losses Soviet anti-aircraft defences would inflict on the US strategic air force, and Soviet seizure of US military bases would put the United States in a difficult position.

As for Dropshot, the declassified documents of 1954-1955 published by historian David Allen Rosenberg in 1982, show that targets in the Soviet Union for nuclear strikes which would leave "a smoking radiating ruin at the end of two hours",⁶⁴ were still being finalized. By the time the planned beginning of the war (1957) came around, however, the situation had changed so radically that talk of an immediate nuclear war had become meaningless.

As for the Soviet leadership of that time, it had its hands full restoring the war-ravaged economy, and was farthest from the thought of any military activity. This is borne out by NSC Directive 20/4 that "a careful weighing of the various factors points to the probability that the Soviet Government is not now planning any deliberate armed action calculated to involve the United States".⁶⁵

It was official military doctrine that the ground forces were the backbone and basis of Soviet armed strength. The troops did not get atomic arms until 1954, when a campaign was launched to train servicemen in their use. When the Second World War ended, the Soviet Army's strength was cut. As a result, 2,874,000 men and officers were left by 1948 out of the 1945 total of 11,365,000. True, the outbreak of the Korean War triggered an additional mobilization, with the result that by 1955 the Soviet Armed Forces had 5,763,000 men.⁶⁶

It is only fair to note that Stalin's postwar policy did nothing to buttress confidence abroad in Soviet intentions. Mass arrests, ideological discussions, the induced split of the international communist movement, such foreign-policy moves as delaying the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran and Stalin's raising the question of the straits, the drumming into the heads of the people that another world war was inevitable, and so on, certainly did not help create a climate of confidence. On the contrary, all this created a guarded attitude even among sober-minded Western politicians. This sort of thing was seized upon by those who expounded the idea of rolling back socialism to intimidate people in the capitalist countries. Quite evidently, the blame for the cold war and its consequences should not be placed exclusively on the West. The crimes and errors of the Stalin leadership could not be justified even if they were prompted by the best of intentions.

A revision of certain aspects of Soviet military doctrine and the aims of military planning was launched immediately after Stalin's death in 1953. The Soviet Government under Malenkov declared its aim of relieving international tensions and shifting the economic emphasis on the consumer industries. The September 1953 CPSU Central Committee Plenum acted on Nikita Khrushchev's report and adopted a large-scale agricultural development programme. This on the one hand. On the other, a discussion was started with the aim of backing away from Stalin's dogmatic concept of "constantly operating factors" and bringing Soviet military doctrine abreast of the nuclear age and the revol-

ution in military technologies. The editor-in-chief of *Voyennaya Mysl*, N. Talensky, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevsky, and other theorists took part in the discussion. The discussion eventually strengthened the view that nuclear arms were a specific type of arms not to be compared with any other and liable to cardinaly alter the course and nature of any coming war. Gradually, nuclear weapons were raised to the status of the decisive service, with a crucial effect on the outcome of any war.

The idea that another world war was not inevitable was first sounded in an article by M. Gus in the journal *Zvezda* in November 1953. "It has been shown and proved in practice," he wrote, "that we are able to avert war and paralyze the operation of the law (that war is inevitable. — *V.I.*)."⁶⁷

It was a heretical idea for its time and was strongly resisted by adherents to the old approach. A number of Party publications attacked Gus's idea. In the February 1954 issue of *Zvezda* a V. Tereshkin wrote, "there are no grounds to speak of the disappearance of the inevitability of war because the imperialist system has survived the Second World War, and with it have survived the laws of its development and downfall."⁶⁸

But the thaw in international relations and the "spirit of Geneva" after the 1955 summit, disproved the dogmatists.

In February 1956, the 20th Congress of the CPSU went on record that another world war was not inevitable. This was put down in the Party programme. The international conferences of Communist and Workers' Parties, that is, the world communist movement as a whole, accepted the idea. For all Communists fighting for peace and averting war became one of the main goals.

Still, the nuclear war threat survived. The Eisenhower Administration that had come to power in 1953 set out to modernize US national strategy with an eye to the nuclear, as well as atomic, arms of enormous destructive power in the possession of the USSR. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles advanced the "massive retaliation" strategy when addressing the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on January 12, 1954. Instead of Truman's "emergency" measures, Dulles said, the United States would set its goals for an entire historical era.

Dulles took a realistic view of the relation of strength given in NSC Directive 162/2 endorsed by Eisenhower in October 1953, and of the menace involved by a total nuclear war. He therefore laid the main emphasis on the use of tactical atomic weapons in any bid to secure the long-term objectives of any local or limited war.

Since superiority was essential, Dulles set out to improve nuclear delivery vehicles of various classes, with the main emphasis on upgrading the bomber force.

To obtain additional Congress allocations a propaganda campaign was launched to show that the United States was behind the Soviet Union in number of bombers. This was the first campaign in which the "Soviet threat" was exploited by military-industrial monopolies to prove that their industries had to be built up.

To be sure, the campaign played a bad trick on the US leadership, for it overlooked the fact that the Soviet Union had taken a different tack. The Soviet leaders were not of a single mind concerning priorities in the build-up of nuclear delivery vehicles. There were three points of view. Some suggested distributing available nuclear missiles among the various arms of the service in a certain proportion. Some thought nuclear missiles should go to the air force and navy only. And some felt that the strategic nuclear-missile force should be a separate and independent arm of the service.⁶⁹ To follow the last-named course, powerful, long-range, launch vehicles reaching US territory, were needed. They were, indeed, developed in a matter of three years, and tested in August 1957. Rocket booster R-7, developed by Sergei Korolev's designers, took the first 80-kilogram artificial earth satellite into space orbit on October 4 that year.

As we see, while public opinion in the United States was being conditioned to the need of a riposte to the mythical Soviet long-range bomber, the Soviet Union took an entirely different course and created intercontinental ballistic missiles, which were more dependable and less vulnerable nuclear delivery vehicles. This radically changed the world situation. No country could now hope to escape a first or retaliatory strike.

When the Soviet Union acquired the capability of hitting US territory, it had to update its military doctrine to suit the new realities. Nikita Khrushchev and Soviet Defence Minister Rodion Malinovsky made the basic provisions of the new military doctrine public at the 21st and 22nd congresses of the CPSU and, specifically, at the January 1960 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The basic provisions of the new doctrine were much like those of the old doctrine as concerned the possible enemy, the resolute nature of the confrontation, the necessity of defeating and destroying the enemy, and the coalition that would fight the war. The doctrine retained the point about the comprehensive

nature of warfare, which would involve all arms and types of forces.

But it also contained fundamentally new provisions, notably that nuclear missiles were decisive and capable of replacing all other types of weaponry. "Our country," Khrushchev said at the Supreme Soviet session, "has powerful missiles. The air force and navy are no longer as important as before. They are not being reduced, but, indeed, replaced. Nearly all of the air force is being replaced by missile weapons. We have now greatly reduced, and will evidently continue to reduce or even halt, the production of bombers and other outdated technology. As concerns the navy, submarines are gaining in significance while surface ships can no longer play the role they played in the past."⁷⁰

As a result, a new arm of the service—strategic-purpose missile troops, was established as part of the USSR Armed Forces. The numerical strength of the Soviet Army and Navy was massively reduced. The Supreme Soviet learned that the Armed Forces were being reduced by 1,200,000 men, so that 2,423,000 would remain after the reduction. This was the lowest troops figure since the war.

Following the Berlin and Caribbean crises, the reductions were modified. When the United States began its armed intervention in Vietnam, and then when the universal conscription law was enacted in 1967, troop strength was increased. The idea of substituting nuclear missiles for surface warships and the bomber force was scrapped. The Soviet Union continued to build up its conventional armaments.

The original version of the Soviet military doctrine viewed in the light of present-day knowledge about the consequences of a nuclear war, gravitated towards sensible sufficiency. It was designed to deter any potential aggressor at a time when no realistic conclusions had yet been drawn about the effects of nuclear war.

In January 1963, the Soviet Union let it be known that it was making 100-megaton warheads. Announcing this, Khrushchev came close to apprehending the dangers that were implicit in such weaponry. A 100-megaton bomb, he said, was the limit of military rationale. Anything more powerful, he added, would be immensely dangerous for its user as well.⁷¹ Today, when we know of the "nuclear winter" effect, we might add that a 100-megaton blast is immensely dangerous for all people on Earth, because it is likely to cause irreversible disastrous changes in the biosphere and the Earth's climate.

Indeed, the use of a few such powerful warheads could have wiped out civilization as far back as the early 1960s. The point I want to make is that if military technology had ceased its onward march at that time, the security of neither side would have suffered. Knowledge of the destructive powers of the already available weapons would have deterred anyone from using nuclear arms in any variety of war.

But the policy-making of those days overlooked this knowledge. Ever more destructive weapons were developed. Chiefly, because military men and politicians on both sides tried to pass off nuclear war as an acceptable political tool.

The first to break the impasse created by the dangers of a nuclear war were the US leaders. The "flexible response" strategy of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations was designed to assure security and achieve long-term aims with no full-scale use of nuclear weapons.

The new US doctrine contained many a realistic innovation. Its open version, indeed, was fairly attractive. It said, among other things, that the sole concern of the US leadership was to inflict "unacceptable damage" to the defences and economy of the attacker. US politicians did not then plan a nuclear first strike.

But the new military doctrine had two vulnerable points. The first was Herman Kahn's "escalation" concept which envisaged diverse scenarios for turning a conventional into a nuclear war. This depended on the prevailing situation, not on a commitment renouncing first use of nuclear arms. The basic provision of the doctrine to avoid a first strike was thus devalued, because it left the enemy in the dark as to America's next step and to what point of "escalation" it would go. This was an open invitation to use nuclear arms first and not wait until the US leadership did so.

"Since nuclear weapons can play a crucial role in an armed struggle, each belligerent will strive to be the first to use it," wrote a Soviet military expert in 1969. He added: "Consequently, we can speak of a new nuclear principle, that of forestalling the enemy."⁷²

The other weak point was that the doctrine envisaged a nuclear potential that was able to put out of action all Soviet military objectives at one go. The economy was to set its sights on securing US nuclear missile superiority over the Soviet Union and, at the same time, set up a foolproof anti-missile and civilian defence system. Accordingly, between 1961 and 1968 the number of ICBMs went up from 28 to 1,054, submarine-launched

ballistic missiles from 80 to 656, and nuclear delivery vehicles from 1,762 to 2,358.⁷³ The regular armed forces, whose strength had been somewhat reduced under Eisenhower, increased from 2.5 million to 3.5 million.

Under cover of the "counter-force potential", the US Government started a dirty war in Vietnam, with a deleterious effect on world affairs. The Vietnam War acted as a brake on the conclusion of important international agreements. Only one agreement, that on non-proliferation of nuclear arms, was concluded between 1963, the year of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, and 1972, the year of SALT-1. Only one summit was held throughout that period—by US President Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin, yielding no tangible results. Vietnam became a testing ground for the latest destructive conventional arms. Throughout the war, the USA and the USSR feverishly proceeded to build up nuclear and conventional mass annihilation stockpiles in a bid to win superiority.

The Soviet search for new weapon systems and strategic solutions of the mid-60s and early 70s was either behind that of the United States or parallel. After its "missile shock", the United States had managed to saddle the Soviet Union with a policy of military build-up. Until then, the Soviets were almost always slightly behind. They had been second to the United States in acquiring atomic arms, atomic submarines, long-range strategic bombers, and so on.

By and large, the Soviet leadership had its own criteria of security. For a long time, for example (unlike the US leadership), it did not consider nuclear arms the decisive type of weapon. Neither did it follow the US lead as concerned a bomber force. It found its own solution to the problem of nuclear delivery, and thus came out ahead of America. Later, however, both sides followed parallel courses, with the United States ahead.

This stood out in bold relief during the all-out Soviet build-up of nuclear arms and other armaments in order to secure rough parity. The Soviets adopted many of the strategic ideas nursed by the US military establishment. This included the provision that strategic military superiority was imperative.

"Military history shows," said a book that came out at the time, "that tactical successes will be enduring only if they express the tendency of one side having a general superiority over the other. The same applies to the correlation of troop strength in armed actions on an operational or strategic scale."⁷⁴

The drive for superiority followed logically from the objective of winning a nuclear war. Many of the provisions of the original military doctrine were altered to emphasize the rationale of war in modern-day conditions. The idea that nuclear weapons abolished other types of weapons, was renounced. This made Soviet strategists also renounce the provision that limited or local wars would inevitably grow over into a full-scale thermonuclear conflict. In effect, the Soviet military establishment had thus accepted the US "flexible response" and "limited war" concepts.

The substance of a limited war, like that of any other, Soviet military theorists maintained, takes concrete shape and acquires detail by virtue of its social character: socially just wars are at once progressive wars of liberation, whereas an unjust war is a reactionary war of conquest, acting as a brake on the march of history.⁷⁵

The Soviet military establishment redoubled attention to conventional arms and armed forces. Ground forces were assigned the task of finishing off the enemy and seizing (occupying) his territory.⁷⁶

A decision was taken to build up a system of anti-missile and civilian defence on the US model. The early editions of *Military Strategy*, the basic theoretical handbook of the early 1960s, said strategic defence had lost importance.⁷⁷ At the end of the 1960s, Soviet military experts asserted that aggressive acts from the outside would be countered by devastating strategic nuclear strikes and dependable systems of anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence.⁷⁸

To prove that the Soviet military establishment had always believed in strategic defence, those promoting SDI refer to an observation Alexei Kosygin had made to President Lyndon Johnson. But, like US policy, that of the Soviet Union has also seen many changes. Besides, since then the two countries have signed the ABM Treaty.

Though modernization of the Soviet military doctrine occurred when the search for new spheres of agreement had slowed down, it was, in effect no more than an element in the evolution of Soviet policy. The other element was that the Soviet Union had come to realize that nuclear war was unacceptable as a political instrument. Measures were being devised to prevent such a war and, indeed, completely eliminate its possibility. In the late 1950s, the Soviet Union had come out with a proposal to scrap all types of weapons and disband all armies. At that time, this elicited no response what-

ever. In the early sixties, Soviet literature cast doubt on the Clausewitz formula. Prominent journalist Valentin Zorin, writing in Moscow's *New Times* weekly soon after the Caribbean crisis, said among other things that now, in the age of megaton bombs and intercontinental missiles, the Clausewitz formula of war being the continuation of politics by other means, was fraught with disaster and no longer acceptable.⁷⁹

Military theorists objected vehemently. The authors of a fundamental military text accused Zorin of confusing two, albeit interrelated, issues: the essence and political content of nuclear war, on the one hand, and the sense and desirability of using it as a means of securing political aims, on the other. "This confusion is methodologically intolerable," they wrote. "Objectively, it tends to obfuscate the class essence of the nuclear war that is being prepared by the more aggressive imperialist circles, and thus misleads the mass of the people."⁸⁰

As we see, totally incompatible views prevailed in Soviet society concerning the nature and possible consequences of a nuclear conflict. Later developments showed that the military establishment was in the wrong. But at that time this clash of opinions triggered a succession of debates in the press and elsewhere.

Unclassified Soviet literature still said a nuclear war was winnable. But the Soviet spokesman at offensive strategic arms talks with the United States in 1969 handed the Americans a classified memorandum suggesting the following common position: "War between our two countries may be disastrous for both sides. It could be tantamount to suicide for the country that ventured on such a war."⁸¹ This was taken as the basis for negotiations, which culminated in the signing of accords limiting build-up of strategic armaments.

The talks were spurred by events that had by then affected the United States and the Soviet Union. In the case of the Johnson Administration, the futility of the flexible response policy was brought home to it with a vengeance in Vietnam, on the periphery of the capitalist world. If an economically and militarily powerful country like the United States could not cope with a relatively small and underdeveloped country, the chances of pursuing imperial power politics by military means were slim indeed. On the other hand, US statesmen and generals observed the Soviet Union building up its nuclear-missile potential, nullifying US superiority in that field. Counter-force as a variety of nuclear blackmail, coupled with a policy from strength, was

paying no dividends. The Soviet Union balked at making concessions and shrugged off American pressure.

The time was fast approaching when the Soviet Union would exceed the USA in missiles and attain strategic superiority. The strategic thinking of those days considered this a threat to US security. The US leaders were dismayed. To reverse the undesirable course of events, Johnson called on the Soviet side to hold a summit meeting. But his presidency was running out, while President elect Richard Nixon gave to understand a summit was undesirable. So, it did not take place.

Entering upon his duties as President, Nixon said the USA had to regain superiority. Within weeks, however, he saw that this was impossible. The only other choice he had was to start equal negotiations.

Though guardedly, the Soviet Government welcomed the American negotiation overtures. As it developed, US sources affirm, the Soviets preferred not to exploit the difficulties of the United States. The strategic arms limitation talks began on a note of goodwill, with the negotiators meeting each other half-way.

4. The Road to the New Thinking

Speaking at an international gathering in Moscow, Dennis Meadows, author of *The Limits to Growth* Club of Rome report, recalled a joke he had heard from Soviet academic Djermen Gvishiani after the signing of SALT-1. "In the past," Gvishiani had said, "the bear and the eagle sitting in the same boat knocked holes of different diameter in its bottom; now, they have come to terms that the holes should be of the same caliber."

The implication was that SALT-1 had nothing to do with reduction, let alone elimination, of nuclear arms. And one of the reasons, as I have said, was the military establishment's disbelief that nuclear war meant humankind would perish, though, in fact, that was the basis for the negotiations.

On the other hand, arms reduction was hindered by the inertia of the military establishment's parochial bureaucratic approach to war and peace whipped on by doctrines and statutes to prepare for possible war. As recently as 1982, even though a turn to new attitudes was already in the making, a Soviet military book maintained that "to conduct a victorious war the country

must have first-class human material, which must be trained for possible war beforehand."⁸²

It was no easy thing to reverse this tendency in the thinking of ranking functionaries and concrete politics.

The above was true of both the USA and USSR. Richard Ovchinnikov, former Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and chief of the Soviet mission at the UN, noted in his memoirs there were three divergent groups in the American leadership. One had thought from the outset that detente was a forced measure and a here-and-now expedient; the other that detente could benefit forces of social regression (when hopes that it would hold down the national liberation processes proved futile, its enthusiasm gave place to annoyance), and the third recognized the imperative of adapting to the changing realities. It was aware that the USA had passed the peak of its power and that emphasis on force in the nuclear age was suicidal. Keen-sighted though they were, however, they lacked the political courage to hold up their line consistently.⁸³ A compromise between these three groups resulted in the shaping of a new US military doctrine. Known as the Schlesinger or realistic deterrence strategy, it was part of the more general Nixon Doctrine.

Though "realistic deterrence" was ultimately named after the Secretary of Defence in the second Nixon cabinet, its general principles had been presented by Nixon's first Defence Secretary, Melvin Laird, before a House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on March 4, 1971. The new strategy, he said, was realistic because, among other things, it took into account the strategic, fiscal, manpower, and political realities.⁸⁴ Acting on these "realities", the United States reduced the strength of its armed force from 3,548,000 to 2,100,000 by going over to a volunteer army. A "sufficiency" concept took the place of the provoking concept of "superiority", though while the US relinquished its edge in number of nuclear delivery vehicles, it retained the edge in number of warheads.

Considering the fact that the United States had multiple re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), including independently targetable ones, while the Soviet Union had none as yet, "sufficiency" was hardly a fair reflection of the prevailing state of affairs.

Having drawn the due lessons from the Vietnam War, the United States was more cautious in using conventional forces, preferring to act through its allies and posing as the guarantor of international security. More attention was devoted to installing bases on islands rather than the mainland, and redoubling the

US naval presence in all parts of the world, reducing dependence on US installations in various countries.

The real sense behind the new doctrine was made clear by Schlesinger at a Washington press conference on January 10, 1974. The "option of targets" concept shifted the emphasis on attacking military rather than civilian objectives, that is, missile silos, military bases, armaments industries, and the like.

This was paraded as a more humane approach. But Soviet experts suspected rightly that this was intended, first, to rationalize a nuclear conflict and squeeze it back into the framework of an ordinary war, and, second, to orient the US armed forces on a first strike. For would there be any sense in hitting silos that had already fired their missiles? The same purpose was served by the build-up of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

Still, despite various underwater reefs, US military strategists were steadily shifting from the doctrine of direct war preparations and rationalization of acts of war to the concept of sufficiency and containment (deterrence). This reflected the growing realism of US statesmen and generals, which resulted in the publication of a presidential memo by the Carter Administration in January 1977. Just two reasons remained for the arms race: to make sure, chiefly through psychological intimidation, that the enemy did not strike, and to meet the interests of the profit-seeking military-industrial corporations. At the same time, a political sentiment was accumulating which secured an abrupt turn in US policy a few years later and again created the threat of a nuclear war.

Far-reaching change was also underway in the psychology and outlook of people in the Soviet Union. A longing for good-neighbour relations, for openness and detente, was making itself felt ever more strongly. Influential forces had arisen who sought to overcome the suspicion and isolationism of the cold war period. The road to new ideas, one of which was the self-sustained value of peace and detente, had been long and difficult. But its end was reached earlier in the USSR than in the United States, especially as concerned the US political world. The Soviet Union was more consistent and resolute in seeking detente than the United States.

It is only fair to note, however, that the Soviet leadership proved incapable of reacting promptly enough to the changed world situation. This was due to the law that the fact is father to the thought, not vice versa. While society marches on, knowledge of the problems piling up in it can never keep up. Conser-

vative thinking, inertia, the predominance of old-time theories, and the traditions of political struggle were no less of a hindrance to the appreciation of the true dangers of a nuclear war and the stockpiling of nuclear arms than the class interests of the military-industrial complex in the West.

Bearing in mind the ideological character of the Soviet establishment, we will more easily understand how difficult it was to advance ideas that were at odds with the providential faith in the ultimate triumph of communism in the non-too-distant future, which imposed a search for all possible ways and means of securing the downfall of the ideological rival. I will try to show here the enormous damage done to disarmament by certain irresponsible utterances of Soviet leaders in the past—often prompted by the sincere belief that the chips were down and there was no other way to human progress.

The lag of the social consciousness behind social being is a law of the process of history. But society cannot advance unless a certain equilibrium is achieved between consciousness and being at crucial turnings. At such times a sober view of things and a goodly measure of pragmatism must help to overcome the negative effects of the lag of the consciousness. Revolutionary eras, and such an era is in evidence today, are revolutionary precisely because they compel people to clear out the rubbish and secure a balance in society between theory and practice.

That there was a clash of opinions at the end of the 1960s and in the early 70s concerning broader relations with the West and adoption of new principles for negotiation with the capitalist states, notably the USA, is borne out by the records of theoretical discussions of those days. They reflected a broad spectrum of opinion about the very possibility of holding talks, the credibility of agreements and treaties, and confidence in the intentions of the negotiation partner.

The press said the struggle for peace could not succeed unless there was superiority in arms. Proper relations between East and West were said to be impossible. This was the attitude of Yevgeny Rybkín, for example, who wrote in a review of a book on war and peace that he did not think spokesmen of the opposite systems could agree on disarmament. Disarmament, he added, could not be achieved through what he called a utopian "relaxation" of the political and class struggle on the world scene. And he amplified: "It requires exceedingly active pressure by revolutionary forces in imperialist countries on their governments, coupled with a flexible but principled policy of the so-

cialist camp. Any other notion of how to achieve disarmament is an illusion."⁸⁵

This view became widespread. Especially in military books. Drawing up its peace programmes, the Soviet Government felt it had to curb nihilist sentiment concerning peace accords with the capitalist countries. Addressing the USSR Supreme Soviet, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said: "Those sorry theorists who are trying to prevail on us that disarmament is an illusion, ought to be told that by taking this stand they are joining hands with the most rabid imperialist reactionaries and weakening the front of struggle against them."⁸⁶

In February 1969 came the first Soviet impulses to create a favourable situation for strategic arms limitation talks at the end of the year. Addressing the UN General Assembly, Gromyko said the Soviet Union was always ready to sit down at the negotiation table if this furthered solution of the questions in dispute.⁸⁷

But the strategic arms limitation talks dragged on and on. Not until May 1972 did the US President come on his first visit to Moscow, where he negotiated with Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny. That was a truly historic development, highlighted by a series of agreements under the over-all heading of SALT-1.

By that time a considerable improvement was achieved in Soviet-French relations. A treaty had been concluded with the Federal Republic of Germany, and then a quadripartite agreement on West Berlin. This was evidence that the postwar frontiers in Europe were consolidating. Cumulatively, this gave Brezhnev cause to say that the postwar period in Europe was running to a close and that Europe was going over to a new historical phase in which it would live under the sign of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation. The culmination of that phase was reached in 1975, when 35 countries gathered in Helsinki at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Attempts were made to torpedo the ongoing detente process. Both in the United States and the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, however, they made no serious impact on the leadership, which was firmly committed to the idea of peaceful coexistence. Those who wanted a tough policy gave up one position after another. The military doctrine was in a state of flux.

The signing of SALT-1 did not halt the race to secure arms superiority. All it did was to set limits for the number of nuclear delivery vehicles on each side, forbidding any purely numerical build-up over and above the fixed ceilings. But it gave both sides

a free hand in intensifying the contest by increasing the arsenal of MIRVed warheads. Either side hoped to attain superiority by making what were called rational weapons more effective. On the other hand, the signing of the ABM Treaty was evidence that both sides were disappointed in the chances of developing an impregnable anti-nuclear defence system. Marshal Grechko, then USSR Minister of Defence, put it thus:

"Development of new and more powerful offensive weapons was not always matched by development of sufficiently effective means of defence. This is the case today. There is so far no dependable means of defence against nuclear missiles."⁸⁸

Clearly, as we see from the above, the breakdown of the sword-and-shield principle was then still viewed as a temporary contingency, and means of defence were still being energetically sought.

That the two sides did not say in the Treaty that nuclear war was not winnable, showed, too, that the aim of securing victory was still down in their military doctrines. Yet SALT-1 envisaged that the two sides would renounce attempts at securing advantages in arms, which, in fact, placed in doubt the very aim of victory.

To escape this conflicting situation, military books paid attention chiefly to the moral factor. Marshal Grechko: "The principle of securing victory by building up superior strength at the crucial moment and in the crucial sector will not yield the desired result if the qualitative factors, the main one being morale of the personnel, are not taken into account. Here we may also recall the maxim that skill rather than numbers is important in warcraft."⁸⁹

The relaxation of international tensions caused the Soviet press to recall the notion of the early 1960s that the Clausewitz formula was outdated. Writing in *Izvestia* on July 11, 1973, Alexander Bovin said this in most conclusive terms. But he had opponents. One V. Sheliag, for example, declared that all talk about the destruction of civilization and nuclear war not being winnable were based on various mathematical calculations: the nuclear stockpiles were divided by the number of people on Earth, showing that all mankind could be destroyed. "But this," he added, "was a simplistic and one-sided approach to so complicated a social and historical issue as war."⁹⁰

But criticism vanished at once when CC CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev made a similar "simplistic" allusion. For ages, he said in 1974, humanity had followed the rule that he who desires peace should prepare for war. A most dangerous formu-

la this in the nuclear age, he added, for a person could die but once, while the stockpile of weaponry in the world could destroy all life on Earth several times over.⁹¹

Though Brezhnev failed to dot the i's his statement showed that the doctrine of nuclear war being winnable had begun to erode. Soviet generals no longer said the surprise factor was an earnest of success. The question of superiority, too, was seen in a new light. Speaking in Tula on January 18, 1977, Brezhnev said the Soviet Union did not seek superiority over the United States. At the UN General Assembly of 1982, the Soviet spokesman pledged that the USSR had renounced first use of nuclear weapons. To be sure, this was essentially a political act, because a first nuclear strike had long since been deleted from the Soviet military doctrine. That much, at least, was said by D. Proektor, an eminent expert on matters of war and peace, in a 1978 article, and by N. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, in a statement of 1979.⁹²

The signing of SALT-2 in 1979 by Brezhnev and Carter had the effect of halting the race in improving the killing power of nuclear warheads. Other channels for improving armaments were not closed.

By that time, however, the international situation had changed radically. While those in the United States who wanted new agreements had begun to lose influence, members of the Committee on the Present Danger had begun calling the tune in foreign affairs. They took their cue from the so-called Group B, set up as a counterweight to the official CIA group looking into Soviet military activity, and mounted a campaign about the USA spending less on military needs than the Soviet Union. The issue was slanted to create an impression favourable for the campaigners.

In the early 1980s detente was pushed into obscurity. Conservatives headed by Ronald Reagan, raised on the ideological principle of anti-communism, came to power in the United States. Seeing the world through an ideological prism, Reagan mounted a feverish campaign of high-powered arming in a bid to secure a decisive edge in counterforce armaments. This was seen as a way out of the impasse of American-Soviet strategic parity. The idea that the United States must be able to win a long nuclear war against the Soviet Union figured once again in the US press and the utterances of senior US officials.⁹³

The US strategy of direct confrontation envisaged local wars on the periphery of the capitalist world, but as Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger said on February 8, 1982, the USA

would not restrict itself to operations on the immediate front and would strike at the enemy's most vulnerable objectives wherever they may be. Weinberger described this as geographic or horizontal escalation.

Another salient point for the Soviet leadership to consider was that the United States turned down the Soviet proposal for both sides to publicly renounce first use of nuclear weapons. The reckless adventurism of US policy during the early phase of Reagan's Administration, in a setting of an anti-communist "crusade", spurred the Soviet military establishment to seek military means of countering the danger. In effect, principles that took the Soviet military doctrine back to where it had been at the end of the 60s reappeared in print. Take the pamphlet of Nikolai Ogarkov, then Chief of General Staff. Its thrust was that the coming war was winnable. "The fact that war is not fatally inevitable," he added, "does not mean that it will not arise."⁹⁴ Referring to the basics of military training, he wrote that servicemen must be taught to defeat a strong and technically well equipped enemy in all the possible exigencies of modern warfare.⁹⁵

The new outlook of both the US and Soviet military and political leaderships had a most far-reaching influence on their conduct of affairs: responding to the stationing of US medium-range missiles in Western Europe, the Soviet Union took counter-measures. With both sides committed to the principle that war was winnable whatever its scale, arithmetical equality or superiority made it possible to rationalize and compute losses in life and property and make them psychologically acceptable.

It was clear, on the other hand, that anything that upset parity, any new threat, triggered counter-measures and brought the world closer to the abyss.

But there was yet another tendency in the Soviet Union. At the height of the new deterioration in world affairs, the Kremlin declared in April 1981 that it was criminal to regard nuclear war as a rational and all but legitimate continuation of politics.⁹⁶ Nuclear weapons were described as a menace to the survival of life on Earth. The due conclusions were drawn.

By the time scientists were able to prove that even a "mild" version of a nuclear war would destroy the biosphere globally, the Soviet Union had people who appreciated this and were straining to restructure approaches. True, it took some time before they were able to work out practical solutions: not until after the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee did a group of leaders emerge that launched perestroika.

The nuclear winter concept struck a devastating blow at any plans of securing superiority through a build-up of the qualitative effectiveness and destructive power of nuclear weapons. There were so many warheads in the world at the time that use of just one per cent was enough to destroy civilization. Here logic pointed to two approaches: one was to destroy nuclear arms as morally obsolete and, two, to look for new weapons to neutralize the destructive power of nuclear warheads.

The United States chose the second approach. Making his well-known Star Wars speech on March 23, 1983, President Reagan set forth what is known as the Strategic Defence Initiative—a large-scale space-based system of anti-missile defence involving new types of weapons based on principles that were fundamentally different from those of nuclear arms, and notably on directed energy. This applied above all to lasers and charged-particle beam weapons.

The SDI built upon the notion that the temporary break in the gradualness of the sword-and-shield principle was over since the invention of new sources of radiation and the extensive advances of high-speed computer technologies, notably microprocessors. This paved the way for highly intricate automated systems that would react to any danger by themselves, without human interference. Two principles—their being “non-nuclear” (quite relative, as I see it) and their being “automatic” (that is, beyond human control—and thus beyond all human weaknesses and uncontrollable behaviour)—would, as its authors conceived it, take the SDI weapons system outside the vicious circle of a nuclear confrontation. The “defensive” nature of SDI would make it attractive to the world public.

Then, the SDI architects saw their hopes collapse. Critics pointed out with a good deal of reason that the strategic *defence* initiative was in no way defensive and did not transcend the framework of nuclear confrontation. More, the existence of nuclear weapons was its only *raison d'être*. It could play no reasonable role as a defence system in a nuclear-weapons-free world. Besides, the *Department of State Bulletin* carried a text from the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 22, 1985, saying the USA would continue “to explore the promising concepts which use nuclear energy to power devices which could destroy ballistic missiles at great distances”.⁹⁷ In sum, the SDI was no more than a new variety of nuclear weapons system, and should, therefore, be treated as such.

No less objectionable is the use of the SDI in the framework of the old counterforce strategy. This speaks of its anything but purely defensive nature. It is offensive, because there is no sense in using it in the absence of a 100-per cent capability of protecting the population and military targets from the adversary's nuclear first strike. And since the USA had at that time refused to renounce first use of nuclear arms, the ambiguity of the SDI was still more glaring.

Considering the continuous rivalry of offensive and defensive weapons, it was reasonable to expect that activation of any large-scale anti-missile system would spur the other side to build up its offensive arsenal. That was exactly what Reagan had meant when he said he wanted to exhaust the Soviet Union through the arms race.

The problem that the Soviet leaders faced after the "nuclear winter" research results had been made public was much the same as the one that faced the Americans. The logic of following the strategic pattern of United States moves required the USSR to create a space-based system of its own in reply to the SDI. But that would draw off enormous funds from the civilian sector of the economy, which was already in a stagnant condition. There was even a plan, in fact, of setting up a Defence Fund and marshalling people's savings. In an article of May 9, 1984, Marshal Ogarkov noted that the other side's capability of delivering a "disarming" nuclear strike was shrinking, while the destructive power of conventional arms, and arms based on new physical principles, had increased. The development of such types of weapon, Ogarkov wrote, was a thing of the immediate future, and to overlook this today would be a grave error. He added: "This cannot but alter the prevailing ideas about the ways and means of warfare and, more, about a country's military power."⁹⁸

The bid of finding a way out of the nuclear impasse led the Soviet Union to adopt an entirely different variant, that of eliminating all nuclear arms and preventing the stationing of arms in outer space. A keen diplomatic battle ensued to link up the elimination of nuclear arms with the scrapping of SDI. The matter was vitally important for humankind: it would have halted the appearance of a fundamentally new type of weapon before it had ever been developed. But the effort failed. Both sides had built up nuclear weapons stockpiles that were much too big to be used. Indeed, this had made them worthless. And the same thing could now happen to the space-based system. Who was to guar-

antee, however, that it would not bring on Doomsday before becoming worthless?

As long as national security depended on military means, weapons would be a rational means of politics. Would it not be better, however, if the amount of arms were reduced to a minimal sensible sufficiency for defence. This I will go into in due course. The point I want to make now is that at present, with the adoption of its new military doctrine, the Soviet Union has departed from the logic of parallels and will no longer doggedly follow in the wake of the United States and stockpile analogous or symmetrical types of weapons.

The national strategies of the Soviet Union and the United States are on divergent courses. Soviet responses to American challenges are increasingly asymmetric. Defence measures are being reduced to the minimum essential for defence or containment of the potential aggressor. Furthermore, the USSR is getting rid of morally obsolete types of weapons that are no longer able to contain or deter, and whose use is therefore senseless and dangerous for the survival of life owing to their specific qualities.

On January 15, 1986, CC CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev made public a far-ranging disarmament programme. It envisages a phased reduction of nuclear forces until none remain by the year 2000. This was a unique opportunity for the world to throw out a most barbaric and destructive type of weapon and rule out the appearance of new, still more dangerous, types. A new door was thus opened for world peace and a world free of violence, fear, suspicion, and war.

The programme for destroying nuclear arms—and it has already begun to function with the destruction by the Soviet Union and the United States of their intermediate nuclear force (medium- and shorter-range missiles)—is likely to halt the criminal carnage stretching to our days from the savage ages of barbarism and put an end to wars, which are still considered a means of securing political objectives and economic interests.

Gorbachev's Statement calls on all those who want civilization to survive, who want to raise it to a higher level of social progress, who hate war and will do everything for it to be banished from the life of humankind, to apprehend the new thinking as the sole possible means of resolving the pile of problems facing the human race.

Since it is a question of safeguarding peace and delivering humankind from the threat of nuclear war, the Statement said, no

one must stay indifferently on the sidelines. Each and everyone must pitch in. Every country, big and small, socialist and capitalist, must contribute. The contribution of every responsible political party, every mass organization, every individual, is important. All efforts must be concentrated on securing the lofty aim, for no aim is more insistent, more noble and humane. And it is up to the present generation to achieve it. It must not be left over for our descendants to achieve. That is the imperative or, if you like, the burden of historical responsibility for all acts and decisions in the period prior to the turn of the third millennium.

Peace and disarmament will forever be the core of the foreign policy of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Government. And the Soviet Union is ever ready to collaborate with all those who follow reason and goodwill, and have a sense of responsibility for a weapons-free future without wars.⁹⁹

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PART TWO

SEARCH FOR A JUST PEACE

1. The Philosopher's View of Universal Peace

Karl Marx wrote in the middle of the 19th century that "war develops [certain features] earlier than peace".¹ Years passed and we saw more proof of this than in Marx's time. War has developed to its limit. Beyond that limit it has become impossible. Yet people's notions of universal peace are still vague. Simple common-sense proposals are still often received as unrealistic. That, indeed, was how many initially received Gorbachev's Statement on eliminating nuclear arms before the 21st century. A few years passed and the outlines of nuclear disarmament have become tangible. We know now that the plan is possible.

What we need to know, however, is what we will get after disarmament. So far, we have not the faintest idea. Thinking in categories that were shaped when jungle law prevailed, helps us very little to picture a nuclear- and weapons-free world. What had seemed habitual has disintegrated before our eyes, giving place to a new, dubious, as yet unstable, but so necessary political thinking of a non-violent world.

Petrianov-Sokolov, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, who is an eminent Soviet chemist and inventor of means of defence against chemical weapons, which are no less destructive and barbarian than nuclear weapons, likes to say in his speeches that he knows very well what will happen if a nuclear war breaks out, and has no idea of what will happen if it does not.

This is a profound thought. It shows the blank spot in our knowledge of peace and its prospects. The new conditions and tasks require that humankind should look into and understand the other side of disarmament: the emergence of a new world order that has got to be just.

The search for universal peace has been as long as the search for sure-fire ways of winning a war. For a long time, war was looked upon as a natural part of human existence. Peace was little else but a breathing space between wars. Hence, the search was confined to creating a system of rules that would restrict the

destructive consequences of war. This was wholly realistic, and society wanted it. The Laws of Manu and the Arthashastra which have come down from Ancient India, do not deny the necessity of warfare. They only limit military actions with rules of common law. For example, they condemn use of perfidious and cruel arms, such as red-hot, poisoned, and the like. They forbid to kill unarmed people, enemies, who surrender, and wounded men who drop out of the fighting.²

True, these rules were not faithfully obeyed. But they did influence the public morality, worked against cruelty in battle, and stimulated further search for social models free of wars and violence. The search prompted legends to be written of a Golden Age when people lived in peace and accord. Nearly all nations have them, showing that people had dreamed of universal and eternal peace even back in the times when humankind had only just appeared on Earth.

The legends, it is true, remained legends. People could not conceive the existence of the human race without wars. Still, radical ideas of non-violence did penetrate morality and ethics, even actual behaviour. The *ahimsa* principle of non-inflicting hurt by action, speech, even thought, is one of the oldest principles of the Buddhist philosophy. King Ashoka of India, when converted to Buddhism, regarded *ahimsa* as a national virtue, renounced wars, and said he would conquer the world by love.³ Thus, he went down in history as the first peace-maker.

The problem of peace has always attracted philosophers, thinkers, statesmen and politicians. But all down the ages it was considered within a restrictive framework. In the Ancient Greece of Plato and Aristotle the common view was that internal wars between Greek-inhabited city-states were unacceptable, while external wars fought to win slaves were declared great and sacred, for in their absence the economic advancement of slave countries was inconceivable. During the feudal fragmentation, this tradition was carried on in the works of the Christian theologians. They sang praise to crusades against unbelievers, while preaching "God's peace" in relation to other Christians.

Augustine had even declared war an evil essential in relation to peace, for in its absence people would not appreciate the blessings of peace.

The tradition of limiting wars by rule and ritual, the code of knights, that limited their destructive consequences, lived on, though the code was often flouted, and wholly disregarded in relation to common people.

Bourgeois society produced some new dimensions of the problem of war and peace. This may be traced to its nature as compared with previous social arrangements, which had reposed upon a rigid hierarchy based on inequality and main force. The new society proclaimed a formal equality of all people, both the producers and the owners of commodities. This added to the numbers to whom the laws of civilized behaviour applied. So far, however, only in a person-to-person relationship.

We should not, of course, confuse standards of behaviour with actual behaviour. Besides, bourgeois society, like the previous types of society, is based on antagonism between people. Though, certainly, we must not underestimate the worth of the new ideas advanced by bourgeois humanists. As Frederick Engels pointed out, "the men who founded the modern rule of the bourgeoisie had anything but bourgeois limitations."⁴

Works attacking war appeared when the groundwork had been laid for the final elimination of one of the most widespread medieval types of war, namely, feudal strife, which dislocated economic life and interfered with trade and industry, the basis of the new bourgeois mode of production. Feudal wars were contrary to the interests of the new ruling class which, upon obtaining power, gradually stamped out wars between feudal lords, subordinating the interests of separate domains to the interests of the national state.

Thus had humankind risen to a higher level of civilization when internecine armed strife, a usual and normal thing before, came to be regarded as an extraordinary calamity. While Plato and Aristotle, who had considered internal wars intolerable, could not yet find material guarantees to halt such wars, the emergence of a system of centralized states and of a ruling class for which they were economically undesirable, reduced wars to something that occurred between national states only.

The modern view of international relations was formulated by Thomas Hobbes in his famous *Leviathan*. It is still being examined by political scientists. They take his principle of war by every man against every man as a starting point for further discussion or, conversely, negate it by offering new principles of relations.

Thomas Hobbes lived when capitalism was only emerging but its most typical features were already in evidence. One such feature was the existence of powerful national states, which he pictured to himself as leviathans, those Biblical monsters that subordinated the egoistic feelings of people, whose interests were

by nature antagonistic, to a general law. It was clear by that time that the state could unite its citizens, at least on a national level, and reduce their divergent interests to a common denominator, whereas no institution to that effect existed at supra-national level.

Hobbes considered people's envy and hostility, and striving for glory, everlasting and immutable. "So that in the nature of man," he wrote, "we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory."⁵ But in society, in relations between individuals, war of every man against every man is held down by the authorities, whereas on the international scene there are no restraints of that kind. "Though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another, yet in all times, Kings and Persons of Sovereign Authority, because of their Independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another," Hobbes concluded,⁶ sizing up the situation of his time, which, in that respect, has changed but little since.

The picture which Hobbes drew for us is looked upon by our contemporaries as a graphic reflection of the still existing *threat* to use force, which, even in the absence of war, is continuously accompanied by tension, creating a situation in which war is often seen as the only possible way of resolving a contradiction between the interests of different nations.

The picture of the world as drawn by Hobbes and his followers shows war and peace to be interchangeable, equally rational and equally acceptable. The common rule of reason, Hobbes stressed, says "that every man ought to endeavour Peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantage of War."⁷ We may recall here that this common rule was put just as succinctly by Vegetius in his aphorism: Let him who desires peace, prepare for war.

Speaking of rules of behaviour, Hobbes produced a detailed picture of standards that would dampen egoism, which he considered part of the natural character. For a long time, however, these standards operated at the national level only.

In fact, our contemporaries write as follows on the question of war and peace: "If the international order is likened to a state of nature, it is not of the Hobbesian sort. On the contrary, it is the very Hobbesian intuition that what prevails in the international realm is not law or morality, but power alone, and particularly the *threat* to use force, that explains the relative stability of

most world-orders... In politics, a *credible* threat of war normally replaces the actual fighting. Deterrence is one of the most fundamental species of the threat system."⁸

Economic, political and cultural internationalization typical of the capitalist system has tied together the life of many countries and peoples. It has, indeed, laid the basis for an integral and mutually dependent world. As inexorably as the antagonism between the interests of particular persons had in the class society given way to public and state regulation on a national scale, so did the need arise to rule out wars as means of international politics and lay the ground for universal peace based on equality and non-violence rather than fear and force.

As I have said, the first theories that declared internal war unacceptable had appeared long before conditions matured for such theories to be put into effect. The same applied to the theories of universal peace, which contradicted the traditional view of the system of international relations being one of unceasing wars between national states. The birth of capitalism was highlighted by dreams and treatises of eternal peace. They gave rise to the humanitarian tradition of the anti-war movement, which looked upon war as a curse.

Capitalism relieved the individual of his natural limitations and dependence by substituting his equality before the law for the hierarchy of estates. It is a different matter that this substitution was slow, conflicting, and inevitably restricted. Because formal equality before the law is not the same thing as factual equality based on social emancipation, general abundance, and wealth.

Though bourgeois humanism was a big step forward in relation to feudalism, it could only advance the idea of the singleness of all people because they all belonged to the human race. "Accord exists even among the most ferocious and wild animals," wrote the Dutch scholar and humanist Desiderius Erasmus. "A lion will never crave the blood of other lions. The wild boar will never sink his tusks into another boar. Peace reigns among the lynxes. A dragon does not in fury attack another dragon. And the accord among wolves has even become proverbial... Only people, they who need single-mindedness more than those others, are not pacified either by kind and powerful notions or upbringing or the obvious benefit of mutual accord. The most painful trials and the bitterest experiences cannot unite them and inspire mutual love.

"Yet people have the same shape of face and body, the same sound of voice, while all the other living creatures differ from

each other in shape and body. Only humans are endowed with a visage and power of reason... Besides, people have a tongue, the best mediator in establishing friendship and accord."⁹

Analyzing politics, we should always consider the difference between declared aims and the true interests, as well as the contradiction between what is desired and what is real. The appeals of Desiderius Erasmus, Sebastian Franck, Jan Amos Komensky, and other humanists had no tangible effect on the humanity of their time, racked as it was by national, religious, and property conflicts. But they did create a tradition which was never obscured amid the diversity of products of the human brain. So that one day, when the requisite conditions arise, when humanity comes to the end of that long and arduous road marked by enormous sacrifice, and finally realizes the unity and interdependence of all people on Earth, it will become reality.

Alongside appeals for eternal peace, there appeared projects of international relations in which war would be redundant. The first such project was worked out by Duc de Sully, minister of King Henry IV of France, though by nature it differed but little from the medieval concept of "God's peace". Hailing alliance of the Christian rulers against Mohammedan Turkey, Sully's project was really a screen for the hegemonic pretensions of France, for its interest in weakening the rival monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Sully devised the idea, popular among his contemporary wholists, to divide Europe into 15 approximately equally strong states, ruling out the existence of "superpowers" that were liable by virtue of their strength to breach the peace and fight wars of conquest.

The projects of universal peace by Emery Crucé, Duc de Sully, William Penn, and Saint-Pierre did not, in effect, transcend the tradition set by Hobbes when he devised a supra-national state, this enabling him to reduce the diverse interests of nations to a common denominator just as a national state reduced those of private persons.

Later generations of thinkers went farther than their predecessors who did not question the legitimacy of feudal absolutist monarchies and saw no other way of securing universal peace than by the voluntary agreement of rulers. A spate of projects appeared, envisaging alliances or confederations or a supra-national state. The French Enlighteners, for their part, came forward with the idea that only revolution that destroys despotism could dependably create a peaceful union of states. Later, this tradition went into the Marxist theory of international relations.

A big contribution to the problem of universal peace was made by Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried von Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who lived at the turn of the 18th into the 19th century, thus completing the period of early capitalist development in classical philosophy. By that time, and especially during Napoleon's campaigns of conquest, the character of the bourgeoisie as the ruling class of exploiters had already begun to show. While conflicting in relation to each other, the treatises of Kant, Herder and Fichte really complemented each other inasmuch as they each emphasized a different leading idea, and these have become part of our present knowledge of the world.

We can see clearly today that Kant's great achievement had been that he was the first to assert the inevitable establishment of eternal and universal peace at some point in the objective course of history. In so doing, he proceeded from the Hobbesian idea of man's natural egoism, which bred an antagonism of interests. But Kant set out on his search precisely where Hobbes had stopped. While for the latter the national state was the acme of progress, Kant envisaged the establishment of a voluntary worldwide alliance of states which would secure eternal peace even against the wishes and interests of people.

At first glance, Kant's conception reposed on fatalism, on complete subordination to fate and providence. Speaking of the guarantees of eternal peace he observed: "This *guarantee* is given by Nature (*natura daedala rerum*), that great artist whose mechanical course distinctly reveals the rationale of securing agreement among men through discord, even against their will, and hence as a compulsion of a thing called *Fate*, whose governing laws are unknown to us. When we examine its practicality in the course of world events as a profound wisdom of a higher cause directed to the objective ultimate purpose of the human race, and predetermining this course of world events, we call it Providence."¹⁰

We learn as we go along that, while speaking with so much conviction about that inexorable tendency, Kant referred not only to past experience that had led people from endless conflict to unity under the protection of the law, at least in the existing states. He also noted a new tendency of an entirely mundane order that had nothing to do with any divine will: the tendency towards economic and commercial internationalization. "How wisely does nature divide peoples whom the will of every state would have readily, on the basis of international law, put under its power by cunning or force, on the one hand," he writes, "while, on the other hand, it

unites those peoples whom world citizenship would not have protected from violence and war by dint of a mutual egoistic interest. The *spirit of trade* which seizes every people sooner or later, is something which cannot exist alongside war. Since out of all the forces subject to state power, the *force of money* is probably the most dependable, the states feel compelled (not by ethics, of course) to promote a noble peace and prevent war wherever it threatens to break out by mediation, as though they are in constant agreement with this aim... Thus, by the very arrangement of human inclinations, nature guarantees eternal peace with, of course, a surety that is insufficient to (in theory) *predict* the time of its coming. But such a thing is practicable and obliges us to work for this (not at all illusory) goal."¹¹

Also important is Kant's idea that the world order guaranteeing universal and eternal peace will constitute a system of independent states, not one super-national state. There are attempts today to pervert this important idea, to inject it with a certain type of international federalism. But the philosopher had formulated his thoughts clearly enough to rule out distortion. "The idea of international law presupposes a *separate* existence of many neighbour states independent of each other. Although such a condition is in itself a state of war (if the federative union of states fails to prevent hostility), it is in greater agreement with reason than the merging of states into a single power superior to others and on the way to becoming a universal monarchy, because in the growing domain of government, laws are increasingly losing their force and merciless despotism, rooting out the germs of the good, in the end turns into anarchy."¹²

That is why, Kant holds, differences between people lead to accord in a setting of peace with the growth of culture and a gradual convergence towards greater unity of principles. This, he says, will be secured not through a weakening of all forces, as is the case under despotism (in the cemetery of freedom), but through their equilibrium and dynamic competition.¹³

Herder respected the views of his great contemporary. Yet he embarked on a polemic with him, because he believed that any agreement between states concluded in a setting of hostile relations cannot be a guarantee of peace. Moral improvement of people, an injection of humanism and democracy, were essential for such a guarantee to be valid. That is why Herder addressed not the rulers but the peoples who suffer the most from wars. If the voice of the peoples is impressive enough, he believed, the rulers will heed it and obey.¹⁴

Fichte was Kant's pupil and could not, therefore, fail to embrace his humanistic tendency. But he went a step further than his teacher, because, like Herder, he felt there was a contradiction of sorts between recognizing human egoism as eternal, the social arrangement based on this egoism, and the dream of universal peace. Reviewing Kant's treatise, Fichte wrote that any intrinsically unjust state is bound to desire to plunder its neighbours. Only a law-governed state arrangement based on an "equilibrium" of property, on a just distribution of wealth, on law and reason, may be a model and premise for an alliance of people truly capable of establishing eternal peace.¹⁵

Kant, Herder and Fichte lived at a time when the world had just been overturned by the French revolution. The bourgeoisie that was taking power was still revolutionary and expressed general human interests. It still had control over a considerable segment of the Third Estate, including the proletariat. Precisely as bearers of the generally human elements of the revolutionary morality, the bourgeois ideologists of the 18th and 19th centuries were able to apprehend the vital want for peace and to overcome egoistic class interests, at least in theory. Hence the interpretation of the traditional bourgeois values, such as the eternally egoistic essence of man or universal trade, in a general human spirit. But this could not go on for long.

The 19th century did not yield treatises resembling those on eternal peace by the great early-bourgeois ideologists. And for good reasons. First, the bourgeoisie had in a hundred years gradually turned from a revolutionary class fighting against feudalism and absolute monarchy, into the ruling and exploiting class, with all the consequences this entailed. Among these consequences, above all, was the convergence of the attitudes of former class enemies against the mounting revolutionary movement of the working class, emerging as a class with its own slogans of eliminating private property.

The end of the 1840s showed that a bourgeois revolution was liable to go too far and grow over into a proletarian uprising. This frightened the bourgeoisie. It toned down its own demands, and sought compromise with the absolutist feudal elite. The other reason why the demands for eternal peace tended to weaken was the long absence on the European continent, the most advanced part of the world at that time, of a large war such as the Thirty Years War of 1618-1648, the War of Spanish Succession, the conquest campaigns of Charles XII of Sweden at the

beginning of the 18th century, the Seven-Year War, and other such devastating conflicts.

The Napoleonic wars completed a specific stage in European history. Joining hands against revolution, the monarchs of Europe formed a Holy Alliance and took steps to prevent any weakening of their reactionary bloc. This was the beginning of modern diplomacy in 1815. On the other hand, the wars fought in the 19th century were considered just wars by most people since they resulted in the collapse of the old regime and the establishment of new, progressive relations reflecting the interests of the then still united Third Estate. Naturally, the mass of the people did not object to the war for the unification of Germany, the Garibaldi campaigns, and so on.

The feudal counter-revolution was not inclined to preach non-violence either, seeking to cope with the ever mounting revolutionary process by resort to arms. The proletariat did not see any way of ending exploitation other than by armed uprising and forcible overthrow of bourgeois governments. Peace as an aim in itself was not essential for any of the classes of that time, since class interests predominated over general human interests.

The third thing that we must bear in mind as concerns 19th-century Europe and America, is that the arena of destructive conflicts and antagonisms had begun to move into other regions in the course of the colonial seizures. The most radical elements of society were shipped off to the colonies. The livelihood of a large segment of people in the developed capitalist countries was assured at the expense of the colonies. The bourgeoisie, which had grown into a monopoly bourgeoisie, had begun to bribe the upper strata of the working class. An atmosphere of chauvinism and racism spread among all the classes of capitalist society, though their stake in the colonial seizures differed. Capitalism's entry upon its monopoly stage in Europe was highlighted by several decades of peace in which matured the contradictions that culminated in the outbreak of the First World War.

Frederick Engels predicted the future worldwide slaughter several dozens of years ahead. He was one of the very few who did so. The bulk of the people failed to reflect upon the growing destructive power of arms, and were hardly able to foresee what the war would be like for them.

Herbert Spencer was the only 19th-century liberal bourgeois theorist who rose above class and national prejudices and came out resolutely against militarism, and for disarmament. Spencer's sociological theory was built on the contraposition of

"militant" and "industrial" types of society. By the former he evidently meant pre-capitalist social systems. Nor did Spencer idealize capitalism. He pinpointed a large number of its features that derived from earlier stages of human society when military activity was the main form of existence for quite a few peoples. This required a special type of political organization, the maximum mobilization and integration of all the members of society, a "complete corporate action", and hence the development of mechanisms of compulsion, of a special centralization of government, and so on.¹⁶

Spencer noted the progressive advance of various countries to an "industrial society" free of "military" restrictions, but pointed out regressive tendencies as well, which led to elements of militarism appearing in developed European capitalist countries in the 1880s. This, he observed, applied to France, Britain and, especially, to Germany. In his opinion the "militant type of society" had no future, for war could have no positive sense for humankind. "Only further evils," Spencer wrote, "are to be looked for from the continuance of militancy in civilized nations... And they show by implication that for the diminution of this suffering, not only of the direct kind but of the indirect kind, the one thing needful is the checking of international antagonisms and the diminution of those armaments which are at once cause and consequence of them."¹⁷

Utterances like Spencer's were exceedingly rare in the literature of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The colonial wars that swept the far-flung territories of Asia and Africa needed their apologists, who went out of their way to justify so-called geopolitics and to produce the concept of living space. For a long time to come this *Lebensraum* excuse was an ideological justification for aggression. Meanwhile, contradictions were building up in Europe. A military psychosis was seizing hold.

"When we try to look into the mechanism that triggers world wars," writes Daniil Proektor, a Soviet expert on war and peace, "we must not abstract ourselves from the sentiment reigning among those who make the final decision. In those days, the gravitation towards war created by imperialist programmes and aggressive policies gained the upper hand over the wish of safeguarding peace. The imperialist plans of redividing the world were not the only reason. The ruling classes, the upper crust of bourgeois society, dreaded social change in their countries. This was another, equal or even stronger, reason. War was considered a dependable means of diverting the mass of the people

from any thought of revolution. Pretexts for war, on the other hand, were always on hand or were deliberately created."¹⁸

As soon as it broke out, the First World War showed what inordinate suffering it held in store for the common people. Psychologically, humanity was unprepared. After the chauvinist dust had settled came the revelation. The anti-war movement gathered momentum. Pacifist sentiment spread. One of the results of the war were the socialist revolutions, another was the emergence of a massive anti-war movement that made an impact on politicians, statesmen, and the military. It was closely connected with the communist movement, and Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell, who were far removed from Marxism, found themselves in the same camp with the Communists in the fight against the threat of another war.

This was no accident. Because the revolutionary government in Russia had been the first to advance a large-scale disarmament programme, and also the first to propagate and carry it into effect.

Certainly, the Communists should not lay claim to achievement alone, but also admit the mistakes they made before the new realities and the relevant tasks had sunk in. "It stands to reason," Gorbachev said on the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1987, "our external activity did not consist exclusively of successes and achievements. Not always, not in all matters—before and after the Second World War—had we succeeded in using opportunities that happened to arise."¹⁹

Projects of eternal peace which were once worked out by scholars in the cloistered seclusion of their studies, gave place to practical attempts at rationalizing international relations and combating the war danger. Initially, these efforts were futile, for their followers were too few. Today, however, it may be said that the potential of peace and goodwill is quite capable of securing the survival of humanity and laying the ground for a non-violent world.

2. From the World Revolution to the Non-Aggression Pact

Marx and Engels were level-headed politicians. They looked upon the projects of eternal peace produced by their predecessors with a measure of scepticism. There were few reasons in those days to believe in Utopia. "The state based upon reason has completely collapsed," wrote Engels about the crisis of the ideals of Enlightenment. "The promised eternal peace was

turned into an endless war of conquest.”²⁰ Still, neither he nor Marx could fail to look into war and peace, and draw conclusions based on their own view of the existing world. In that sense, Marxism is, indeed, ever open for all progressive and new ideas produced in social science.

“The history of philosophy and the history of social science,” wrote Lenin, “show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling ‘sectarianism’ in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose *away from* the highroad of the development of world civilization. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate *continuation* of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism.”²¹

One of the most progressive ideas of that time was that eternal peace was impossible as long as the old social system continued to prevail, because the egoistic interests of the ruling classes would inevitably collide and their contradictions would inevitably be settled with resort to arms. This standpoint followed directly from the principle of every man warring against every man, though it led to an entirely different conclusion. The modern bourgeois ideology was highlighted by the assertion that the existing order, in which might was right, was just. “Starting with Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Bodinus and others of modern times, not to mention earlier ones,” wrote Marx and Engels, “might has been represented as the basis of right. Thereby the theoretical view of politics was freed from morality... Later, in the 18th century in France and in the 19th century in England, all right was reduced to civil law ... and the latter to a quite definite power, the power of the owners of private property.”²²

The might is right principle as the basis for international law materialized most distinctly in the colonial policies of the capitalist powers. As Karl Marx pointed out, “the profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked.”²³

The conclusion of Marx and Engels was that it was essential to change the system of social relations, to establish a new system, that of socialism and communism, before universal and eternal peace would become at all possible. Not until these new social relations were established, would it be possible to secure universal peace: such was the conclusion drawn by Marxists in

their earliest period. "The very conditions of universal peace," Marx wrote, depended on "the relations of labour and capital."²⁴

Initially, Marxists held, the communist revolution would in a short time (but not simultaneously!²⁵) encompass the advanced capitalist countries. The relations between them, on the one hand, and the colonial and semi-colonial peoples, on the other, would then be put on a civilized plane, removing all contradictions that might have led to war. The economic strength of the communist states would make it possible to cope with the resistance of the ruling classes in backward countries with relative ease. Thus, the world, based on communist principles (initially, Marx and Engels did not use the term socialism in the sense in which we use it today), would be relieved of wars and, eventually, of violence in general.

This interpretation proved simplistic. Subsequently, Marx and Engels admitted to its having been so. First, the hope of a rapid victorious revolution fell through. A long struggle ensued of labour against capital before the socialist revolution turned from a prospect into reality. Second, study of the tendencies governing world processes led to the conclusion that the revolutionary process had shifted to "the extremities of the bourgeois body"²⁶ where capitalism had not yet sunk deep root, notably Russia, upon which Marx and Engels had pinned special hopes in the 1870s and 80s.²⁷

This opened in theory the prospect of the existence of proletarian dictatorships and a hostile capitalist encirclement. The matter was not then subjected to close scrutiny, because, by all evidence, Marx and Engels assumed that the revolutionary government would be in a state of war with the hostile bourgeois governments right up to the time one of the two classes should win.

Here is another important point: Marxists held that proletarian dictatorship was not the end goal of the labour movement. The end goal was the elimination of all classes,²⁸ laying the ground for the solution of a universal rather than class problem, that of providing every member of the human race with an opportunity for free and harmonious development. This priority of universally human over class values, even if those latter are values of the most advanced and revolutionary class, has become the basis for the current new political thinking, though, of course, our appreciation of this priority diverges from the pertinent views which prevailed in the working-class movement for all of a hundred years.

Marx and Engels may have denied that universal peace was possible under capitalism. But they were no nihilists, and treated the struggle for peace and against war as one of the most important objectives of the working-class movement. The crimes of the ruling bourgeoisie, Marx wrote, have taught the working class to master the mysteries of international politics, to watch the diplomatic moves of their respective governments, and to counteract them, if necessary, by all means at their disposal. Outlining international policy based on the equality of nations and non-interference in internal affairs, Marx pointed out that "the fight for such a foreign policy forms part of the general struggle for the emancipation of the working classes".²⁹

Those were not abstract and well-meaning wishes. They materialized in labour actions aimed at preventing the outbreak of various specific wars, as was the case with the armed intervention of certain countries against the North during the Civil War in the United States. "It was not the wisdom of the ruling classes," Marx noted at the time, "but the heroic resistance to their criminal folly by the working classes of England that saved the West of Europe from plunging headlong into an infamous crusade for the perpetuation and propagation of slavery on the other side of the Atlantic."³⁰

The emergence of a working-class movement had, indeed, made it possible to organize the masses for action to prevent wars, though, of course, they were rarely successful. But the end goal of the workers in the fight for peace, as it said in the Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association (the First International) was to work for world relations in which the common laws of morality and justice that are supposed to guide private individuals in their relations should also become supreme laws in relations between nations.³¹

As we see, Marx and Engels, the founders of the new socio-political theory, had worked out the basic principles that connect the ultimate strategic guidelines of the struggle for eternal and universal peace with the concrete practical tasks of the struggle for the prevention of concrete wars. This was part of the general proletarian cause, for it restricted the painful effects of the barbarian laws immanent in capitalism for settling political and economic problems with resort to arms.

The working-class parties affiliated with the First and later the Second International based their activity on Marxist principles. Regrettably, most of the social-democratic parties did not practise them at the critical moment preceding the First

World War. Only the Bolshevik party in Russia, Karl Liebknecht in Germany and Jean Jaurès in France, had the courage to come out against the war in a setting of mass psychosis, chauvinism, and militarism. This was doubtless a tragedy for the international working-class movement, for the universally human elements of Marxist theory were scuttled to suit what were not even class-based but purely utilitarian, narrowly partisan, interests. One can only wonder if this had, perhaps, been the first step towards the split of the working-class movement into two distinct streams, a split that is only now beginning to mend, and this precisely on the basis of the common struggle for survival?

The struggle for peace and against war was taken over by the Bolsheviks. It is hard to picture today how their appeals to halt the worldwide slaughter were blotted out in the then prevailing atmosphere of unmitigated chauvinism. But that little group of internationalists triumphed in the long run, because their slogans were closest to the hearts and minds of the masses, whose sentiment changed in the course of the war.

Lenin's views on the eve of the world war are best illustrated by what he said to Alfred Myakosen, a Polish journalist. Asked if he wanted war to break out in Europe, Lenin said unhesitatingly that he did not. "I have done and will continue to do everything in my power," he added, "to prevent mobilization and war. I do not want millions of proletarians to exterminate each other, paying with their blood for the madness of capitalism. To foresee war objectively, and to try and use it to best advantage if it should break out, is one thing. To want war or to work for it is something else."³²

Still, Lenin was no pacifist. Marxists, he said, were not unreserved opponents of any kind of war.³³ That is the context in which we should consider the Bolshevik slogan of converting the imperialist into a civil war.

The very first decree enacted by the Soviet Government the day after the revolution, was the Decree on Peace. It laid the basis for a fundamentally new concept of international relations, picking up where some eminent pre-Marxian thinkers had left off in their dream of eternal peace. The decree offered all belligerents to make just and democratic peace, "without annexations (i.e., without the seizure of foreign lands, without the forcible incorporation of foreign nations) and without indemnities".³⁴ The Decree on Peace condemned aggression, demanded that the plunder of colonies stop, and so on. Coming as it did from

one of the most powerful countries of the world, this made a doubtlessly strong impression.

The Decree on Peace imparted not only national, but also international significance, to the October Revolution in Russia. Its ideas captured the minds and hearts of all those who wanted peace and justice to prevail. It gave strength to the Revolution in face of the viciously counter-attacking ruling classes. The lessons of that period should not be forgotten. Especially so today, when uniting the progressive forces against the common danger is at the centre of the political tasks of the world movement for the survival of civilization.

The Soviet peace proposals showed, first, that the interests of the Bolsheviks coincided with those of the democratic movement in the world as a whole. Even the political opponents of the Bolsheviks had to take this into account. Otto Bauer, the Austrian Socialist, wrote on returning from a Russian POW camp that "the Russian revolution was fighting for the vital interests of the Russian people, and, indeed, for the principles of international democracy."³⁵ Second, the Bolsheviks' call for a just and democratic peace made a strong impression on the mass of the people because it was indissolubly related to the call for a worldwide social overturn, a socialist world revolution.

A legitimate result of the imperialist war, the October Revolution had thus become a turning point in the search for universal peace. It linked the need for peace with the tasks of the world revolution and made the demands of the anti-war movement more radical—not in theory alone, but also in practice. The war had changed the pacifist movement from top to bottom: the social background of its members, and all its theoretical conceptions.

Still, we must not forget the weakness of the anti-war movement. It had become a mass movement working for universal peace. Naturally, it was held down by the objective conditions of its time, which gave no scope for progressive principles, on the one hand, and for the subjective qualities of its leaders to assert themselves, on the other. Yet what these leaders wanted was a quick and resolute assault on the old structures of power which stood in the way of justice.

Certainly, the war-weary masses were inspired by those attractive ideas. All the more so, because they yearned for an end to the costly war. This was a powerful incentive, but it did not work for long. For obvious reasons, it was eroded by inevitable disappointment, because it did not lead to immediate success.

Such was the case in postwar Europe, exerting a strong influence on the Bolsheviks as well, for they had originally expected revolution to engulf the whole continent. The unavoidable apprehension of the realities occurred during the very first few years after the Revolution. Describing the situation among Communists in the wake of the October Revolution, Lenin wrote: "Really great revolutions grow out of the contradictions between the old, between what is directed towards developing the old, and the very abstract striving for the new, which must be so new as not to contain the tiniest particle of the old."³⁶

The hopes that the Bolsheviks pinned on the immediate victory of the world revolution was, in effect, a "very abstract striving" which made itself felt most strongly in the debate over the Brest Peace. The Bolsheviks' peace proposals had been addressed less to governments and much more to the peoples, because in Russia the masses had joined hands under the slogan of peace. The same thing was to have happened in the other belligerent countries, which were no less weary of the war. Peace was not seen as an aim in itself, but as a means of turning the imperialist into a revolutionary war.

Recalling these sentiments, Lenin stressed that "in the early period of the revolution many entertained the hope that the socialist revolution would begin in Western Europe immediately the imperialist war ended; at the time when the masses were armed there could have been a successful revolution in some of the Western countries as well. It could have taken place had it not been for the split within the proletariat of Western Europe being deeper and the treachery of the former socialist leaders greater than had been imagined."³⁷

In the first few months after the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks had an opportunity to test their principles in practice. Not all of them by far stood the test. Before the revolution, for example, while calling for peace, the Bolsheviks rejected the idea of a separate peace with Germany. But when the Soviet Government could no longer drag out its negotiations with Germany while waiting for the European revolution to gather momentum, it signed a predatory separate peace which Lenin himself described as "obscene" in face of bitter opposition by Left Communists.

Although soon the revolution of November 1918 in Germany revived the hopes of the Bolsheviks, the Civil War at home compelled them to amend their ideas about the growth of the Russian into an all-European revolution.

The Soviet Government waited, languishing in a circle of enemy armies. It manoeuvred, exploiting the contradictions between the two imperialist blocs and gathering strength for a decisive offensive. In 1918, referring to the delay of the European revolution, Lenin said: "The foreign policy of Soviet power must not be changed in any way. Our military preparations are not yet complete, and our general slogan, therefore, will remain as before — manoeuvre, withdraw, bide our time, and continue our preparations with all our might."³⁸ Acting on these guidelines, Lenin would come to terms with most diverse forces in the territory of the former Russian Empire. He did so because he believed, and was proved right, that the revolutionary pressure of the masses would overthrow various counter-revolutionary governments, thus also invalidating and scrapping the contracts of peace with them.

The Red Army backed the communist revolutionary governments as well as the national-democratic ones, as in the case of the Khiva and Bukhara emirates. Meanwhile, the hopes of a communist victory in Finland and Poland did not come true.

The Polish experience of 1920 had been especially painful. Pursuing Pilsudski's retreating counter-revolutionary troops, the Red Army reached the environs of Warsaw, but was then compelled to turn back. Yet the Russian Bolsheviks had pinned all their hopes on the Polish proletariat. Their failure was a most serious lesson to the Bolsheviks. The 9th Bolshevik Party Conference discussed the outcome of the war with Poland in September 1920. By that time the Soviet Government had signed a number of peace treaties with its neighbours. The country could no longer make war. It was decided to have a breathing space and resolve some of the vital economic problems. An appropriate international setting was required. "Every people," Lenin said at the time, "lives in a state, and every state belongs to a system of states, which are in a certain system of political equilibrium in relation to one another."³⁹ And though this equilibrium was unstable,⁴⁰ "peaceful cohabitation" with the capitalist encirclement had become possible for a period of time.

The parties in the Communist International founded in 1919 wanted to know the answer as to the outlook and time of the socialist world revolution, which was down as an aim in their programmes. Yet the conversion to peaceful construction and coexistence made the revolution more remote, causing confusion amid Communists abroad. Lenin responded by saying that the Soviet Government had not abandoned its ultimate goal. A Communist world revolution, and decisive clashes with capital-

ism, were still down in the programme of the Russian Communist Party. Yet a knife was still raised against the Soviet land, he said at the 8th All-Russia Congress of Soviets. "If, in the face of these ever actively hostile forces, we pledged ourselves—as we have been advised to do—never to resort to certain actions which from a military-strategic point of view may prove to be aggressive, we would be not only fools but criminals."⁴¹

The development of Marxist theory continued after Lenin had passed away. The Communists faced new problems. In 1923, European capitalism's postwar crisis gave way to temporary stabilization. The Versailles system relieved some of the imperialist contradictions by driving them inward. A period of postwar prosperity dampened the revolutionary mood of the masses. Meanwhile, the pacifist movement gained a strong influence on ruling circles in the capitalist countries. This occurred in an environment of massive anti-militarism, which spoke of a universal hatred of war. Calls for peace ceased to be the monopoly of Communists and lost their revolutionary impact. Many liberal and social-democratic governments in Europe worked pacifist principles into their programmes and proclaimed a pacifist era.

Meanwhile the Russian Bolsheviks were immersed in various discussions, including the question of the world revolution and the building of socialism in a single, separate, relatively backward country. The issue was not settled until the capitalist stabilization began, since the hope of revolutionary processes occurring in the West had not died before then. The last major revolutionary action was the uprising in Hamburg organized by the Communist Party of Germany with the backing of the Comintern Executive, including its chairman Grigory Zinoviev and members of the Russian Communist Party leadership Karl Radek and Joseph Stalin in October 1923. It failed, showing that the West had passed the time when revolutions were possible.

Some members of the Russian Communist Party, notably Nikolai Bukharin and Joseph Stalin, formulated the idea of building socialism in one country as a counterweight to Leon Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution.

Postponement of the world revolution and the building of socialism in one country, necessitated calls for peaceful coexistence. The objectives of the Soviet state in world affairs had changed.

To set a good example, the Soviet Union reduced its armed forces ten times on a unilateral basis in the early half of the 1920s. Having earlier opposed the "bourgeois pacifism" of the Western governments (in September 1924, Stalin had gone so far

as to publicly identify pacifism with fascism⁴²), Soviet Russia decided to participate in a disarmament conference with a number of other countries. Nikolai Krestinsky, Deputy Foreign Commissar of the USSR, wrote to the Soviet envoy in London in January 1926: "We attach much importance to furthering disarmament and relieving the mass of the workers of the current economic hardships. Hence, we are prepared to overlook the negative fact that the initiative comes from the League of Nations which we and certain other countries do not recognize."⁴³

Ably represented by Deputy Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov, the Kremlin did its utmost to direct the Preparatory Commission towards practical action. But it turned out to be no more than a talking shop and rejected the Soviet offer of a convention on immediate, complete and universal disarmament, and then also its compromise version, an instrument for partial disarmament. The main professed reason was the reluctance of the United States—however strange this may sound to the American of our day—to accept international control over arms reduction. The State Secretary's directive for the US spokesman in Geneva, said: "The United States will not tolerate the supervision of any outside body in this matter nor be subject to inspection or supervision by foreign agencies or individuals."⁴⁴

By that time far-reaching changes had occurred in Soviet foreign policy. The economic crisis of 1929 that spread to the entire world save the Soviet Union, revived hope in the hearts of Communists that the capitalist system was all but on the brink of collapse. Also, the Bukharin group in the Communist Party leadership had lost out, entailing a change of course.

The social-democratic movement, including its left wing (and social-democratic pacifism), was declared the chief enemy of the Communists. This was a slideback to the ideas propagated by Grigory Zinoviev, former chairman of the Comintern, in 1924. The German Social Democrats, Zinoviev had said then, "are a faction of German fascism with a socialist vocabulary, and will soon either collapse with a bang or burst like a bubble".⁴⁵

The directive to act with resolution had a strong impact on Soviet foreign policy. Stalin set forth his views on pacifist literature in a letter to Soviet writer Maxim Gorky. Written in 1930, it was not made public until 1949. "What we want are stories that lead from the horrors of *imperialist* war to the need for overcoming *imperialist* governments that organize such wars. Besides, after all, we are not against *any kind* of war. We are against *imperialist* war because it is a counter-revolutionary war.

But we are f o r anti-imperialist, revolutionary wars of liberation although such wars, as we know, are not free of the horrors of bloodshed and, indeed, abound in them."⁴⁶

That Stalin saw fit to deal with the issue at that precise time, 1930, was no accident. The Soviet Union was facing the all too real threat of a number of capitalist states that were trying to resolve their economic problems with resort to war. It was doing its utmost to build up a heavy industry and buttress its defences. Though working to avert a war, the Soviet Government underestimated the muscle of the peace forces in the West—both the cause and the effect of the guideline that pacifism and the social-democratic movement were the main target.

"Quite understandably," said the Central Committee's Political Report to the 16th Congress of the Party delivered by Stalin, "the so-called pacifism is breathing its last. The League of Nations is rotting alive, 'disarmament projects' are tumbling into the abyss, and conferences called to reduce naval armaments turn into conferences for the modernization and expansion of navies. This means the war danger will mount at a redoubled pace.

"Let the Social Democrats prattle about pacifism, peace, capitalism's peaceful development, and the like. The experience of their stay in power in Germany and Britain shows that their pacifism is nothing but a mask to cover up preparations for fresh wars."⁴⁷

The subsequent course of events did not, in effect, bear out this point of view. The end of the crisis in 1933 showed that the Communists had again been overhasty in anticipating the end of capitalism. What was worse, reactionary fascist regimes had stepped on to Europe's political stage, auguring degradation and regress for human civilization. It was on the order of the day to save bourgeois democracy from the fascists' medieval barbarism. Communist parties in the West European countries where fascism had come to power demanded that the Comintern alter its course, for it had come into collision with the prevailing state of affairs.

The anti-fascist line of the Comintern, as adopted at its 7th Congress in 1935, was more realistic in setting the objectives and methods of the communist movement. The sectarian "class front" tactics gave way to the popular front strategy joining all forces that had a stake in combating fascism. This on the one hand. On the other, however, the events that were unfolding inside the Soviet Union had begun exercising an ever greater influence on Comintern policy.

The Soviet Communist Party took a realistic view of the prevailing world situation. It scrapped its slogans of world revolution as conceived in earlier programmes. In the 1920s, indeed, the very existence of the Soviet Union had been primarily vindicated by its being the advance detachment of the international working class and a buttress, as Stalin described it, that would help speed up the victory of the proletariat in other countries. At the 17th Congress in 1934, however, this posture was substantially changed. In his report, Stalin stressed that "in the past, as now, we take our bearings from the Soviet Union and no one but the Soviet Union... Whenever the interests of the Soviet Union call for closer ties with a country that is not interested in breaching the peace, we do so without hesitation."⁴⁸

This was a fundamentally new element in the position of the Communists. The romantic idea of a world conflagration made way for a level-headed understanding of the fact that in the circumstances the new society would have to be built within the framework of the prevailing situation. This had altered the relationship between the Soviet Union and the international working class. Previously, it was the USSR that had to assist the world proletariat, whereas henceforth it would be the main task of the world proletariat to back up the Soviet Union.

"Workers in the West," Stalin said in the concluding part of his report to the 17th Congress, "say that the Soviet working class is the shock force of the world proletariat. That is fine. For it means that the world proletariat is prepared to do its best and continue to support the Soviet working class."⁴⁹

By virtue of its new course, the Soviet Union adopted most of the rules of the game and the logic of the current system of international relations. The Soviet view of various countries and of international institutions was substantially emended. The Soviet Union joined the League of Nations, which had only recently been described by Stalin as "rotting alive". France, which had been declared the chief aggressor at the 16th Party Congress, was embraced as an ally. Later, the same metamorphosis occurred vis-à-vis Nazi Germany.

In the context of international law and the traditions that prevailed on the international scene, the Soviet Union, interested in averting war, in which, as the Bolshevik leaders rightly believed, the USSR would be the chief target of attack, behaved quite justifiably and correctly. The class outlook of the capitalist governments, strongly anti-Soviet and anti-communist, prompted them to prod Nazi Germany to attack the Soviet Union. Hitler, for his

part, made the most of the contradictions between the blocs of imperialist countries for his own ends. A sober evaluation of things led to the conclusion the time for justice in world politics was not yet ripe.

Yet, though it had lost its ideological innocence, the Soviet Union under Stalin had not at all won the due prestige among the public at large. The secret protocols of the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 and the war with Finland confused and dismayed the world communist movement and the progressive intelligentsia.

Stalin's regime was identified with Hitler's totalitarian regime not only in respect to home policy and the wholesale repressions, but also in foreign affairs. And it took years and years for the Soviet Union to live down the image of the aggressive totalitarian state that had shaped in Stalin's time.

3. Break-up of the Old System

In 1879 Germany and Austria-Hungary had concluded a treaty. The published text said that since the close cooperation between Germany and Austria threatened no one and was designed to strengthen peace in Europe on principles established by the Treaty of Berlin, the Sovereigns of the two countries had decided to conclude an alliance of peace and mutual agreement.⁵⁰

A short time later, a treaty was concluded between Russia and France, both of which professed a desire for peace. What the agreement was really all about, however, did not become public knowledge until after the Bolsheviks who had come to power in Russia, published its secret part, saying Russia would field 700,000 men against Germany, while France would field 1,300,000.⁵¹ It will be remembered that a short time later two European military blocs—the Quadruple Alliance and the Triple Entente—became embroiled in a bloodthirsty war. After the belligerent powers were joined by Great Britain and its dominions, and then also by the United States, the war became worldwide. The official professions of peaceful intentions had let loose a world war.

Paradoxes of that sort are no rarity in the modern history of civilization. They are, in fact, part and parcel of what we have described as the traditional system of international relations.

Of late, writers have shown a lively interest in that traditional system. Because the shaping of the new political thinking re-

quires them to see what elements of the old system are acceptable today and what elements are to be scrapped or radically reshaped, with all concerned countries pitching in.

Like any other type, the old system of international relations reduced all composite elements to a common denominator, namely, the role of every country in the system depending on its strength, notably military strength. "The international prestige of a country is measured by its capacity to do damage," wrote French political scientist Gaston Bouthoul.⁵² This predetermined the use of force in maximalizing the authority of any state. Force was also used to protect the interests of a country attacked with the object of minimizing its authority or depriving it of independence.

Obviously, that system would not work for universal peace. Peace, if it were constant, would repose on the prevailing correlation of strength, but could not, in the circumstances, guarantee that any change of balance would be properly registered. Besides, a peace concluded after a war ended was favourable to the victor country and so utterly burdensome to the loser that it inevitably generated revenge-seeking sentiment. The Versailles Peace, for example, had to no small extent contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War. Even some leaders of the Entente had objected to its terms, such as former French Prime Minister Joseph Caillaux and Italian Prime Minister Francesco Nitti. The latter described the Versailles Peace as one of the more absurd and criminal acts that had completely undermined the authority of the victors, for had they not maintained in their statement of December 30, 1916, that the allied governments had united for the defence and liberty of the peoples (*les gouvernements alliés unis pour la défense et la liberté des peuples*).⁵³

As for the Marxists, they did not hesitate to stigmatize the Versailles Peace as an instrument that would create rather than solve any problems. "It is an unheard-of predatory peace, which has made slaves of tens of millions of people, including the most civilized," wrote Lenin. "This is no peace, but terms dictated to a defenceless victim by armed robbers."⁵⁴

At this time, when, as Lenin put it, "seven-tenths of the world's population were in a condition of servitude", the Soviet Union entered the system of international relations—initially as a state that could not influence developments in the world other than through revolutionary ideas that were winning the backing of the working class in all countries. The sources of raw material and markets that they had lost in Russia, and the Tsar's war

debts that Soviet Russia refused to pay, soured the mood of the imperialist victors. "Rejected by the very reason of our socialist birth," General Secretary Gorbachev said in his report on the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, "we could not under any circumstances be right in the eyes of the imperialists."⁵⁵ This created additional difficulties for those in charge of the young Soviet state's foreign relations. To the imbalance of forces between the Soviet Union as one of the states that had belonged to the traditional system of foreign relations and the imperialist world, was added the fact that the imperialists of all capitalist countries joined hands with the aim of strangling socialism at its birth.

Despite its unfavourable position in the system of states, the Soviet Government had from the beginning pursued a policy based on principles that differed from those of the imperialist countries. One such principle was that of universal disarmament proclaimed first by Foreign Commissar Georgy Chicherin in Genoa, and another was the principle of sufficiency for defence, proclaimed by his deputy, Maxim Litvinov, at the Preparatory Commission (that laboured in preparation of a disarmament conference) in Geneva, and carried forward unilaterally by the USSR in the 1920s. There was also the principle of the equality of all states, in furtherance of which the Soviet Government repealed all unequal treaties signed by the tsarist government with the semicolonial countries of the East. No less important was the principle declared by Lenin of citizen diplomacy which led to the publication of all secret treaties signed by tsarist Russia.

Regrettably, not all Leninist principles were adhered to later. Admittedly, there had been objective reasons for this, and also the subjective mood of the Soviet leaders of those times.

The traditional system of international relations was based on antagonisms that flowed from class and national antagonisms built into the structure of capitalist relationships. It reposed, indeed, on the antagonistic contradictions between the main classes of bourgeois society that operated mainly on the home front. This left a strong imprint on the aims of particular states, the aims of the system and the universal human aims of civilization as a whole. The aims of civilization, wrote Fedor Burlatsky and Alexander Galkin, flowed from the interests of humankind. Biologically as well as socially, humanity had a stake in survival, in advancing the human race, and ensuring its greater prosperity. "In other words," they wrote, "survival of the human race and creation of favourable conditions for the advancement of its

component societies and individuals, is the objective aim and purpose of the system of international relations."⁵⁶

But again and again that aim came into collision with the aims of the traditional system of international relations, which we might define as the effect of its constituent forces, that is, the national states. Consequently, the progress of the system as a whole depended not on the self-advancement of the system as such, but on internal processes in the various countries concerned. That is what led Marx to define the dependence of foreign trade and economic relations in general, as well as of foreign policy, on internal trade, on the state of the economy and the home policy of each separate country. Hence, it was hardly possible to describe one country as being more progressive or more reactionary than another. Later, however, this began to change. In due course, the emergence of fascist states that in effect disregarded the standards of international law and the traditional values of democracy and freedom, drew a line between democratic and totalitarian states. This was most starkly evident at the time of the Second World War.

On the other hand, the newly established socialist states came to play a conflicting role on the world scene. Though they had initially totally rejected the principles of bourgeois democracy, they had with the passage of time begun to initiate moves that furthered democratization of the system of international relations. Admittedly, at that time the all too narrowly conceived class and national interests of the socialist countries hindered the making of a new international order based on general human principles and moral standards.

This sort of thing had its limits. It could continue only so long as the traditional system reposed on its own foundation, namely, the isolation of economies from country to country, which made it possible to break off economic ties between belligerents without disastrous results for the world as a whole. It could continue only so long as the traditional system reposed on the type of weapons that made it possible to resolve issues in dispute by means of war without endangering the system as a whole. It could continue only so long as the universal human interests could not, in the absence of the requisite state of international processes, assume a form other than that of the interests of separate states.

The policy of the allied states after the Second World War was the first breach in the traditional system of international relations.

For all the novelty of the anti-Hitler coalition as compared with the situation following the October Revolution, the alliance of states representing antagonistic social systems was not a fundamentally new type of international relationship substantially different from the traditional system: though the anti-Hitler coalition had been formed in face of an aggressor, and defended the right cause of nations, it used the same ways and means, then the only possible and necessary ways and means, as were in use under the old system of relations. The victory over the Nazis was possible above all thanks to the economic and military power of the allies which secured the military and economic downfall of the aggressor, and the due retribution.

It is another matter that the aim was set, at least in theory, of devising a mechanism that would prevent the outbreak of another world war. Typically, that aim was set totally out of context with the discovery of nuclear energy, no matter what the devotees of nuclear deterrence may say about the existence of nuclear arms containing potential aggressors. In fact, it was the terrors of the Second World War that had horrified humanity to a point where the aim of averting any fresh slaughter was seen as agenda item number one.

When shaping the concept of the United Nations Organization, the powers took into account the faults of the first organization of that kind, the League of Nations, formed after the First World War. Speaking of the results of the Big Three Yalta Conference in the House of Commons, Winston Churchill referred to the United Nations as that "strongly-armed body [to which] we look to prevent wars of aggression, or the preparation of such wars, and to enable disputes between States, both great and small, to be adjusted by peaceful and lawful means, by persuasion, by the pressure of public opinion, by legal method, and eventually by another category of method which constitutes the principles of this new organization."

Churchill went on to say that "the former League of Nations, so hardly used and found to be inadequate for the task it attempted, will be replaced by a far stronger body in which the United States will play a vitally important part."⁵⁷

Two points attract attention in Churchill's provisions. The first being that not the causes but the effects of aggression and war are taken into focus, thus limiting the functions of the new organization to those of a world policeman: for was not the weakness of the League of Nations rather than the character of the prevailing traditional international system (which condi-

tioned that weakness) declared to have been the chief fault? The second point was that even then, at the end of the war, the United States, that economically strongest country of the West, was declared the buttress and guarantor of the United Nations.

The very idea of the United Nations was based from the outset on traditional principles: it envisaged a modification rather than reconstruction of traditional foreign relations, with the strongest of the powers cast as the world leader (as the chief principle of the old system required).

Western hopes that the United States and its allies would now, after the crushing defeat of their chief imperialist rivals, dominate the world, were not, however, fated to come true. The Soviet Union had come out of the war far stronger than was expected. More, the West proved unable to prevent the emergence of new socialist states and of a socialist world system. This changed the situation in the world, causing a bi-polar rather than uni-polar modification of the old system.

The Soviet leadership took a sober view of the world's post-war arrangements. It, too, acted within the frame of the old policies and had no illusions about the intentions of its wartime allies. Speaking at a dinner at the Yalta Conference, Stalin rendered his view of the anti-Hitler coalition and the postwar prospects. "These days a radical change has occurred in the history of Europe," he said. "It is very good to have the alliance of the main powers at times of war. Otherwise it would have been impossible to win the war. But an alliance against a common enemy is something clear and self-understood. It is far more difficult to maintain the alliance after the war to secure a lasting peace and the gains of victory. The fact that we fought together is a good thing. But it was not so difficult to achieve. I raise a toast to the hope that our alliance, which was born as a war need, should endure and continue after the war so that our countries would not confine themselves to internal affairs and remember that apart from their own problems there is also a common cause, that they must safeguard unity with as much enthusiasm in peacetime as they did at the time of war."⁵⁸

The subsequent course of events, as we know, failed to follow either the conjectures of the Western leaders or those of their Eastern counterparts. Mutual distrust which persisted since pre-war times, coupled with the conflicting aims, led to a cold war, which obscured the universal peace concept. In the final analysis, the driving force behind the cold war was the hegemonism of the United States which none had bothered to conceal in

those days. This does not go to say, however, that the Soviet leadership of those days, was entirely blameless. As Gorbachev noted, "The Soviet Union was unable to use the immense moral prestige it had earned during the war to consolidate the peace-loving democratic forces and halt the hand of the organizers of the cold war, for our reaction to the provocative imperialist moves had not always been adequate."⁵⁹

Whatever the case, the human race embarked upon a period of confrontation between the two world systems. Luckily, this did not develop into an open armed conflict. The credit here, too, I feel, should not be ascribed to any of the two sides either. Fedor Burlatsky was right, I think, when he said that both sides "had at the time of the cold war mistaken each other's intentions".⁶⁰

True, it is hard to say how the world would have fared if the Americans had succeeded in completing their nuclear war preparations before the Soviets acquired a nuclear capacity to hit back. But that would be a mere guess. History followed a different tack.

Conditions appeared for search of the way to disarmament and to guarantees of a secure peace. An examination of how that search proceeded enabled me to draw a few conclusions.

The moment the war had ended, the Soviet Union mounted a peace offensive, suggesting universal disarmament.

The first and most important reason why the idea was rejected was the relative military weakness of the Soviet Union, which elicited a somewhat contemptuous attitude of the Western states. Nor should we forget that the "rolling back communism" idea prompted the West to draw up plans of a nuclear attack, which called for further arming rather than disarmament. The overall psychological mood of people in the capitalist countries, was distinctly anti-communist, inspired by dread of the "horrors of Bolshevism" which, as we now know, was justified by the home policies of the Stalinist regime, whose crimes were unpardonable. This hindered most moves to win influential politicians and public leaders for the peace movement.

This does not mean that the antiwar movement of those times was totally incapable of securing certain successes. One such success was that the antiwar movement prevented the use of nuclear arms in Korea in the early 50s.

The Soviet Union bypassed governments that were reluctant to negotiate disarmament and appealed directly to the masses. But this approach did not, as it had not after the October Revol-

ution, bring about any radicalization. The Communist parties, which associated the drive to avert war with preparations for socialist revolution, had, to some extent, isolated the anti-war movement, organized and directed by Communists, from other public movements.

The other thing that made the Soviet peace offensive in the early postwar years ineffective was that it took no account of the interests of its opponents. True, the same applied to the Western proposals, especially those of the United States, such as the Baruch and Marshall plans. Each of the contending sides worked exclusively for its own interests. And since these interests diverged, and since they were considered incompatible, and, indeed, irreconcilable, agreement on practically any question was impossible.

Lastly, both sides were inwardly convinced that another world war was possible, necessary, even inevitable. This was the fundamental point that prevented progress in any negotiations. Peace was not an aim in itself, but a means to gain advantages in preparation for war. Naturally, such advantages could be achieved only at the expense of the weaker or more tractable side. Compromises were achievable only through concessions. But the Soviet Union, though relatively weaker than the combined Western forces, had leaders whose resolution and sense of purpose were unbendable. Past history had shown that the more determined the world's first socialist country was in preparing for defence, the more favourable the conditions became for its advancement.

But this could not go on forever. Constant war preparedness led to structural disproportions in the economy, a drop in living standards and, ultimately, a drop also in the country's defence capability. Meanwhile, big US losses in Korea had the effect of a cold shower for the Pentagon and the White House. The change of leadership in the Soviet Union and the United States in 1953 paved the way for a considerable advance towards peaceful coexistence. It is another matter that the advance was half-hearted and the peace policy inconsistent.

Still, a number of agreements was signed between 1955 and 1963, limiting the more disastrous consequences of nuclear weapons. The most important was the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in Outer Space, the Atmosphere, and Under Water.

Examining that first period of detente, we see that the success of that first arms limitation had resulted from an interaction of

factors that had not existed in the days of the cold war. The main thing that prompted the Western powers to come to terms with the socialist Soviet Union was the psychological shock of seeing Soviet achievements in the military field. The Soviet nuclear arms, and then also nuclear missiles, was something the West could not ignore. As Robert H. Ferrell, a prominent US student of diplomacy, pointed out, the "statement-making of the Dulles era reflected the uncertainty of American policy in the face of virtual atomic equality with Russia".⁶¹

The other factor that furthered detente was the truly massive change of direction in Western public opinion concerning the nuclear threat and defence of peace. The over-riding motive power behind that anti-nuclear movement was fear. And the reason for it was the development of Soviet weapons that could hit the West, coupled with the fact that nuclear blasts were becoming ever more deadly and devastating.

The distinctive feature of such anti-war and anti-nuclear organizations as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Britain, SANE in the United States, and the German Peace Union and Fight Against Atomic Death in the FRG, was that they represented a wide-ranging diversity of classes and social forces. Headed by prominent public and political leaders like Bertrand Russell, German Social-Democratic Party Chairman Erich Ollenhauer, and J. William Fulbright, they were not, as a rule, sponsored by any political party, and rejected monopoly by any of the parties. This attracted the allegiance of a considerable segment of those who had priorly shown no interest in politics. Contrary to traditional political notions, this had no adverse effect on the public opinion created by the anti-nuclear movement. Not, at least, until a certain moment in time.

One can hardly claim that the results of the initial detente were all positive. Despite the limitation of nuclear test blasts, it had proved impossible to start the disarmament process, though at that time disarmament proposals were prolifically advanced on both sides, and both sides were willing to go quite far in the search for a mutually-acceptable compromise. The reason was that both sides hoped to win some advantage. Disarmament was often little more than a screen for the wish to get rid of no longer effective types of weapons, to substitute new and more modern ones for them.

No less important was the ideological factor. In contrast to the pragmatism of the Stalin leadership, which acted above all on national rather than ideological interests, the new Soviet

leadership, notably Nikita Khrushchev, was laden with a revolutionary romanticism that in fact bordered on out-and-out voluntarism, an inability and reluctance to concede abstract principles for the sake of securing practical results. This came into evidence most strikingly in the conflict between Khrushchev and Eisenhower following Francis Gary Powers's U-2 reconnaissance flight in Soviet air space.

After failing to compel the US President to apologize, the Soviet Premier did not hesitate to scuttle the summit which, along with Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union, could possibly have started the process of tangible disarmament.

Referring to the relationship between Khrushchev and Kennedy, writer Burlatsky noted that the US President attached excess importance to the First Secretary's ideological utterances on the assumption that the latter was still nursing the idea of "world revolution". Burlatsky saw this as Kennedy's mistake.⁶² As I see it, the thing was far more complicated. Khrushchev's utterances show that he did not think it impossible to destroy capitalism by means of Soviet nuclear missiles. He therefore justified reduction of conventional armaments by the fact that they were being replaced with new types of weapons.

It is another matter, however, that the Caribbean crisis had opened Khrushchev's eyes. He took a new view of the situation and adjusted his outlook accordingly. By and large, however, the amendment of some of the outdated provisions of the communist doctrine at the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the international conferences of Communist and Workers' Parties, was aimed at heightening the effectiveness of the communist movement and bringing closer socialist revolution.

For Khrushchev class interests were higher than peaceful coexistence and disarmament. More, he was wholly sincere in that respect. It would not be right to spot any distinction between his ideological utterances and his concrete policy. In the changed conditions, however, Khrushchev's return to the revolutionary romanticism of the early Soviet years turned out to be disastrous for him and his policy. Life required realistic politics. It was essential to approach the new principles of international policy without illusions, in a professional spirit.

Still, that initial detente saw new actors step on to the political scene who broke the rules of the game and set about destroying the old system of international relations. The famous Soviet 1959 proposals for general and complete disarmament calling for the destruction of all types of weapons and the disbandment of armies

and staffs, spoke of change in the approach to the principle of force. There had been no shortage of such projects earlier, too. The novel element was, however, that this project was advanced by a power which had in the opinion of all quarters gained considerable advantages at the time and registered a breakthrough in the development of new types of weapons.

This was the first time strength was used not to threaten anyone or to prepare for war, but to promote disarmament, including unilateral. Unfortunately, only a few people then appreciated the genuinely revolutionary quality of that approach. The US posture reposed on the old notions of armed force as a factor of politics. It was the view of the United States, as its spokesman in the UN General Assembly Disarmament Subcommittee made clear in 1955, that if an effort were made to reduce armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures to a level that was too low, to a level that reflected weakness, it would not be conducive to stability and the best interests of peace. If armaments, armed forces and military expenditures were brought down to too low a level, he added, the danger of war would be increased rather than decreased.⁶³ It was then still a long way to any appreciation of the fact that the world could be non-violent and peace could be based on a system of treaties, accords, and universal security.

4. The Road to a Non-Violent World

Addressing representatives of parties and movements who had come to Moscow on the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Mikhail Gorbachev said everybody was in the same boat and had to behave so that it should not capsize.⁶⁴ Recall Gvishiani's jest that priorly those sitting in that boat were preoccupied in boring holes in its bottom. Possibly, a boat drawing water is more even-keeled. But only to a certain point. And the world reached that point in the early 1960s. Yet it took another ten years for humankind to venture on the next step towards a non-violent world.

The process was set in motion by the appreciation of the dangers of nuclear arms. That was not all, however. People remembered that the Second World War was set off by contradictions that had been built into the peace arrangements following the First World War. In the circumstances, the task of averting another war was associated with a just and final solution of the issues left behind by the Second World War.

In the past, wars culminated in the signing of peace treaties. The Second World War was the only one that did not, though it ended more than 45 years ago.

No peace treaty was signed with Germany. For decades, the Soviet Union had called for a peace conference and a treaty, until it saw fit to conclude agreements with the GDR and FRG governments that emerged in the territory of former Germany. Nor has the Soviet Union signed a peace with Japan. Yet a peace would have settled many an issue, including the notorious problem of the so-called northern territories. All this has, beyond question, gravely complicated the international situation and sharpened the revanchist threat that no victor of the past war can afford to ignore.

In short, the first step that had to be made on the road to a non-violent world was that of removing the causes of a possible war bred by the results of the previous war. This took more than twenty years. The former allies of the Soviet Union created hindrances for they wanted to use the unresolved contradictions in their own interests to the detriment of the Soviet Union. Take the US stance concerning a Soviet peace treaty with Japan. When a Soviet-Japanese declaration was in the making in 1956 on the termination of the state of war between the two countries, the Soviet Union had agreed to recognize Japan's sovereignty over two South Kurile islands. The US Government responded by saying that if the Japanese Government signed a peace with the USSR, the USA would cut off Okinawa and the Bonins from Japan. As a result, Japan has not received the so-called northern islands to this day. Though one can hardly say that Okinawa really belongs to Japan today, since the American military establishment is its lord and master, no peace treaty has yet been signed.⁶⁵

A similar situation shaped by the mid-1960s over Germany. Two independent states and a special territorial entity, West Berlin, had long since existed. But the threat that another world war might begin on German soil remained all too real. Take the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1961. Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov wrote about the one of October 27-28, 1961: "We know what the shot in Sarajevo resulted in. One can only imagine what a salvo could have wrought in West Berlin, that veritable powder keg."⁶⁶ The movement towards a non-violent world and disarmament, I feel, was greatly hindered by postwar issues that had been hanging fire.

A new stage in relations between states began at the very moment when residual wartime problems were finally settled. A

second detente got off the ground when the FRG concluded its Eastern treaties, and a quadri-partite agreement was signed on West Berlin. The latter was an important step buttressing post-war cooperation and proving the integrity of all the previous agreements that had guaranteed the stability of international relations. One of the main factors that helped the parties to come to terms was that they proceeded from earlier agreements not subject to revision.

Along with the other accords of the turn of the 1960s into the 70s, the West Berlin agreement ushered in an era of treaties that in practice embodied principles formulated in the UN Charter adopted in 1945. These principles provided for the sovereign equality of all members of the United Nations; fulfilment in good faith of the obligations assumed in accordance with the UN Charter; settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, and security, and justice, were not endangered; abstention in international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or from any other action inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; giving every assistance to the UN in any action it takes, and refraining from giving assistance to any state against which the UN is taking preventive or enforcement actions.⁶⁷ Confirmation of fidelity to the principles of the UN Charter was highly important for the establishment of a peaceful situation in the centre of Europe. The four powers agreed that force or threat of force must not be used in that region, and all disputes should be resolved by exclusively peaceful means.⁶⁸

But detente required that the system of treaties should be extended to the rest of Europe, that cradle of civilization where the two previous world wars had broken out. This was achieved by the unprecedented Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.⁶⁹ For the first time in history, envoys of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada gathered to entrench the results of postwar development and to chart cooperation within a broad spectrum of topical issues related to peace and security.

The way to the Conference was paved by the efforts of diverse, notably socialist, peace-loving countries. The socialist states had advanced the idea of a collective security dialogue between socialist and capitalist countries on March 18, 1969. The idea won the backing of Finland, which offered to mediate in multilateral consultations with the object of thoroughly prepar-

ing a conference. The initial agenda advanced by the Warsaw Treaty countries suggested two groups of issues, which were later called the first and second baskets, that is, military and economic. Subsequently, a third basket was added on the initiative of the capitalist states pertaining to humanitarian cooperation.

Mutual compromises made it possible, despite the divergent positions, to agree upon an agenda. The main task of the Conference, as the socialist countries saw it, was to work out measures leading to further detente in Europe and the building of a European security system.

"European security and cooperation," the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty countries gathered in Prague on January 25-26, 1972, said, "requires a system of commitments ruling out any and all use or threat of force in mutual relations between the European countries, guaranteeing that all the countries concerned are safe from acts of aggression, and furthering the well-being and prosperity of each nation."⁷⁰

The Soviet Union almost simultaneously advanced a similar idea for Asia. At that time, however, given the war in Vietnam, the Indo-Pakistani clashes, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, the idea made no impact. Neither did the UN General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1972, on non-use of force in international relations and the banning for all time of the use of nuclear arms, which was based on a Soviet draft.

The idea of a European Conference made progress. The NATO countries which had originally ignored the Warsaw Treaty countries' proposals of May 31, 1972, agreed to take part in the preliminary talks held in Helsinki at intervals from November 22, 1972, until June 8, 1973, paving the way for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The Conference opened on July 3, 1973 and worked for two years running until August 1, 1975, when the Final Act was signed, defining the main provisions of a European collective security system.

Beyond question, the Final Act ushered in a new stage in humanity's long search for the way to a universal and just peace. Casting no doubt whatever on the character of the social systems in various countries of Europe, the Final Act established interstate relations that contradicted the old system.

The main points of the Final Act were: the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security; the interrelation between the security of each participating state and se-

curity in Europe as a whole; and respect for the security interests of all participating states inherent in their sovereign equality.⁷¹

The new principles renounced military strength as the criterion of a country's power and influence, war as a political means of resolving contradictions between states, and revenge-seeking by the losers of the past war.

The declared equality of all participants in the Conference paved the way to scrapping the system of European relations in which the great powers predominated while the small European countries were, in effect, fenced off from participation in European affairs. The interests of safeguarding peace in Europe prevailed over the egoistic interests of separate states. The inviolability of postwar frontiers had, in effect, terminated frontier disputes left over from the past and ruled out any new such disputes. Considering Europe's past experience, when it was constantly retailed in endless wars, one can hardly underestimate the elimination for all time of that factor of tension.

The most important factor of the new collective security system in Europe is that it reposes on non-use of force. Settlement of all disputes by exclusively peaceful means puts in question the need for armed forces and armaments as a means of deterring possible aggressors. Theoretical and then also practical possibilities have appeared to reduce the military confrontation in Europe. This has resulted in the conclusion of the Soviet-American INF Treaty in December 1987 and set in motion the talks on reducing the armed forces and conventional armaments of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries.

One can, therefore, hardly exaggerate the merits of the Final Act. Mind you, the second detente, its culmination, occurred when the massive anti-war movement was on the wane. The movement against the war in Vietnam which began in the latter half of the 1960s, had paved the way to that detente and determined its content. Its aims were fairly limited, and it was practically dead when the US troops were withdrawn from Indochina. So, the character of detente, when it began, was in many ways shaped by the aims and interests of the governments that took part in the Paris negotiations.

I have already mentioned above the limited and conflicting nature of the American and Soviet positions as concerned arms limitation. The same may be said of a large set of other issues. All too often, the proclamation of some aim was meant to conceal the true motives, those of expanding the country's sphere of

influence. This was largely true of the policy of the United States and other Western countries, but the same thing also applied often enough to Soviet policy.

A confrontation of the two systems in other regions – Asia, Africa, and Latin America – accompanied detente in Europe. It was precipitated by objective contradictions, the economic interests of the countries concerned, and by the subjective feelings of various statesmen.

The collapse of its Vietnam venture did not mean that the United States renounced interventionism as a policy. It was much too deeply involved in economic ties across the world to accept isolationism. The country's ruling quarters closely associated with the transnational corporations could not ignore the fact that the revolutionary process in the Third World was exercising a far-reaching influence on the US economy, the well-being of Americans, and the world situation. In different circumstances this should have generated a search for an international system that would work in the interests of the US through equal and mutually beneficial ties with suppliers of fuel and raw materials. But the character of the capitalist system and the traditional notion of America's role in the world spurred the strategy of neoglobalism. Though neoglobalism was formulated during Reagan's presidency, its foundations had been laid under Nixon. In his report to Congress in February 1972, President Nixon said: "A leading American role in world affairs continues to be indispensable to the kind of world our own wellbeing requires."⁷²

US dependence on the rest of the world as concerned raw materials and the economy in general, which surfaced most acutely in the early seventies, triggered a conflicting reaction among those who ruled America. And the wish to "rectify" the prevailing situation with resort to arms took the upper hand. Whenever the USA was for some reason unable to resort to armed force openly, it moved to destabilize progressive regimes in the developing countries, complicating the international situation on the scale of entire regions, and preventing the emergence of a collective security system based on the non-use of main force.

A big part in America's conduct of affairs in the Third World was played by the ideological factor, determined above all by the class position of the leaders of developed capitalist countries enriching themselves through non-equivalent neocolonialist exchange.

The rulers of the United States treat the peoples in developing countries as beggars who are imperilling the bloc of capitalist countries that have grown rich on exploiting them.⁷³ Having failed to roll back socialism, the US imperialists decided to make up for it in the Third World and halt the advance of the "beggars" nations. That was how they treated the initiatives of the developing countries on restructuring the world economic order. As a result, seats of tension appeared in regions where the class interests of the imperialists clashed with those of the socialist world system, which was giving precedence to defending the national liberation movement.

Delving into the intricacies of US foreign policy, and that of other capitalist countries for that matter, we see that the thought of universal peace had no place in it. It was entirely subordinated to the egoistic class interests of the transnational corporations and the international military-industrial complex.

Today, too, the potential centred on the achievement of universal peace is none too great. Imperialism is as ever ready to use all possible ways and means to secure its egoistic interests. It meets peace initiatives halfway only under strong outside pressure. The socialist countries exercise such pressure, regardless even of the subjective positions of various leaders.

To be sure, at the time of detente and the following deterioration of the international situation, the socialist countries, too, began to betray signs of a class approach to foreign affairs. Although the period of revolutionary romanticism had, in effect, ended in the mid-sixties, the aim of extending the socialist system, above all to the Third World, predominated as before over the aim of concerting the efforts of different countries and social systems to resolve global, universally human, problems.

The first, soon to become famous, report of the Club of Rome, *Limits of Growth*, was published in 1971. It was the first to question the survival of the human race. Though later the extremist conclusions of its authors were amended, vital issues concerning scientific and technical progress came into focus.

The new problems of that period surfaced owing to the modernization of nuclear and conventional arms, which brought the world to the edge of an accidental, unsanctioned war. Nuclear weapons were conclusively proved irrational as a means of resolving political contradictions.

Besides, detente in the 1970s had revived hopes of shaping a system of political guarantees for the peaceful settlement of con-

licts. A system of that kind had already been set up, but it applied to one continent only: Europe. Follow-up conferences to that of Helsinki took place in Belgrade and Madrid, and then in Stockholm and Vienna. They imparted additional depth to the non-use of force principle, and led to appropriate measures by all European states. The policy from positions of strength was pushed to the background.

Intricate processes were under way at the time in the under-developed countries. Overhasty steps of the revolutionary regimes to raise the level of development in socialist-oriented states created painful difficulties, discredited the ideals of socialism, adding to the East-West tensions. And countries which had opted for the capitalist way betrayed the no less alarming symptoms of poverty and backwardness.

The capitalist states, too, noticed that the world's economic mechanism was functioning in a new environment. Robert S. McNamara, former US Secretary of Defence and later President of the World Bank, predicted that "the fault line along which shocks to world stability travel will shift from an east-west axis to a north-south axis, and the shocks themselves will be significantly less military in character and substantially more political, social, and economic."⁷⁴

Leaders in the socialist countries did not grasp the new tasks facing the world community promptly enough. A dual vision of the processes going on in the world left over from the early socialist years still influenced statesmen quite strongly. The posture of the Soviet leaders was affected by the striving to prove socialism's equality to capitalism, the equality of the USSR and the USA, in the resolution of various issues. This was a left-over from the days when socialism was weaker than imperialism and was for ever the aggrieved side in world conflicts.

But the times had changed. The Soviet Union had to accept a bigger share of responsibility for the future of the world. It had to shake off the narrow-mindedness caused by a peculiar inferiority complex in international affairs. No longer did anyone doubt the viability and power of the socialist system. The talks on strategic arms limitation were evidence that the United States had reconciled itself to military and political parity, at least for the nonce. The impasse of the bi-polar modification of the old system of international relations was causing snags because countries could not reach their political aims, while reaching them by resort to arms was ruled out owing to the omnicidal destructive powers of nuclear arms.

The first to appreciate this were not statesmen and politicians, but the mass of the people. A new type of mass movement erupted in the late 70s and early 80s. It began to intervene in matters that had earlier been the exclusive prerogative of professional politicians and generals. People on both sides spoke publicly of the dangers created by the arms race and by the ecological, demographic, food-supply, and economic problems. Scholars who proved that any type of nuclear war was unacceptable, did so most convincingly.

Still, the old logic continued to reign. A first step was needed to break the vicious circle of the arms race generated by the law of the sword and shield, the prejudices, the egoistic postures, and the psychology of stagnation. And this first step was taken by the Soviet Union. A nucleus of party functionaries and statesmen who had drawn all the right conclusions from the prevailing situation came to the fore in the USSR by the mid-1980s. In April 1985 they came to power. The doors opened for the new thinking and the translation of the new principles into practice.

To be sure, it would be wrong to reduce the new political thinking to just a re-orientation of Soviet statesmen. Before them there had been Mahatma Gandhi, Bertrand Russell, Willy Brandt, Olof Palme, and many other men and women of the anti-war and ecological movements. They had done a lot to mould the principles of the new thinking.

The Soviet peace offensive backed by the public all over the world paved the way for the Delhi Declaration on the principles of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world signed by the leaders of two of the world's biggest countries with a population of more than a billion people. Portrayed in the West as bearers of violence and brutality, the Communists declared for all the world to hear that they believed human life was the greatest value of all, and non-violence the only reasonable basis for the life of the human community—and this not at some remote date but at the present moment. Humankind, the Declaration said, had come to a decisive stage in history. Nuclear arms threatened to destroy everything man created over the centuries and, indeed, all life on Earth. In the nuclear age, humankind must work out a new political thinking, a new conception of peace which would dependably guarantee survival. People wanted to live in a safer and juster world. Humanity deserved a better fate than to be hostage to nuclear terror and despair. The world situation had to be changed. A world free of nuclear arms, violence and hatred, fear and suspicion, had to be built.⁷⁵

The new aim facing humankind led to certain corrections in the Communists' ideological platform. They renounced obsolete principles, and generated new ideas in keeping with the principles of the new political thinking.

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⁷⁴Robert S. McNamara, *One Hundred Countries, Two Billion People. The Dimensions of Development*, Praeger Publishers, Washington, 1973, p. 90.

⁷⁵Pyotr Fedoseyev (editor), *Peace and Disarmament 1987. Academic Studies*, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1987, p. 471 (in Russian).

PART THREE

SURVIVAL AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

1. Marxism and the New Political Thinking

During one of the USSR-USA live two-way television broadcasts, a Soviet participant asked Phil Donahue, the American moderator, if he believed in a "Soviet threat"? Donahue paused, then, evidently pleased with what he would say, smiled and replied: "Well, didn't Premier Khrushchev say you'd bury us?"

Something like twenty years had passed since Nikita Khrushchev died, and more than that since he was dismissed from the leadership. But his utterances, as we see, were still used to prove the existence of a "Soviet threat" — at a time the Soviet leadership was thinking and acting along entirely new lines.

Khrushchev had himself explained what he meant by the word "bury". Speaking at the National Press Club on his visit to the United States in 1959, he said his statement had been deliberately distorted: he had not meant physically burying anyone but a change of social system. "At the reception in question," he said, "I stated that historically capitalism would be buried and communism would take its place."¹

To be fair, there were some grounds for misinterpretations of Khrushchev's statement. He had sincerely believed the capitalist system would soon collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. This belief was wholly in keeping with the Soviet leaders' revolutionary romanticism of those days: they had a programme in which immediate passage to communism substituted for a more practical aim. Besides, they had only just begun to learn the lessons of the incipient nuclear-missile parity. The USSR was becoming a great power second to none in strength. This was sinking in slowly, for any great power is *ipso facto* obliged to assume responsibility for safeguarding peace and civilization. To become aware of it would take time. Initially, parity with other states was apprehended outwardly by a scrupulous emphasis on the visible tokens of prestige.

This was the posture not only of Khrushchev but also of most of the other Soviet leaders of that time. Take Soviet Ambassador

in Washington Mikhail Menshikov's reflections after the breakdown of the 1960 Big Four summit in Paris.

"I wondered what had been lost owing to the collapse of the summit conference," Menshikov wrote. "Its agenda, which had been determined beforehand in an exchange of notes, included disarmament, a German settlement, normalization in West Berlin, and general East-West relations. Let us suppose the conference had taken place. What would it have resulted in?"

The Ambassador's analysis showed that the most one could hope for was halting nuclear weapon tests.

"By and large," Menshikov wrote, "the Paris Conference, even if it had taken place, would hardly have opened up broad horizons for genuine peaceful coexistence and cooperation between our countries. The general international climate would have been a little more tranquil. But the US Government was obviously unprepared for a true normalization of relations.

"The Soviet Union indicated that it would not allow anyone to speak to it from positions of strength. The illusion that it would make unilateral concessions for the sake of a summit meeting, were dispelled. This was a good lesson to the Americans and their allies."²

That the collapse of the summit had not been a "good lesson" to the Americans we see from the subsequent Berlin and Caribbean crises.

This outlook, where prestige had priority over vital disarmament matters (halting nuclear weapon tests was essential at the time to reduce damage to humanity), was typical of those who adhered to the principles of the old system of relations in which force and threat of force were the main instruments to wring consent to demands from the other side.

In the late 50s and early 60s, the Soviet Union fell back on its military power in a bid to compel the world to disarm. Without success. The possibilities of armaments as a means of pressure were limited. This made the Soviet leadership change its logic of behaviour, doubly so because the question of survival had moved to the centre of world affairs.

The new political thinking is based on a fundamentally different behavioural logic of responsibility for the future, sometimes even to the detriment of the country's unilateral interests. A typical example of how the old and new approaches kept clashing, were the talks on the limitation and reduction of intermediate-range weaponry in Europe from 1981 to 1987. They had begun when both sides, the USSR and the USA, adhered to the

old system of relations and were more concerned with prestige than elimination of nuclear arms. The clash of power approaches led to a breakdown in the negotiations, and arms began to build up rather than decrease.

The situation changed when the new leadership came to power in Moscow, proclaiming a new foreign policy based on new political thinking. As Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said at the 27th Congress of the CPSU, compromises were made at the intermediate nuclear force talks, "grinding down the habitual arms race logic".³

Once the Soviet Union had consented to the original zero option advanced by the US Administration, turning it into a global double zero, the two sides came to terms on destroying all medium and shorter range nuclear weapons in Europe, and partly also in Asia. Quite contrary to the previous logic, the Soviet Union agreed to reduce three warheads to every one American warhead.

The talks on reducing strategic nuclear weapons begun by Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik, showed that the times had changed to a point where previously fantastic and unrealistic projects had become practicable.

Not all people, it is true, have yet understood that concessions by one side do not always mean that it has lost, because the main problems of survival are settled to everybody's satisfaction. There were and still are claims that the United States owes the favourable outcome of the INF talks to US and NATO pressure on the USSR — something that falls within the framework of the old thinking.

In fact, however, the force policy of the United States had led to the breakdown of the intermediate nuclear weapons talks in 1983. The talks were resumed when people had come to the fore in the Soviet Union who countered power politics in the East and West with a new thinking and a new policy.

More than enough reasons had accumulated for this re-thinking of the basics of foreign policy: they cannot be reduced to pressure by the US Administration, which, by the way, was compelled to renounce a far greater number of stereotypes than the Soviet Union. As Marshal Akhromeyev, then Chief of Soviet General Staff, said at a press-conference in Geneva on November 25, 1987, in his review of the six years of talks on European nuclear weapons, "What we had to do was not only give up a certain number of warheads, but also reconsider many of the elements in the mutual relationship of states, to see what military

power stood for in international relations. This took nearly seven years. It was difficult for us, but, I think, it was no easier for our partners, to draw up this treaty.”⁴

Reconsideration of ongoing world processes affected some fundamental aspects of Marxist theory, which is the basis for Soviet policy. It had not been easy to grasp that the old approaches were no longer valid. But the revolutionary perestroika in all areas of life led to an understanding of the new reality.

As I have said before, the victory of the October Revolution was made possible because the Bolsheviks adopted the idea of peace as the overriding idea of their platform when people were weary of the First World War. They linked peace with the alternative to the system that generated wars. But at that time the idea of peace was effective only up to the moment the war ended. Then the masses cooled and became less radical. Pacifist dreams of peace appeared, bypassing the idea of pulling down the old social system. This slowed down the revolutionary process.

The slowdown of revolutionary change across the world modified the communist programme. The emphasis on internal goals, those of building socialism in one country, called for favourable conditions, achievable through an active policy of peace. As Mikhail Gorbachev noted, “Lenin’s concept of peaceful coexistence naturally changed. Initially, it was vindicated primarily by the need for minimally favourable external conditions.”⁵ Later, it became essential to greatly expand the content of peaceful coexistence, to impart a new dynamism to it, and to link it up directly with the objectives of social progress.

Let’s see what social progress stands for here. Different social and political forces give it a different, sometimes incompatible, meaning. Also, there are those who are against progress. It is not easy, therefore, to identify the mainstream of progress in the best interests of humanity.

In its day, Marxism had embodied the progressive elements humanity had accumulated by the mid-19th century. That is why it made so great an impact. It became a leading social theory, won the minds of the masses, seized hold of entire countries, and became a material impulse for progress.

But at some stage, people evidently forgot that Marxism’s successful march had been possible only because its aims coincided with those of humanity in general. When, owing to subjective and objective factors, Marxism began to falter in blending class aims with those of all humanity, it began to lose influence.

This necessitated a reconsideration of the antagonistic development of civilization on the eve of the third millennium, definition of the aims of humanity as a whole, and elimination of the class and national limitations of the contending ideological schools. Time has shown, to be sure, that neither side was able to completely overcome the limitations. Still, considerable headway has been made.

Attempts to determine the main general human values were made by outstanding thinkers, such as Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein (who, by the way, were the first to call for a new thinking), Mahatma Gandhi, Teilhard de Chardin, and others. How profound, though somewhat abstract, their conclusions were was not appreciated until now. Promoting an as yet indefinite social ideal, they had gradually moulded the spiritual mood which is now highlighting the emergence of an international system of relations based on non-violence and universal security.

The new situation that took shape by the mid-eighties prompted the diverse social forces to translate previously vague ideals into international practice. The first to tackle this task were the socialist countries. Marxism had its face lifted. A true merger occurred with all the best created by non-Marxist humanitarian thought over the recent decades.

The new political thinking altered the attitude to the truth, on which, Marxists thought, they had a monopoly. Previously, everything non-Marxist was automatically declared incorrect, untrue, and reactionary. Marxism was considered *a priori* the most correct and the truest theory. Now we have already seen that this approach leads to stagnation and backwardness. As General Secretary Gorbachev has said, "Politics must be nourished by everything that constitutes the intellectual wealth of every nation and of human civilization as a whole... Not fertilized by reflection on the human condition, a policy is bad and immoral, and does not deserve respect. That is why I agree that there should be natural contact, a mutual need for politicians and those who make present-day culture to communicate, to meet, to maintain a continual exchange of opinion. I am sure that both sides will gain as a result."⁶

Acceptance of novelties created by human thought does not mean that Marxism is losing its specific qualities, as people in the West would often have us believe. The situation is far more complicated. Marxists are prepared to admit that many of the things that have now been apprehended within the framework of the new thinking, did not initially fit the "orthodox" Marxism.

Soviet writers note that some of the new and important problems which have enriched Marxist thought, were first, albeit incompletely, one-sidedly and even distortedly, formulated within the framework of non-Marxist theoretical concepts. The original experience of current social movements offers ample material for theoretical generalization and reflection over the intricate development of the present-day revolutionary process across the world. It is a fact of history, after all, that the peculiar experience of the ecological movements had prompted a more profound and attentive examination of the global problems of our time. The many current anti-war movements have raised a range of as yet unresolved problems connected with the further development of the concepts of peace and peaceful coexistence. The feminist movements of our day also offer ground for a more profound approach to woman's place and role in present-day society.⁷

All that is true. But introducing a fundamentally new system of international relations and a just society, is a practical rather than theoretical undertaking. A non-violent world is impossible to achieve until the idea of a just world seizes the masses and turns into a material force. The political power of governments must combine with a massive country-wide movement of all those who wish to contribute to peace and goodwill, and to the survival of humanity. This is an essential condition of progress. Rejuvenated socialism is a force that has come forward with an alternative to the old system that will soon be put into effect with the active participation of massive popular movements.

Thus the new thinking has organically entered the Marxist concept. Conversely, the fact that many Western politicians are finding it difficult to accept the new thinking shows above all that the framework of many currents of bourgeois thought have hardened far more than the most dogmatic and scholasticist variety of Marxism. Marxist theory develops because its main operational task is to take note of everything new and progressive created by human thought. Marxism is viable because it is both theory and practice of social progress. It stagnates where one-sided interests obscure its general human essence.

Marxism is facing people as an aim and decisive factor of social progress. That is the main line of Marxism's renewal. Much was said of people before, but they were treated as the little screws and bolts of an enormous bureaucratic machine, whether the state or the international system. Often, the human being was sacrificed to *a priori* aims. To secure such aims, the state was

forced to use diverse, including unjustifiable, means. Now, the situation is changing. The aims of the Communists are changing. So are the means they use. This is not only the consequence of outside pressure. In the course of time, those aspects of theory that were until now obscured by the immediate interests of safeguarding the class positions of the world's first socialist country, have begun to come to the surface.

The priority that is given to the well-being of the individual, to his destiny and the future of all civilization, has recast many of the issues related to the criterion of progress. Where conquest of power by the proletariat was priorly considered the main criterion, for it was believed to be able to build a just society all by itself, it is now clear that conquest of power alone cannot resolve all problems. Humanity, all members of the human race, must rise to a new level of well-being.

The technological revolution of the late 20th century is capable of providing the requisite material conditions. But there are trends limiting progress to only a part of the Earth—the territory of the advanced post-industrial states. This is unfair and generates counteraction by the peoples of the developing countries who refuse to remain on the sidelines of progress.

Universal peace as a condition and guarantee of social progress affects the manner in which various social forces apprehend their aims. Peace does not mean that contradictions between the interests of countries, peoples, classes, social groups and individuals, vanish into thin air. Modern-day Marxists are worlds removed from the uniformism of a barrack-room communism. The world remains divided. There is still competition and contention between various forces or, to use a modern term, there is pluralism. Attempts to do away with this pluralism, whoever makes them and whatever lofty aims are pursued, are immoral and evil if they are forcible. This applies to Communists as well as followers of Western democracy and freedom.

If a side is sure it is right, it must prove that this is the case. Then people will follow it. If people do not follow it, it must abide by the majority view. Such are the rules in democratic society. Marxists accept these rules. They are in no hurry to bestow any blessings on humanity, to make it accept the system they believe in. As Mikhail Gorbachev said on French television, "There is still time to find out whose ideology and whose views and laws are more ethical, and whose economy more rational. History has enough time for peaceful competition between our ways of life to give people a chance to make their

own choice freely and pick the social system that is more to their liking.”⁸

The change of aims of the Soviet Communists has had a most favourable effect on the international situation. Their concept of the ideal arrangement for competition contained so much common sense that it was immediately accepted by members of diverse political currents. The change of attitude of former US President Ronald Reagan, a man who certainly had no sympathy for Reds, is most convincing. He started his presidency by calling for a crusade against Communists, and ended it by signing a number of important agreements on mutual disarmament and, indeed, by admitting that all people, including the Communists, had to live together on one planet.

The first impulse for this came at the Geneva summit in 1985. Addressing General Secretary Gorbachev, Reagan said the United States could not afford illusions about the nature of the USSR. “We cannot assume that their ideology and purpose will change,” he said. “This implies enduring competition. Our task is to assure that this competition remains peaceful.” Reagan said that with all that divided the two countries, they could not afford to let confusion complicate things further. They must be clear with each other and direct. And he concluded: “We must pay each other the tribute of candor.”⁹

This was a welcome statement. It showed that the new political thinking will not become reality until it is the basis for the activity of all political forces. The new thinking cannot be practised unilaterally. It is by nature based on reciprocity and compromise, and a consensus of interests in this heterogeneous and pluralistic world.

Consensus of human interests presupposes elimination of the threat of nuclear war. That, indeed, is the immediate basis for consensus. Humanity faces so many threats that escape from the present peril to civilization is possible only through positive activity in shaping a system of universal security, a new economic and information world order, and settlement of various ecological, demographic and other problems. And all this can be done only in common. A world without wars, I might say, is a necessary condition of progress, while the content of progress is humanity’s joint material and spiritual elevation to a new level of wellbeing.

Solution of global problems must not go counter to the development of separate peoples within national frontiers. The human community consists of hundreds of independent states.

For the first time in history, every state, big and small, is being given a chance to participate as an equal in world affairs. Marxists have long since said that all-round development of every nation will make for harmonious development of the international community. Today, this formula is doubly relevant. Humanity's further progress does not necessarily call for the elimination of the independence of separate states. Though, beyond question, they will have to give up part of their prerogatives in order to ensure the security of the world as a whole.

Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze spoke of this, among other things, when sizing up the results of the Soviet-American INF negotiations. "This is the first agreement," he said, "that envisages all-embracing control and verification, and under which the signatories have deliberately, for the common good, for their common interest, renounced part of their sovereign rights by admitting inspectors to their territory."¹⁰ Economic objectives of concern to many nations, could be achieved in a similar way.

Many questions arise in that connection as concerns the national sovereignty of the members to the emergent international system. Two opposite points of view are held on this score in Soviet literature. According to Georgy Shakhnazarov, the time will soon come when national sovereignty will be restricted, and when, indeed, supranational bodies will make their appearance and take over some of the sovereign rights of national states, including such bodies as would govern the entire world community. But Shakhnazarov's point of view is contested by Alexander Bovin, who believes that, though it is pleasant to soar in the pure air of abstraction, the realities must be abided by that so far make world development ungovernable. There are no signs of any "world government",¹¹ he pointed out.

I think we will know very soon which one of the two was right, though it is easy enough to assume that the further development of the world community will exercise a far stronger effect on national sovereignty than the convinced opponents of *mondialism* happen to think. Take the political integration of Western Europe. In a sense; it has become a fact of life.

Cultural growth will be an important result of general human progress. The crisis of civilization was extensively accompanied by a buildup of negative tendencies in the cultural field. Drug addiction, alcoholism, crime, consumerism, cynicism, and spread of such frightening diseases as AIDS — all this

has been the result of the degradation of traditional human values, a drop in the cultural level of industrial and technocratic societies. And the advances of education have done nothing to save us from it. The human dimension of social progress calls not only for extensive growth of material wealth. In a certain sense, it also calls for a return to the traditional human values that were dropped by the wayside in the chase after prestige, things, comforts, and success.

Naturally, this does not mean we should return to the idealized medievalism that is being dreamed up by certain devotees of a convivial and joyous society. What we need is a society whose ideal will be a blend of the moral commandments that humanity has striven for over the millennia. In the sphere of morality, of ethics and spiritual culture, competition between systems is also possible. The result of the competition will depend to no small extent on which system will prove to be more highly moral. For the contestants to have equal conditions, the argument between them must have the world for its venue. Neither isolationism nor an iron curtain could fence them off from the vital needs of historical development. All of us belong on Earth and must behave accordingly as members of the human race, possibly the only spark of reason in the unembraceable Universe.

Consciousness of the integrity and interdependence of the world as a totality of countries (not ruling out pluralism and diversity) has come into evidence only recently. Yet, as at all revolutionary times, its progress is unusually rapid. Humanity has come to the threshold of a nuclear-free world. What will it be like? That is something we must think of today. The two main problems are clear. The first concerns universal security in the absence of nuclear weapons, and the second concerns ending the backwardness of the Third World, establishing a new economic world order. To settle these problems it is not enough to change policy. It involves a revolutionary change of the social consciousness, of humanity's outlook—and not of non-Marxist theories only, but also of Marxist theory.

This does not mean a face-lifting of outdated formulas, giving old positions new names. The revolution in people's consciousness must concern the basics of the world outlook that took shape as a result of the industrial revolution in the 18th-19th centuries. That is not enough—the style of thinking must change, as must the conception of civilization's mounting problems.

2. The Optimism of History

Sam Cohen, who shares the dubious honour of being father to the American neutron bomb with Edward Teller, has written a book. In that book he examines the cause of the war, perverts the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, vindicates the arms race and the policy of the US Administration, and arrives at the conclusion which he sets down in the title of his book: the USA *can* prevent a third world war.¹²

But one cannot expect a hawk like Cohen to renounce familiarized ideological formulae. He is convinced that the only way to safeguard peace is to build up nuclear muscle. In that respect, he is exponent of the old thinking. In fact, his thinking leads to additional tensions, which will bring war only closer. Still, sober-minded people will agree with Cohen that war can, indeed, be averted. To prove it, however, and to vindicate the means of securing it on the basis of the new thinking, everybody must turn to the eternal issues that troubled all the great philosophers who dived into the question of universal peace.

The main issue is how universal peace can be secured? I have already shown how Hobbes, Kant, Fichte and a few other great thinkers approached the matter. Naturally, no one can either examine or offer new approaches without touching on the fundamental issues of human existence. The new political thinking did not come out of the blue. It is rooted in humanity's suffering, in the many centuries of revelations and mistakes, and in the latest achievements of natural humanitarian science, the philosophy of history, the philosophy of politics and, briefly, in those fields of knowledge that deal with the general laws governing nature, society, and thinking. It is impossible to tackle any particular issues without first settling the general ones. That is the fundamental principle of Marxism and, for that matter, of any other ideological current in which the particular is not treated as a principle.

Marxist philosophy rests upon two fundamental provisions. They set it apart from all other philosophical schools. The first provision establishes the relationship of nature and social phenomena to the world as objectively existing material entities irrespective of our consciousness and feelings. The second provision is that the world is in a continuous state of flux and passes through various stages of development. Marxist philosophy is based on a combination of materialism and dialectics. The application of the principles of dialectical materialism in various

fields of knowledge is different in each case, but the substance of the Marxist approach is the same.

Methods of dialectic materialist analysis are also specific. Still, historical change of the paradigm of human knowledge extends to all fields and is reflected in the study of diverse aspects of natural and social regularities. That is why we cannot speak of laws of development outside a concrete historical context.

Hence, examining the prospects of civilization, provided it survives, we must look into the interconnection between the basic historical paradigms of the human mentality. It is acknowledged by practically everyone that thinking is not immutable, that it acquires new characteristics at every stage of history. Even foes of dialectics cannot deny that various historical types of thinking are not identical. At times of change, distinctions between types of revolutionary thinking are especially visible.

The present era is just such a turning point when humanity faces a choice and when the challenges require fundamentally different approaches. Suffice it to mention the ecological crisis, the global confrontation of the two world systems, the resulting political, social, and economic instability, the cardinal renewal of social production spurred by the end-of-the-century technological revolution, etc., etc.

In the new environment, each social, political, and ideological force is compelled to sift through its arsenal of ideas and get rid of outdated dogmas. And Marxism is no exception.

The initial difficulties in adapting Marxism to the realities of today were traced to the difficulties of applying Marxism in practice to specific situations. On the whole, however, it is a dependable instrument for studying social processes. At present, the process of renewal has reached down into the deeper layers of Marxist social theory and covers rockbottom methodology. As a result, the new thinking is really a profound scientific perestroika of Marxism, and cannot help affecting the methodological premises for universal peace.

Most important for us out of the latest achievements of Marxist philosophical thought of the 1980s, is Alexander Yakovlev's proposition about the non-axiomatic character of social knowledge.¹³ Until now, Marxists proceeded from what was in substance an opposite conclusion that social theory can be built on the model of Euclidean geometry by deducing its provisions from a number of axioms that do not need proving. Yet this is contrary to the materialist spirit of Marxism, which reposes on the objective continuously developing reality. Constructing dog-

matic systems of theoretical knowledge that in their final form contain the illusion of absolute truth results in that the pertinent predictions and conclusions do not coincide with the actual consequences of the objective course of events. It is possible, admittedly, through partial corrections, to align theoretical conclusions with the actual course of history, but in the final analysis the axioms upon which this system reposes become doubtful.

The non-axiomatic character of social science casts doubt on the need for constructing a totally non-conflicting system of views, because it encompasses contradictions not only in nature and the objective social reality, but also the immanent necessity for the theoretical conceptions to be contradictory, since they can reflect the absolute truth only through their contradictory unity. Soviet philosopher G. Batishchev stresses, for example, that "a contradiction cannot be only that *in relation to which* we make our theories; it must itself be present in all the actual relationships of man, filling his essence and saturating his spirituality."¹⁴

The new non-axiomatic approach is fully consistent with the present picture of the world drawn with the help of the latest achievements of natural science. As noted above, the final answer to the all-important question concerning the sense of nuclear war was given by natural scientists: it was they, first of all, who pointed out that nuclear war was senseless because it was not winnable. If, however, we take the more fundamental aspects of being, the biggest contributions to the new world outlook were made by the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics and labile thermodynamics, which are at the basis of the currently nascent world picture.

The discovery of dissipative structures by Soviet scientists B. Belousov and A. Zhabotinsky, and the conception of Noble Prize winner Ilya Prigozhin, have compelled natural scientists, and then also social scientists, to cardinaly alter their outlook of the world.

Ilya Prigozhin maintains that every natural event is unique because, like an event in history, it cannot be repeated. In that respect, natural phenomena have their "history" exactly like social phenomena. Prigozhin's conception shows that there is fundamentally common ground for natural and humanitarian knowledge. Backed by most natural scientists, this compels us to look upon the surrounding world in an entirely new light.

The former picture of the world was based on the achievements of the modern industrial revolution, on Newton's laws and

the rationalism of Descartes. It has come down to us and, despite some amendments made during the epistemological crisis of the early 20th century, was based on the idea of Man's omnipotence as the King of Nature, the subject of unbounded domination over nature.

Soviet philosopher Boris Pruzhinin writes:

"The general philosophical ideas that nowadays determine man's cognitive relation to the world (and consequently also the means of the reflexive fixation of that relation) were connected with a definite, historically concrete, type of man's practical relation to the world. If an individual can create the desired artifact, that is, organize natural substance as he desires, he is, consequently, in his mentally fixed position, capable of conceiving and elucidating the objective properties of nature that help or hinder him in achieving the goal. Here the world is conceived as an object through the aim of the activity. On the plane of objective action, this position is fixed by the content of the aim for which it is necessary to organize a system of actions. On the plane of knowledge, reason is the principle for organizing any expedient human action."¹⁵

This view of knowledge impresses upon us the singularity of the picture of the world that opens from the standpoint of fundamentalism through the act of intuition, which does not allow for any other version of conceiving the world. The cognizing reason, in agreement with its own nature, allows for only one correct way of conceiving the world, and provides the only true knowledge of the world. The task is to rely on reason and assume the correct position, from which the world is seen exactly as it is, thus safeguarding its trueness through further rectification and linguistic articulation of that knowledge.¹⁶

Through the Hegelian idealism, among other things, Marxism was the legitimate successor to Descartes's rationalism. Although the merging of this rationalism with historicism and the revolution that Marx wrought in philosophy by putting the philosophy of history on a materialist basis have led to a considerable change in the Cartesian tradition, Marxism still basically reposes upon philosophical rationalism. The rationalism of Marxist theory was raised to an absolute in Stalin's variety of Marxist philosophy, giving expression to subjectivism and dogmatism, and to artificial theoretical paradigms that were carried into effect despite the resistance of the social environment.

It was difficult to conceive Marxism as a variety of philosophical rationalism because Marxist philosophers considered them-

selves followers of empiricism, a position that is contrary to rationalism. The Marxists of the past pushed the materialist character of empiricism to the forefront, and tried to use the arguments of even mechanistic materialists such as Locke to fight idealism, including dialectical idealism. Not until recently did a tendency arise among Soviet Marxists to revise this approach. Here is what S. Zanko, a Soviet philosopher, had to say on this score: "At the present stage, Marxism shows a preference for the rationalist platform, considering that modern-day rationalism is an ally in the fight against metaphysical materialism."¹⁷ Zanko stresses, at the same time, that Marxism has not as yet taken its own positive attitude towards the clash between rationalism and empiricism. The conflict between the empiricist and rationalist platforms, Marxists hold, is resolved through the reality of human knowledge. Sensual human activity, human practice, is the manner in which the matter is to be settled.

Although Marxism has no conclusive theoretical platform as to the clash between rationalism and empiricism, some ideas may be drawn now about how applicable traditional rationalism is in analyzing natural and social phenomena, including war and peace.

The idea about the fundamental indeterminateness of entire classes of phenomena reigning in quantum mechanics, and the conclusion about the absolute uniqueness of natural, as well as social phenomena, which, as Prigozhin put it, have their own history, has seriously shaken the rationalist conviction that all natural and social processes without exception are absolutely determinative or absolutely knowable. Science and philosophy are still to realize the revolutionary substance of these discoveries, which destroy blind faith in the omnipotence of human reason. Disappointments on this score among Western theorists have already resulted in technological and epistemological pessimism, in loss of faith in further progress. It seems to me, however, that it is not advisable to substitute one narrow position for another directly opposite but just as narrow and one-sided one. Shifts from admiration to despair and vice versa will yield few benefits. Though it must be admitted that the former faith in the omnipotence of industrial progress and the triumph of Reason has been substantially shaken, and on valid grounds.

In the complex and contradictory development of the world, philosophers look for moderate ways, ruling out extremist approaches. Concepts of "theoretical pluralism" have become widespread in the West, while in the Soviet Union emphasis is

no longer made on unconditional prevalence of some position and elimination of another, but on recognition of the objective need for the coexistence of contradictory viewpoints which reflect the truth only as an aggregate. Take Zanko's observation concerning the clash between rationalism and empiricism:

"The old argument between them should be considered an expression of the real contradiction of human knowledge generated and resolved through the actual reality of the social production of life. The Marxist theory of knowledge studies how the main contradiction of human cognition, as expressed in the clash between empiricism and rationalism, is settled. That is the essence of the truly Marxist viewpoint concerning the subject of the old philosophical argument."¹⁸

The notion of "pluralism" in relation to the philosophical aspects of the development of nature and society is not as yet very popular among Soviet social scientists, although the term "socialist pluralism" has been put into political circulation by Mikhail Gorbachev. It would be wise, however, to consider Soviet philosopher Nelly Motroshilova's evaluation of Western research in theoretical or philosophical pluralism. "The term," she writes, "is sometimes used in the context of pseudo-democratic, anti-socialist ideas. Yet in the history of knowledge the same conceptions were often filled with different, sometimes opposite, meaning. We should also employ a strictly differentiated and always specific approach in the case of philosophical concepts whose authors use the notion of pluralism."¹⁹

Speaking of the dialectic of the competition of the two world systems, we are evidently entitled to use the term pluralism to denote a certain stationary condition of humanity in which there is a conflicting unity of systems, nations, states, and social communities within the framework of an integral and interdependent world.

Is such a condition, which approaches the ideal of eternal peace, not reducible either to the totalitarian unity of a world empire or to a state of torpor in face of the nuclear threat, at all possible? To answer this important question we must turn to the conclusions that flow from the premises of the new conception of the world described above.

There has got to be a substantial reconceptualization of the traditional rationalism of the thinking of modern times bred by the impressive successes of science and technology in the course of the industrial revolution and based on the proclaimed omnipotence of Reason. It turns out that social development as a re-

sult of human activity, though it follows its own laws, depends on Nature to a far greater extent than we were previously led to believe. But this means that the laws of society's development can be carried into effect only within the framework of a more complex system of which society and nature are both essential elements. This, by itself, places in doubt the outlook for realizing many of the social laws determined in the days when the contradiction between nature and society did not function in such a dangerous way.

The fact that many natural processes have a "history" and that any absolute repetition of these processes is negated in principle, has quite substantially narrowed, but not entirely abolished, the operation of many of the laws governing the development of the physical world. It follows that the present-day picture of the world is like a mosaic, with processes following their own laws in each of its composite parts. Such a "pluralistic" view has already taken root in natural science and is beginning to reach into social science. This is having some serious consequences since it paves the way for the fundamental thought that simultaneous action is tolerable in the social formation of laws of different, including opposite, direction, with such development not always culminating in the substitution of one set of regularities for other sets.

Here we must refer to the time factor usually presented in social science as a concrete historical evaluation of all processes and phenomena. The pluralism of social regularities may be treated in two ways: as existing at one and the same time, and as existing at different times. The substitution of one set of regularities by others may also be examined synchronically and diachronically. In one case the type of society may be regarded as a stationary condition. In the other, the emphasis is on counterpoising one set of regularities with others, with a process of transition seen as a short-term or simply temporary phenomenon. History, however, shows that the process of transition takes a substantially longer time than the "stationary condition", to say nothing of the difficulty of defining that concept.

Can it be said that the ultimate aim of the development of the capitalist social and economic system was to establish its domination over the entire world and to pass from free-competition capitalism to the stage of "decay"? Pre-monopoly capitalism, which resulted from the industrial revolution, had existed for nearly a century in Britain, and for just a few dozen years in other countries. That is why Marxists today have come to the

conclusion that, most likely, the era of free competition must have preceded monopoly capitalism, while the latter is the adequate form of the capitalist mode of production.²⁰

Yet present-day capitalism has become what it is through interaction with, and under the influence of, socialism. The same, of course, applies to present-day socialism.

The rejection of finalism, which had been in evidence among Marxists, enables us to accept the elements of the new thinking, including those that come from outside, non-Marxist sources, much more easily. On the other hand, however, new complications arise when we try to prove that it is possible to secure the survival of humankind in the present conditions. Providential faith in the ultimate triumph of a magnificent idea is giving place to a sober-minded evaluation of the dangers imperilling humanity and the opportunities for deliverance from these dangers.

It is therefore essential to renounce any rigid schemes that were once said to have best reflected the objective truth. What interests us here are the reflections of the aforementioned Motroshilova, who endeavoured to analyze the objective and subjective dialectics of war and peace in the present conditions.

Speaking of the peaceful development of the contradictions between the two social systems, Motroshilova noted that the objective laws of history have so far helped to preserve humanity as a whole despite the struggle of classes and social systems, wars, carnage, and violence. "World wars, after all," she wrote, "were a tragic offspring of the history of just the 20th century, whereas the preceding history of the antagonistic societies kept within a framework in which the present world, too, has existed for the past forty years, with local wars not growing over into worldwide slaughter. Naturally, local armed conflicts have tragically complicated the life of present-day humanity, and especially the life of those people who are directly involved in them. Still, the existence and preservation of the peaceful unity of the contending opposites is a no less convincing and a more substantial fact of history today than their collision in the form of wars. From the standpoint of the modern-day concept of dialectics this means that there are objective opportunities for an unintermittent dynamic development of the contradiction in the environment of a peaceful unity of opposites that does not grow over into war."²¹

Still, if we proceed from the present-day picture of the world in proving that humanity can survive, we cannot confine ourselves to just saying that humanity is bound to prevail as one

whole on the basis of objective regularities discovered in the past. We cannot say today whether the various regularities will remain the same in future or change to some other form. In any case, we have no grounds to maintain that humanity is bound to survive by virtue of the objective regularities, as we have done in the past with reference to the inevitable victory of communism on a world scale. Renouncing providentialism bordering on fatalism, humanity is, at the same time, becoming more mature and wiser, and accepting an entirely new level of responsibility for the further existence of civilization.

The fact that it is impossible to *predict* with an absolute degree of accuracy the further fate of humanity must not be used as evidence of humanity's inevitable perdition. The question of survival is open. This has its negative side. But it also compels us to turn to the dialectics of the objective conditions for the development of society, and to the subjective factor. So far, social development has tended to expand the sphere of operation of deliberately established laws and rules of human life. Nor have we grounds to think that this tendency will break off in the future. But whatever the case, the fixed aim is quite possible to achieve thanks to the greater conscious and purposeful influence on social processes based on the consensus of diverse interests for the sake of universal survival.

This does not go to say that objective regularities will be abolished. They will operate as natural processes and as a resultant of human wills and interests, acts, and social actions. But the opportunities that divided humanity has achieved so far for regulating world development, lead us to the conclusion that we can use the objective regularities that work for an integral world in the interests of safeguarding civilization, while holding down the regularities that work for division and subsequent destruction.

It is therefore possible, I feel, to agree with Motroshilova that "pinpointing the subjective opportunities for regulating the interaction of opposites is no less important than studying the objective mechanisms of the development of the contradiction and the change of its form... History shows that certain options are always available despite the collision of opposite social forces."²²

Humanity's choice, based on a consensus of interests, gives rise to yet another problem: to what extent can the intentions of the conflicting sides be trusted when they join hands and work together for universal survival? Speaking of present-day intentions, they cannot, in effect, be concealed, and come into evidence without fail in the speeches of leaders, and in political and

military acts. But this issue has yet another, philosophical, aspect. What will happen if conditions are, after all, secured for the guaranteed survival of humanity?

Looking at the matter from the standpoint of present-day philosophy we must first turn to the specificity of the picture of the world that is arising as a result of the latest scientific discoveries, which compel us to revise habitual dogmas and prejudices.

One of the most typical prejudices is that once nuclear weapons are eliminated there will be what may be termed as an "instant interaction" of historical events going back to Newton's picture of the world. Strangely, Albert Einstein's theory of relativity, which had a revolutionizing effect on natural science, has not been duly reflected in the philosophy of history. This applies to Marxist philosophy as well, for it had been afflicted by a dogmatic approach based on extra-historical aims and axiomatic provisions of a non-temporal nature. The victory of communism was hence conceived as a thing of the immediate future, within the lifetime of one or two generations, and as a precise embodiment of the theoretical schemes and ideals of the generation of Communists who had prepared and taken part in the October Revolution and in building socialism in the early Soviet years.

Meanwhile, as we have already seen, the aims and notions of people are altered through the time factor, which changes the earlier aims, the means of achieving them, and the very interests of the people of the new generation as compared with their predecessors. To some extent, the time factor may be compared to the effects of the principle of relativity when bodies move at the velocity of light over great distances.

Newton's laws of motion are effective when bodies move at velocities that are incommensurable with the velocity of light and when they interact at short distances which light covers instantaneously. When the velocities and distances are greater, Newton's laws cease to operate. According to Einstein, the velocity of light has a ceiling, which is also a ceiling for the velocity of all other material bodies. It follows that there is no instantaneous reaction at very large distances, and also no absolute simultaneousness of events, since a common temporal scale is absent.

It seems to me, the same principle applies to history. We cannot speak of a complete identity of aims and principles in the case of various political forces in history unless we take a very short period of time. At large temporal distances, in the process of historical evolution, the identity of political forces is gradually

rubbed out, for they absorb new generations of people and operate in changing conditions, serving different purposes.

The illusion of identity, it is true, derives from the survival of certain attributes in the case of a political party, of national traditions, and so on, though, obviously, the 18th-century conservatives are not at all identical with the neo-conservatives of the late 20th century, however hard the latter might try to trace the sources of their outlook to the remote past. The people are different, their views are different, and so is their politics and their ways and means of securing their goals.

Now, take the evolution of the Marxist outlook in recent decades. The ongoing struggle against Stalinism shows that Soviet Communists have today turned against many of the views of their predecessors. The latter had belonged to the same party but had lived at a different time, in different conditions, and had pursued different purposes. Still, some continuity has survived, and the main stress is on eradicating some of the more odious and inhuman aspects in Stalin's interpretation of Marxism.

Can we, in that case, say that the goals set a century and a half ago are fully being carried into effect today or that they have survived unaltered? Obviously, not. And if that is the case, how can we demand that the present generation of politicians should guarantee that their policy will not change until, say, year 2050? Who would we be demanding this from — politicians who will by then have left this world or politicians not yet born? Most probably, a forecast for so long a term is senseless. For none of us can foretell the image of any social or political force, nor the alignment of forces, nor the personal qualities of leaders of those faraway times.

Still, political forecasting is essential. But making forecasts, we must always remember that they are anything but foolproof. The principle of relativity shows we can use forecasts for just a very limited period of time. The greater the period, the more our imagination begins to falter. The forecast is then less precise and the ability to anticipate less profound, being restricted by the objective ceiling to the principle of historical relativity in velocity and subject.

For a very long time, when still in its cradle, humankind relied on the experience of preceding generations. This was done to gain assurance in its powers, and amounted to a slavish copying of customs and usages. On the other hand, it looked with hope to the rising generations, who were expected to be better and frequently also more powerful than their predecessors. The

dream of a Golden Age that was either still to come or had transpired long ago, was part of the consciousness, with its historical optimism on one pole and pessimism on the other. History has shown, however, that both these extremes were one-sided. At the present stage, we need a fundamentally different approach—an immeasurably higher degree of responsibility for universal human values, for the future of peace, of civilization, and of the world, and mutual confidence.

The experience of our predecessors is not of much help to us here, for we simply cannot use some of their methods owing to the cardinally changed conditions.

What we must stress, however, is that the view of an open future does not come under the head of agnosticism. The open alternatives, in fact, are not reason enough to say *in principle* that the world is unknowable. In the open future lurk possibilities of a discovery that will, say, enable humankind to overtake the velocity of light by using the curvature or heterogeneity of the Universe as conjectured in certain astronomical hypotheses, or by the use of a Time Machine. What this means, in sum, is that *now*, at the present level of development, we can say nothing about the ages ahead.

All the greater is the importance for us of the practical proposals that we must adopt for the survival of civilization. It is up to social scientists and politicians to create a climate of peace and goodwill. They must concentrate on securing mutual confidence. In the absence of mutual confidence there can be no mutual security, and without mutual security humankind cannot survive. It would be a good thing to look at the concrete political proposals showing the essence of comprehensive security submitted by the Soviet Union and adopted by the UN.

They express the new political thinking, and lay a basis upon which the divergent interests of those who have resolved to survive, may be happily combined.

The future is open, and it depends on us and us alone how we will fare. That is the sole and the most effective source of optimism. For we have what it takes to secure unity for the sake of survival and further progress.

3. The Philosophy of Trust

Soviet journalists who interviewed Ronald Reagan recollect that when the time of the interview had run out, the President

pulled a card out of his pocket, and read out the following: "Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they arm themselves because they distrust each other."²³

As Reagan conceived it, this was a most profound judgement that explained the difficulty of establishing normal relations between our two countries. On the other hand, however, the utterance is like a vicious circle. It is impossible to break out of it if both sides act the same. Nor does it matter who had been the first. The solution, the breaking of the circle, depends on who is the first to reverse the escalation of distrust. Reagan, when he read the phrase out loud, did not seem to have an answer as to how to shake off the evil spell. That is the only explanation for his saying he wanted the adversary, that is, the Soviet Union, to go to bed each night fearing the United States would use nuclear arms.²⁴

But what about the adversary? Might he not lose self-control?

This means the escape from the vicious circle of the arms race is not through intimidation and nuclear deterrence. A fundamentally different security mechanism is wanted, which would operate without blackmail, violence and pressure.

In recent years, it has been possible to pinpoint new solutions in foreign policy and defence, which are two highly conservative fields trammelled by all sorts of old traditions. Diverse political forces, for example, are contributing to the concept of comprehensive (all-embracing) security. The Communists spelled out their relevant ideas at the 27th Congress of the CPSU, and in some documents later. Then, the Soviet concept was put into effect in a UN General Assembly resolution in 1987. Now the issue has gained prominence in view of the initial progress of nuclear disarmament.

Several stages of the INF Treaty have already been put into effect. Strategic offensive arms have gone through the mill of limitation. This calls for the development of a system that would guarantee security in a nuclear-free world. Since the logic of distrust that spurred the arms race continues to operate, it is essential to provide all the answers to the question of guaranteed security before the last batch of nuclear warheads is finally destroyed. For a return to what prevailed before nuclear arms came into the world, when destructive world wars were fought, is not what we want. The world must move forward to progress, and not return to what it is trying to leave behind.

In this light the concept of comprehensive security is a real revolution that will sweep out the old system of international re-

lations and lay the foundations for a new one in the third millennium. The break-up of the old system began a long time ago. What we must remember, however, is that break-up does not mean a new system is shaping automatically. Though now the world is aware that the old is dying in agony, and that the only way to stop the agony is to create a new world order free of old survivals.

On the political, military and psychological planes, security and confidence among states is the main issue making for normal and civilized international relations. Absence of trust automatically breeds a sense of danger, necessitating armament. This is a specific feature of the old system based on main force by the stronger against the weaker. The appearance of nuclear weapons and the appreciation of their destructive powers set a restraint on using them as a method of resolving contradictions. The only way out now is to destroy those morally outdated weapons. Today, leaders of the major countries are of like mind on this point. But what next?

We now have two versions of the probable further course of events. The first concerns development of new non-nuclear weapon systems that would deter the potential aggressor. This means the logic of distrust will continue in a nuclear-free world, as will the tricks and methods of the old system. It is all too easy to foretell what this may mean for humankind. For it has been tried before. Either a swift-acting automated system will break out of control and destroy humanity, bringing about what nuclear weapons had failed to do, or the world will return to the prewar condition when it made sense fighting for economic interests.

But here is another way: security and confidence coupled with the principle of sensible sufficiency. Sensible sufficiency, national security, and confidence—that is the substance of universal security and universal peace in the nuclear-free era.

Until now, the only means conducive to security was an endless build-up of arms. The two poles here were prevention of aggression, and defeating the enemy. True, attack always presupposed a considerable advantage in armaments. Opponents of approximately equal strength would not start a war unless there was a mountain of antagonistic contradictions, with the aims of either side totally incompatible. To be sure, a vicious circle ensued: to gain military superiority, the countries concerned looked for allies, with the result that the number of belligerents increased and wars became world wars.

Prevention of war depends mainly on the presence of nuclear arms. But this will work only for a start, and must be followed by arms reduction. What will prompt a halt to war preparations is exhaustion of resources on both sides. The ability of one side to exhaust the other through the arms race, thus to put it on its knees, is shrinking because of critical phenomena in the financial sphere. This leads to cutbacks of the capital which, as Marx put it, "the nation throws down the drain" in a non-productive arms race. And the most significant condition for a nuclear-free world is to produce a system of multilateral and bilateral treaties which, even now, are working quite dependably to restrict military activity on both sides.

A big step forward has been made since the time when international treaties were little more than fig leaves covering up preparations for aggression. In the prewar period, the behaviour of the German Nazis and Japanese militarists was considered immoral and perfidious, doing untold damage to the nascent tradition of international law. The world community managed to cope with those two pirate powers and start upon forming a system of agreements securing the world's postwar arrangement. If allied unity had then been preserved, all chances of starting wars would have been eradicated. President Eisenhower recalled that one day, in Berlin, the capital of defeated Germany, Marshal Zhukov said to him that if the Soviet Union and the United States had concerted their peace-keeping efforts, no one on Earth would have dared to start a war.

Regrettably, things went a different way. Still, a war between the two powers did not break out. Even US intelligence was certain the Soviet Union had no intentions of starting an offensive war. The United States did plan a crushing strike, but abandoned the idea in the long run. The two sides did not let matters reach the point of war and agreed — after harrowing reflection and debate — to conclude arms limitation agreements. These agreements are in force. The signatories abide by them within certain limits, though no punishment aside from public condemnation is envisaged for breaching them. Why do they operate? I think the answer to that is more important than the answer to why the arms race has not yet stopped. In the latter case, we have the logic of the old system, and the answer is not surprising at all. What is surprising is that the system of treaties shaped over dozens of years continues to operate, and that no one seeks to violate it.

The democratic structures that function in various countries presuppose a due amount of continuity, and the statesmen's re-

sponsibility to the people. They hold down the egoistic interests of the military-industrial complex and act as a restraint on militarist forces.

This does not go to say that the present system should be idealized. There are still wars here and there, such as the recent bloody war between Iran and Iraq, which claimed as many as a million and a half lives. Arms merchants profit from such conflicts. Yet we have seen that nowadays political solutions of the sharpest conflicts can be effective even where conflicting interests have come into collision. The new system of relations has proved its worth, and, having begun in Europe, should be applied in other regions as well.

If we want to be materialists in politics, if we want to think realistically, we must find the fundamental reason why the postwar system of treaties has functioned more or less effectively. I think it may be traced to the internationalization of various worldwide processes, strengthening the *integrity* and *interdependence* of the world of today.

The old system of international relations reposed on the self-contained economies of separate states. Due to this isolation, countries could break off economic ties and make war on each other. Today, in the case of quite a few countries, this is practically impossible, even regardless of the enormous destructive power of present-day armaments. The interdependence of most of the countries with a high level of production and with interweaving financial institutions that react most sensitively to the slightest change in world affairs, the highly ramified channels of fuel and raw materials supply, and other distinctive features of the world economy—all this has become a more dependable barrier to armed conflicts than the existence of nuclear arms.

When proving the need for the “peaceful cohabitation” of the young Soviet republic with the capitalist states, Lenin wrote that there was “a force more powerful than the wishes, the will and the decisions of any of the governments or classes that are hostile to us. That force are the general economic world relations, which compel them to make contact with [Soviet Russia].”²⁵ Strongly felt in the early part of the 20th century, it is doubly typical of the end of the century.

The integrity and interdependence of the world is continually stronger as society in different countries becomes increasingly internationalized. This is an objective and natural process, which counteracts the increasingly conflicting developments resulting from the backwardness and accumulation of structural contra-

dictions of the Third World. The world needs a mechanism that would, relying on objective economic laws, resolve problems by political means, through agreements. That is the only way, lest life on Earth should perish.

It is therefore essential to revise the politico-military deterrence mechanisms functioning since the war. Partly, we should go back to the system that was planned and entrenched in the UN Charter. This is urgent. Doubly so because the postwar peacekeeping mechanisms were developed when nuclear weapons had not yet come into the world, though war had already demonstrated all its destructive powers. The concept of intimidation and deterrence that made its appearance later, prevented the world arrangement conceived by the Allies to be put into practice. But its value is unquestionable.

Speaking at the 42nd UN General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said the "security system arose out of what had already been achieved in the peaceful coexistence of nations after the war. It grew out of the activity of the UN and the extensive system of treaties that contained the arms race, out of negotiations on the central problems of our time and the codification of human rights, regional security processes, and the nonaligned movement".²⁶

The principles of averting war through special bodies such as the Security Council and UN Armed Forces are down in the UN Charter. Unfortunately, the division that split the United Nations as well as the permanent members of the Security Council, worked strongly against the prestige and peacekeeping capabilities of that international organization. It seems to me, however, that the time has come to make full use of UN influence in settling regional armed conflicts that have been dragging on now for dozens of years. That the situation in the UN has changed for the better is borne out by the unanimous adoption in 1987 of the Security Council Resolution 598 on the Irano-Iraqi war. The Soviet Union has called for another step in the right direction—enlivening the UN Military Staff Committee, giving it the status of Chiefs of General Staffs of the Armed Forces. A return to the provisions of the UN Charter would enhance the role of the international armed forces in overcoming various conflicts fraught with the risk of nuclear war. This would lead to universal peace.

But the main obligation to keep the peace still devolves on the countries themselves. The system of comprehensive security does not abolish the sovereignty of states. Besides, as long as ar-

maments remain, the military element of security will continue to persist.

The process of arms reduction is a phased process. Hence, the factor of arms sufficiency as the basis of security is changeable. Initially, all-embracing security will repose on strategic nuclear parity at a level that is considerably lower than today, established on the principle of sensible sufficiency in the nuclear era. Soviet experts say: "To prevent an unpunished nuclear attack, that is, an attack that would not hold out the threat of retaliation with unacceptable losses for the aggressor, it is enough for the attacked country to retain use of only a few per cent of its strategic arsenal. This paves the way for reduction of nuclear (and other) armaments in large blocks, without fear of prejudicing security."²⁷

The destruction of nuclear weapons casts in a new light the question of sensible sufficiency of conventional arms for defence. "Sufficiency of military potential," writes military expert Lev Semeiko, "is expressed in a definite quantity and quality of arms and troops designed for defence, and also in their structure and location. Arms and troops must show convincingly that they have no aggressive intentions."²⁸

The second element of sensible sufficiency, Soviet experts note, is a sufficient capability to destroy the aggressor if a war does happen to break out. Judging from military publications, this implies a non-nuclear war since, as General of the Army Dmitry Yazov, USSR Minister of Defence, put it, "the facts impose upon us the *new political thinking*, which regards nuclear war unthinkable and unwinnable... A nuclear war, if an aggressor should ever start it, will be global in scale and will entail disastrous consequences not only for the belligerent countries, but for all humankind."²⁹

For this reason, Soviet military experts are aware that a "conventional" world war is theoretically possible at present and also after nuclear weapons are scrapped. But such a war cannot be a means for settling political problems.

A conventional world war, the Soviet Defence Minister concluded, would be fundamentally different from what it was in the past. "If it is started by aggressive imperialist circles," he said, "it will cover most of the continents, oceans and seas, the atmosphere round the Earth, and outer space. The fighting will be in more complex conditions, and will entail losses and destruction many times greater than witnessed during the Second World War. Because many contemporary systems of conventional,

high-accuracy weapons have approached low-power nuclear weapons in efficiency."³⁰

The concept of sensible sufficiency does not stand for complete unilateral elimination of means for repulsing and destroying the aggressor. It seems to me that if the sides come to terms on how to interpret the principle of sensible sufficiency and limits of defence, they would both be able to lower the thresholds for destroying the potential aggressor, for the latter would have much less power and resources than an offensive would require. In any case, the way to sensible sufficiency will be paved by mutual agreements lowering the threshold of sufficiency.

On the other hand, sensible sufficiency as conceived by the Soviets calls for a number of unilateral disarmament measures owing to the asymmetry of Soviet and American armaments. Soviet experts stress that asymmetrical riposte to a provocative action of the other side will play an important part in carrying forward the principle of sensible sufficiency. *"To all appearances,"* they say, *"sensible sufficiency must provide for a flexible combination of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures of arms limitation."*³¹

The concept of sensible sufficiency increases the need for complete confidence between states that have adopted it as the basis of their military policy. Confrontation policy allowed for the most fantastic conjectures concerning the adversary's intentions. Given the system of comprehensive security, this attitude is intolerable, because it destroys the very foundation of security based on mutual confidence. Firm knowledge of the other country's intentions, predictable policies, stable guidelines in foreign policy, and full information about the armed forces, armaments and structure of the other side—all this makes for true confidence and, consequently, for the complete security of states.

A number of measures has already been taken to build military confidence. Among them is the Stockholm resolution on the non-use of force or threat of force, backed by a set of confidence-building and military security measures. The Stockholm document contains the first ever understanding on on-site inspections by request of the interested side. This is a most important step. It paves the way for international verification of military activity.

Other confidence-building steps were taken after the Stockholm agreement was signed. Visits to nuclear testing grounds and chemical projects in the Soviet Union and the United States,

and an agreement of inspection if suspicion arises during the destruction of intermediate-range missiles in Europe—all this raises verification to a new, higher level, and accordingly, enhances the level of confidence between states.

The process has made significant headway thanks to the changed attitude of the Soviet leadership. Analyzing Khrushchev's 1959 plan of general and complete disarmament, writers N. Yefimov and S. Kondrashov say it was impracticable because, among other things, "it did not provide for any far-reaching system of control. In those days control and inspection were identified with espionage. Khrushchev did not mince words in expressing his attitude. For example, he said, 'Don't stick your nose into someone else's bedroom if the door is locked'."³²

It took the long road of trial and error for the respective countries to agree to curtailing their sovereignty and allowing inspectors to verify compliance with concluded agreements.

In a more general sense, confidence, as defined in the Warsaw Treaty document on military doctrine, is furthered through comparison of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO military doctrines, analysis of their character, study of their prospective evolution; elimination of arms and armed forces imbalances, and their reduction to lower levels; the establishment of nuclear-free and chemical weapons-free zones, zones of moderated arms concentration and heightened confidence; dismantlement of military bases in foreign territory; their removal to within national frontiers; mutual withdrawal from the engagement zones of the two military alliances of the more dangerous offensive weapons, reduction of armed forces and armaments to a minimum agreed level, and, lastly, the dissolution of both blocs.³³

Negotiators of the two blocs are discussing Warsaw Treaty proposals. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization have updated their military doctrine to fit the nuclear confrontation of today. In effect, it is a doctrine for preventing war, because its basic provisions make for defensive military activity and solemnly pledge promotion of peaceful political solutions. If NATO also updates its military doctrine, peace in Europe would become much more secure, and the prospect of universal peace would be more real.

The old system of international relations, the result of the social antagonisms that prevail in exploiter societies, was marked by monstrous hypocrisy, narrow-mindedness and absence of humanity. When one thing was said in public while the very opposite was plotted in secret, the natural result was lack of trust.

Only a very naive person would speak of confidence in those circumstances. Everything depended on the balance of power. If there was not enough power to halt the hand of the aggressor, nothing could prevent war, not the loftiest speeches.

The interdependence of the world today calls for a humanization of international relations. So far, the balance of power has made it possible to safeguard peace. But power may itself go out of control. Besides, the security of one side can no longer be assured by peril to the other, for there can be no winner. What the socialist countries suggest is a model of world security based not on balance of power but on balance of interests.

The rift between political and moral values in relations between states must be overcome. "If we look at world affairs from the human angle," Gorbachev has stressed, "nothing is more urgent than humanizing politics. Nuclear disarmament is, in substance, also a question of humanism or, more precisely, above all a question of humanism. This calls for new approaches in international affairs. For ages, politics has been a sort of reservation for the powerful. Today, it is still largely the domain of governments and statesmen. But no longer of governments and statesmen alone. The leading social tendency is towards democratization, which is asserting itself ever more loudly and convincingly in international political affairs."³⁴

Democratization and humanization are paving the way for glasnost in matters of security. Many formerly closed zones, the prerogative of military experts and politicians, are being opened up to the public. Better informed about the more topical issues of the world today, cognizant of all the aspects of international struggle and cooperation, the public will be a salubrious influence on those who make the decisions. That influence is bound to close the gap between words and deeds. Until recently, for example, the world public was deliberately led astray as to the true Soviet military budget. For some reason, this was considered the best way of protecting state interests. But with reduction of military expenditure being a key confidence-building measure based on the principle of sensible sufficiency, speculation over the Soviet defence budget certainly did not further success in the negotiations. Eager to produce new stimuli for confidence-building, the Soviet Government has revealed the structure of its military expenditures.³⁵

But, I feel, the main confidence-building factor laying the groundwork for comprehensive security is the ongoing change in the socialist countries through perestroika.

The Soviet Union and its allies have broken the vicious circle in foreign policy. They have demonstrated the effects of democratization and glasnost in practice. With the humanization of international affairs, the spirit of perestroika can do much more for confidence than the many proposals at international negotiations. Already now, with perestroika still in the initial stage, its influence on public opinion is so great that conservatives are compelled to reckon with it. Yefimov and Kondrashov have examined the difference between detente of the 70s and the current perestroika. If we look more closely and more critically at the recent past, they write, detente was not only a vitally important aim for us, but also an essential tranquillizer which made for a better mood in a society that was increasingly afflicted by stagnation: "Detente was an attempt at improving matters on the international scene. But it will be more right to look at the other side. History, the people, the future of socialism, cried out for change inside the country. We had to begin at home. Only by changing for the better as individuals and as a state could we win respect and confidence, and change our relations with other people and other states. The road of self-improvement is the road that leads to other people and other states."³⁶

The impact that Soviet perestroika made on world affairs is very strongly felt. Nuclear disarmament has gone off to a start. Humankind has moved a step away from the abyss. But there are still many obstacles on the road to universal security. The existence of a powerful military-industrial complex is one of the obstacles. They keep blocking peace initiatives and fanning suspicion and distrust. Building security and confidence is a reciprocal undertaking. Small wonder voices resound in the West calling for perestroika in the United States as well. It is another matter that the Soviet leadership appreciates the difficulties facing Western industrialists and politicians bogged down in military production. The new thinking presupposes new initiatives linked with the interests of the other side. Breaking the vicious circle of distrust is something both sides must do together.

4. Development Through Disarmament

Speaking at an international forum, "For a Nuclear-Free World and Survival", General Secretary Gorbachev recalled that US President Reagan had said to him in Geneva the United States and the Soviet Union would surely join hands if they had to repulse an

invasion from extraterrestrials. "I will not dispute this hypothesis," Gorbachev said, "though worrying about it is probably premature. It is far more important to deal with the troubles that have already come to our common house. We must be aware of the imperative of removing the nuclear danger. We must recognize that there is no umbrella either on Earth or in outer space that can protect us if a nuclear storm should break out."³⁷

The Soviet Union is quite prepared to renounce its status of nuclear power, to reduce its conventional armaments substantially, to buttress confidence. Is the United States and its allies also prepared? Whether or not an all-embracing security system is possible depends on the answer.

Marxists have always proceeded from a sober enough appreciation of the nature of capitalism. They have no illusions about the true nature of the arms race. But times are changing. The international situation has changed greatly. Transformations have begun. Is it not time, therefore, to alter theory?

The report on the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution raised three sharp theoretical questions concerning present-day imperialism.

The first question concerned the nature of imperialism. Imperialism is the chief military menace. But is it possible to block its more dangerous effects? The second is related to the first: can capitalism rid itself of militarism, can it function and develop economically without militarism? And the third: can the capitalist system get along without neocolonialism, one of its present vital sources of supply? In other words, can the capitalist system function in the absence of non-equivalent exchange with the Third World?³⁸

Replying to these questions today in the light of available experience, Marxists are on the whole optimistic. A chance has appeared to concert the action of nations and block off negative tendencies in international relations. True, imperialism cannot change its spots. But its manifestations can be directed along desired channels if the factors meeting the interests of those involved in military production are promptly satisfied.

The new approach to monopoly concerns involved in the system of military production would not have been possible before, when the world had not yet known so great a number of explosive problems, one of them being the critical development of the postwar financial mechanism based on non-equivalent exchange and exploitation of developing by industrially advanced countries. "The substance of the matter," says a Soviet Government

statement of 1976, "is that current international economic relations, which were shaped when world forces were differently aligned and which worked exclusively in the egoistic interests of imperialist monopolies, have come into collision with the vital interests of most countries and with the general international situation."³⁹

Since then, one more factor has emerged: the link between increasing military expenditures and the growing gap between the economic levels of developed and developing countries. Special mention of this was made in the Political Report of the CCCPSU to the 27th Congress of the CPSU, drawing a parallel between the trillion-dollar debt of the developing countries and the more than trillion-dollar accretion in recent US military expenditures.⁴⁰ But, in a way, this is a negative connection. Could it be reversed?

The biggest world-wide problem is the pile-up of problems in the relationship between North and South. The rulers in the capitalist countries are increasingly aware of this. No longer can they turn their backs on the growing lag of the Third World behind the advanced states. The disastrous consequences for the world and civilization are much too obvious. People in the West are debating ways and means of remedying the situation. In general terms, their proposals are centred on setting up a new economic world order with an internationally controlled fair redistribution of incomes from the sale of fuel, raw materials, energy and manufactured goods.

This will necessitate a massive injection of capital to update economic structures and secure an at least minimal social infrastructure for a more or less human existence in the Third World countries.

Enormous funds will be required to resolve these global problems. Yet in physical terms, these funds are but an insignificant portion of what is now spent for military needs. A reduction of military expenditures would enable countries to set aside funds for the furtherance of human progress.

All arms reduction is fiercely resisted by those who have a stake in armaments. "Arms production is so profitable," Soviet expert Nikolai Karpukhin observes, "that even the slightest hint of an agreement on scaling down the arms race causes psychological shock among military magnates."⁴¹

The signing of the INF Treaty caused a storm of protest by the militarist lobby in Western countries. That sort of reaction should, of course, be taken into account by all those who want disarmament.

There is indeed nothing in the world today more profitable to produce than arms. Not because of the nature of arms, but owing to the artificially created conditions. But why not provide the same conditions to producers in other fields?

The US military-industrial complex emerged after the Second World War to meet a number of interconnected but also conflicting needs. It built up arms production, on the one hand, and created an enclave isolated from the rest of the country's spontaneous economy, on the other. As a result, a group of monopoly corporations merged with the country's political machine, which assured guaranteed high profits to a handful of firms, a minority of the capitalist class of America, at the expense of the taxpayers. Though more than 120,000 enterprises of all sorts are involved in filling Pentagon orders, the core of the military-industrial complex consists of some 10,000 enterprises.⁴² According to some official figures, however, the lion's share of the orders (37.8 per cent in 1984) goes to the twelve leading contractors, with another 40 to 50 per cent to thirty companies. And if we consider that, as a rule, these companies are also the Pentagon's chief research and development contractors this narrows the circle still more.⁴³

The relationship within the group of privileged companies has nothing in common with the free capitalist market, spontaneous in motion and subject to crises (even despite the high degree of monopolization in the civilian industries and agriculture). Within the military-industrial complex you have a near-socialism, with government orders guaranteeing profits dozens of years ahead. But like any system directed to obtaining ceaseless maximum profits, the complex must function unintermittently, on a continuously widening, extensive scale.

Experts predict that in the nineties the military-industrial complex will pass the peak of the already adopted programmes whereupon profits will begin to decline. The Strategic Defence Initiative is designed to increase Pentagon expenditure, making up for the declining profits from nuclear programmes. That is why arms manufacturers are resisting the idea of dropping SDI. They are aware that if nuclear weapons are done away with, the structure of the military-industrial complex will be undermined and much of their profits will go by the board. More, the system of military orders itself may cease to function in face of the mounting anti-war sentiment.

What attracts firms to the military-industrial complex are the stable government orders, the incomparably higher profits than in other fields, the favourable credit terms, and access to the latest

technology. Since regulation is, in fact, purely administrative, it is natural that the military-industrial complex is eager to control the key posts in the government. The association with power means favourable opportunities in the competitive struggle.

Certainly, it would be naive to hope that the nature of the military-industrial complex could be changed by cutting off the drive for maximum profits. It was believed until recently that the only way to bridle the military-industrial complex was revolutionary struggle, overthrowing the capitalist system whose ugly offspring it was. But the outlook for capitalism's downfall, for anti-monopoly democracy, seems to be drifting farther and farther away into the future. In the coming decades, we shall evidently have to coexist with imperialism and, therefore, come to terms with it. Yes, in the new circumstances we must work together if we want to survive. This means new ways must be found to cope with the piling up problems.

At the end of the 1960s a discussion took place in the Soviet Union concerning cooperation with the capitalist countries. Some politicians and generals held that we should make the most of the popular pressure on imperialist governments. It was an illusion, they said, to hope to reach agreements by negotiation. Others, who finally took the upper hand, held that equal negotiations were the only way to safeguard peace. They took note, of course, that the popular movement against the Vietnam war and economic difficulties would prompt the adversary to come to the negotiation table.

In the latter half of the 1980s, the situation changed. Now we have some positive experience of negotiation and know what we can expect of our partners. But as before, we must consider the interests of the other side which consists of politicians greatly dependent on the military-industrial complex.

If the peace forces had time to wait, there would probably be no need to make extreme concessions. But time is running out. Peace will most probably have to be ransomed.

The idea is not novel. Reflecting on the passage to socialism, Marx and Engels did not rule out paying a ransom for starting to build socialism. "We do not consider compensation unacceptable in some circumstances," Engels wrote. "Marx has said to me—and often—that it would be cheapest to buy our way forward."⁴⁴ Lenin, too, backed this idea provided it would "compel the capitalists to submit peacefully and to come over to socialism in a cultured and organized fashion, provided they were paid well."⁴⁵

This was applied to *socialism*. Today, the issue is different: humanity has one big common task—survival. All concerned must come to terms on mutually beneficial conditions.

How can peace be ransomed? It is hard to say in what concrete way military expenditure will be channelled to civilian industries. But the general outlines are coming to sight.

If the conversion will not occur as the result of a total anti-militarist victory but by agreement, big concessions will have to be made to firms that have invested heavily in military production for them to cut back or at least keep military expenditures within the limits of sensible sufficiency. What the firms will want is an approximately equal level of profitability and stable orders, on the one hand, and orders that would make for the maximum research and development, on the other. It will be hardly possible to simply transfer investments into civilian industries, because two of the demands the military-industrial complex is sure to make cannot be carried out by government regulation with subsidies and artificially provided profits. To be sure, the lag in social facilities in the advanced capitalist as well as the socialist countries is so obvious that much of the released funds will have to be channelled there even without special agreements or mechanisms.

But the problem will have to be solved on an international plane. The mechanism of subsidies and stable government orders is nothing unusual or criminal. It is extensively used in the socialist countries to finance vital projects. The military-industrial complex is dangerous because it produces destructive types of weapons, and not because of how it is financed. The subsidy mechanism applied to arms manufacturers could be used as part of the now emerging new economic world order, notably to help developing countries.

The extent of their backwardness is an indication of how much will have to be invested in the developing countries—something like a trillion dollars, with the schedule stretching over dozens of years. The scale and vital necessity of what has to be done, the stability of the aid programmes—all this is paving the way for an international system based on cooperation among all the advanced countries.

Once these programmes are launched, a gigantic solvent demand will arise, a market that will fit the size of present-day production worldwide. It is only natural that no single country or group of countries belonging to the same system can cope with such programmes. No one will gain unilateral advantages. Still, international control will be necessary to run such projects, with

the sovereign rights of individual countries being partially transferred to an international body.

As Gorbachev pointed out in his article, "The Realities and the Guarantees of Security", it is not necessary to set up any separate system outside the United Nations. It was to relieve the new economic world order of dependence on separate governments that the Soviet Union suggested founding an international fund, Disarmament for Development, which would be open to all states. Part of the money saved by countries through disarmament and reduction of military expenditures would go into this fund, which could be set up within the UN framework by an international agreement that would govern its activity and the distribution of its resources. These resources would accumulate in the fund either in material form at international prices or as cash contributions, including contributions in national currencies. Each contributing country would pick the most convenient form for its contribution.

The funds could be turned over directly to the developing countries or channelled through the UN system to UNICEF, UNEP, and other specialized UN bodies to finance development programmes at national, subregional or regional level.⁴⁶

If such a fund is founded in one form or another, the principles governing its activity would be hammered out in ideological and diplomatic struggle. But it is already clear that its system of subsidies for priority needs will make it profitable for firms now active in military production to take part in it. It will not be necessary then to persuade those who cannot today conceive a world without arms to do something useful for the sake of survival and not produce arms for the sake of destruction.

Conversion to civilian production is not simple. It will also extend to the socialist countries. And those who are promoting the new political thinking in the Soviet Union must examine the reasons for the arms race there, pinpoint the basic positions of those who are for and those who are against, and determine the outlook for disarmament and its consequences for economic and social progress.

It has not been easy to line up the priorities in Soviet foreign policy. At each turning point, discussions broke out between the advocates and the opponents of new approaches to the West. To predict the further course of events, therefore, we should find out why conservative views exist at all concerning war and peace, and why there is resistance to innovations. Partly, we can find the answer in Gorbachev's book, *Perestroika and the New Think-*

ing, where, as Chairman of the USSR Defence Council, he notes the existence throughout the postrevolution period of a Western threat of attack, which, indeed, was carried into effect during the Civil War and World War II. "Neither can we forget that the American military establishment and the National Security Council had planned an atomic attack on the Soviet Union," Gorbachev writes. "We ask ourselves why the West was the first to set up NATO and why it was always the first to develop new weapon systems?... I say again, put yourselves in our place and see how you would react?"⁴⁷

Suspicion was generated by long dealings with the neighbours of Russia, which was at different times subjected to devastating invasions, especially from the West. The psychological effect of this was naturally also felt after the war. People who called for caution in evaluating the true intentions of the United States and its allies, fell back on examples from history.

But it will be only fair to name the other reasons for the massive deployment of armaments in the Soviet Union. And there were other reasons, however more conspicuous the role of psychological inertia may have been.

The system of administrative fiat that took shape in the Soviet Union in the early thirties, gave rise to a peculiar phenomenon: a merging of the interests of ideologists and technocrats. The ideological tradition that came down from the revolutionary years generated a striving to secure such aims as the building of communism in the Soviet Union and a socialist revolution worldwide in the shortest possible period of history. Yet as the world revolution slowed down, the Communist Party leadership, with Stalin at its head, was compelled to focus attention on the regularities of the internal struggle in the hostile capitalist camp. The drive to remodel society on socialist lines, coupled with wholesale repressions, gave impulse to the ideological postulate that heavy industry must hold priority as the foundation of socialist society, with the consumer industries, the social sphere, a poor second. All later attempts to reshuffle the priorities had no success. Emphasis on gross output in industry, the cost-intensive financing of expensive projects, and the growth of departmentalism—all these indissoluble aspects of the system of administrative fiat—caused stagnation in the Soviet economy in the seventies and eighties, and naturally affected the defence industries.

I might venture to say that the parallel courses on which the Soviet Union and the United States built up their armaments in the seventies were determined by the emphasis on gross output

in the Soviet Union's military industry. Any increase in oil and gas output, in the output of cement and steel regardless of demand, quality, and range of products, was considered an increase in the country's economic power. So was an increase in the number of missiles considered an increase in military strength. The resistance that military theorists put up to new approaches in strategy was largely due to their departmental approach, which can be no less destructive in the socialist environment than private interests are in the capitalist. Take the tense public struggle against the project of reversing the current of some of the northern and Siberian rivers. Yet, clearly, the military establishment had stronger positions than the river people. Besides, it was harder to combat departmentalism in vitally important matters if a veil of strict secrecy was thrown over them.

The situation was also complicated by the fact that ideologists often came to the aid of the military, backing various military measures with references to Marxist-Leninist theory. Scholasticism and dogmatism fitted in with the departmental technocratic approach. Even today when the new political thinking has been officially proclaimed by the Communist Party leadership, not all ideologists are capable of espousing new approaches, and continue to repeat old dogmas.

Opponents of new approaches in foreign policy resist anything that affects the interests of the military establishment. A most typical example was the resistance to the reduction of the armed forces in the early sixties. The reduction was not carried out in full partly because of the tension on the world scene and partly because of the resistance of those who were being reduced. That is why we should not think that conversion to civilian industries in the Soviet Union will be an easy matter.

But, to be fair, with convincing experience in the past to fall back on, we can safely say that there is no influential force in the Soviet Union that could reverse the trend towards disarmament. The anti-military citizen movement is strong enough to cope with all attempts at taking the country back to its former position. The opponents of disarmament will be sure to give ground.

Absence of a powerful military-industrial complex with a vital stake in making arms and controlling society, is witnessing a gradual reorientation of defence industries to producing consumer goods.

The conversion problem was raised at the 26th Congress of the CPSU in 1981, albeit on a limited scale. It is under way now on a far larger scale. There are cases when ministries working

for defence have, on their own initiative, gone over to producing consumer goods. And the powerful shipbuilding ministry has gone to the length of taking the Moscow Zoo under its care: it will be totally reconstructed, and improved to meet the highest world standards, and all this at practically no cost to itself. Since the personnel at defence factories is highly competent, the consumer goods, notably domestic appliances, they produce, are of a very high quality and in great demand. This alone shows that if appropriate international agreements are concluded on a reciprocal basis, the Soviet Union will have no special problems converting to civilian production.

One of the demands of the military-industrial complex is that if military production is scrapped, it should be replaced by projects involving the highest level of technology. That is how its apologists justify SDI. The Disarmament for Development fund, as conceived by the Soviet Union, would provide for a global programme of scientific and technological cooperation, for an international peaceful cooperation mechanism in outer space, and for programmes combating diseases requiring an exceedingly high technological level and creating a demand for intensive scientific activity.

A promising project is a joint flight to Mars. It is realistic and practicable, but entails funds that no single government could possibly raise. In an interview to *Pravda*, US scientist Carl Sagan, one of the authors of the "nuclear winter" concept, said such a joint flight was the most promising programme of Soviet-American cooperation. He said people on Earth would watch the spaceship on television. The life of the US astronauts would hang on the competence of their Soviet colleagues, and vice versa, as a mirror reflection of the situation on Earth, where people were alive because no one in Washington and Moscow had committed a fatal mistake.⁴⁸

In sum, there is enough of interest for monopoly firms engaged in military production. True, it would be a compromise for the survival of civilization. And the road to compromise is not simple. It will take massive popular movements to overcome the obstacles, movements strong enough to force the ruling circles in the capitalist states to give ground.

The fact that the United States refused to participate in the Disarmament for Development Conference in 1987 shows the US Administration's attitude. But public pressure is increasing. The new Soviet initiatives are clear and comprehensible from the point of view of common sense and morality. They entail no

one-sided concessions, and are based on the priority of the general and global, as contrary to private, class or other egoistic interests. This makes them appealing to all.

The upgrading of nuclear armaments in the postwar period did not achieve its aims. Socialism has not been consigned to the garbage heap. Capitalism, too, has not collapsed. No great power has gained world supremacy. But the price paid by the nations has been very high. Take US military expenditures. US economist E. Denison estimated that in the first 33 postwar years the US economy failed to produce some four trillion dollars' worth of commodities owing to militarization, while the growth rate of the gross national product was 20 per cent lower than it could have been in the absence of military expenditures.⁴⁹ Mind you, this estimate was made before the Reagan Administration's truly astronomical military programmes which added another more than two trillion dollars to the outlay! And if the arms race is not stopped at once, another fifteen trillion dollars will go down the drain in the next 15 years. It is high time these senseless outlays were stopped. For more than 40 years, the United States and the Soviet Union, along with the other nuclear powers, have been denying themselves various necessities in order to stockpile nuclear weapons. Yet the effort turned out to be senseless. It would be a crime against common sense to continue along these lines. Politicians must realize there is no alternative to disarmament if they want to retain the trust of their people.

Two prominent Soviet journalists, Valentin Falin and Alexander Bovin, discussed the problem of survival in the popular Soviet newspaper, *Moscow News*. They also discussed the problem of safeguarding peace in the presence of imperialism. "Imperialism as a system," Falin said, "is not foreign to the instinct of self-preservation. We have seen it pick the lesser of two evils. Today, war is an incomparably greater evil for the West. Hence the political alternative to any military solution of international conflicts."

Alexander Bovin amplified: "I think there are two different instincts. First, the instinct of social self-preservation. It rules out war between imperialist states. In face of the socialist world, inter-imperialist contradictions are kept down. Second, there is the instinct of physical self-preservation. It has distinctly reduced the chances of a deliberate nuclear war against socialism. For the side that begins first is also sure to die..."⁵⁰

It seems to me that both Falin and Bovin are right to pin their hopes on the capitalist world's instinct of self-preservation — both political and physical. But humankind must not be a hostage to the instincts of a handful of politicians. It requires more

dependable guarantees of security. A system of universal security backed up by mechanisms ensuring humanity's further development would make these guarantees safer. And I hope and believe that humanity will pick them. The roads to security can be different. And everyone is free to pick his own road. Only one road must be avoided — the one leading to perdition.

It is not enough to simply disarm, however, and ensure the survival of civilization. Humanity cannot stop developing. That is clear. Disarmament is only one condition for further progress.

So long as we live in a nuclear world, the responsibility that devolves upon us compels us to think of the roads humanity will take. I have produced a most general outline of the new world order. It is very likely that other ideas will appear. The main thing is to stay on the path to survival and humanity's further progress.

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IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: THE OUTLOOK FOR PROGRESS

Speaking of how socialist revolution would progress in Russia, Lenin said that "coercion is effective against those who want to restore their rule. But there the significance of force ends, and after that only influence and example are effective. We must show the significance of communism in practice, by example."¹ For ages, coercion had figured in international relations in its direct and crudest sense—as main force. War was the surest, though definitely risky, way of settling problems. But now humankind has come to a frontier where war would mean *omnicide*.

Hence, we must look for new ways. The search for survival is a common undertaking. But someone has to be first. By force of its example, socialism has already influenced a goodly portion of humankind. But insufficiently so. The second revolution that is now under way, called *perestroika*, will bring the advantages of socialism to bear on a far greater scale. The force of example in domestic affairs will go up. But in this integral and interdependent world we cannot confine ourselves to merely clearing away the effects of the preceding years of stagnation.

There was more than enough evidence of stagnation on the international scene as well. Old approaches were no longer acceptable. Now, ideas worked out in the nuclear age should help fashion a just and non-violent world. This is the next step in the mainstream of human thought. For ages, the best minds had reflected on the ways of achieving universal peace. Now the outlines of such a peace have come into sight. And it is only right that socialism, brought into the world by a war-weary nation on a wave of anti-war sentiment, has become the chief catalyst on the road to eternal peace. Is this not a guideline for the future? A stimulant for new proposals breaking down the barrier of outdated traditions and prejudices?

But moulding a new ethic is not something socialism can do on its own. In the fight for universal peace, for banishing wars

for good from international affairs, socialism needs the backing of all those who want to survive. There can be no other safeguard of peace.

Gone are the days when the Communists dreamed of a world conflagration that would consume all capitalists. A conflagration today would consume everybody. Export of revolution has been condemned. The new goals require new approaches. We are offering them. And we are ready to accept anything offered by others. The main thing is to move away from what we are so eager to avoid. And it is high time to give up fears that someone wants to "bury" someone. The Communists are farthest from the thought.

If we have any thoughts of a world revolution, as Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said, they are most intimately related to the country's revolutionary perestroika. We make no secret of it. We want all humankind to be organized on the basis of peace as the supreme value of being, of human life, of freedom and dignity—as the measure of everything, and thus on the basis of peaceful coexistence as the universal principle of international relations.²

A "world revolution" of that sort is sure to win support everywhere. At least I hope so, for if I had no such hope I would not have tackled this book.

Someone may be disappointed over finding no ready prescriptions here for building a non-violent world. But the movement has only just begun, and predicting what forms it will take is a waste of time. Here we must probably take the cue from young Marx who said that "while constructing the future and settling everything for all time is not our affair, it is all the more obvious what we have to accomplish at present."³

References

¹V.I. Lenin, "Speech Delivered at a Meeting of Activists of the Moscow Organization of the RCP(B), December 6, 1920", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 457.

²See Eduard Shevardnadze, *Speech at the 42nd UN General Assembly on September 24, 1987*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1987, p. 6 (in Russian).

³Karl Marx, "Letters from the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*", in Marx, Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 142.

The Philosophy of Survival

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Vladimir Ivanov (b. 1957), researcher of the Moscow Institute of Philosophy, a division of the USSR Academy of Sciences, is a leading specialist in the philosophy of history and politics, and has devoted himself to the evolution of the new thinking.

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